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preface
I wrote this book to shed light on an under-explored part of Europeanization. To 
some, the idea of domestic defence policy becoming Europeanized is both abhorrent 
and an anathema. The challenge of this book has been to capture the diverse range 
of institutions, actors, and processes involved in the Europeanization of defence and 
similarly, to show how the pace of Europeanization changes from issue to issue. 
one of the surprising elements of this research has been the extent to which 
different processes and actors feature in formal treaty amending integration and 
informal day-to-day Europeanization of defence. Both this formal and informal 
Europeanization is having a transformatory effect on national governments and the 
way they conduct their defence policies.  
formal integration is causing national governments to reform their bureaucracies, 
armed forces and security policy. informal integration – particularly through the 
transformation of the arms trade – is removing agency from national governments 
and placing it in the hands of committees attached to the European commission, 
including the European Defence agency. thus far, these committees have produced 
policies that are broadly in line with British government preferences. the potential 
remains, however, for these agencies to create an internationalized arms trade, 
removed from the control or influence of national governments. 
One of the fascinating elements for me, writing this book, has been to interview 
current and former officials and politicians and to try to unravel the wiring of 
domestic policy formulation, and understand something of bureaucratic culture 
in the uK and Eu more widely. it is my hope that i have conveyed some of this 
thinking and analysis in a way that attracts further research from others on this and 
related topics. 
robert Dover, november 2006 
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introduction
the Europeanization of defence is an undernourished element of the relatively 
new field of Europeanization studies. The majority of the extant Europeanization 
literature covers the extent to which membership of the European union affects 
the policies produced by member states, and similarly the way that states configure 
their bureaucracies in responding to Eu policy initiatives. as a result the underlying 
assumption of Europeanization is that this phenomenon is top-down. pressure 
is exerted from Eu institutions, European law or by expectations on national 
governments to engage in Eu issues means that member states are compelled to 
alter their policies to reflect and deliver a ‘Europeanized’ agenda.  
This book shows these assumptions to be incorrect. The Europeanization of 
British defence policy (1997-2005) demonstrates that these presumptions can be 
reversed with member governments uploading their preferences into the Eu and 
effectively locking the other Members into their ‘uploaded’ preferences. Uploading 
domestic preferences provides full weight to Alan Milward’s thesis of the ‘The 
European Rescue of the Nation-State’ in which he argued that in placing national 
policy competencies at the European level national governments saw a multiplication 
of their influence as a result (Milward 1999). Furthermore this book highlights 
the inconsistencies between what this study describes as ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
Europeanization. formal Europeanization occurs at intergovernmental conferences 
(iGc), through the creation or amendment of treaties or through presidency 
conclusions. informal Europeanization is that which occurs outside of iGcs, but 
that has a transformatory affect on the political or bureaucratic behaviour of national 
governments or supranational institutions. so, for example, whilst the EsDp was 
negotiated as a discreet item of formal Europeanization separate from other nice 
IGC business, the deepening integration of defence has been intimately linked to 
disagreements over the war in iraq and the reform of the common agricultural 
policy (see chapter 6). 
Most accounts of Europeanization emphasize the link between the national 
and supranational levels, on a governmental basis. chapter 7, which deals with the 
Europeanization of the arms trade demonstrates that the influence of big business can 
steer both national and European policy away from stated strategic objectives and 
opens up new sites of Europeanization for further research, as well as demonstrating 
the ways in hich entrepreneurial policy actors can go outside of conventional 
Europeanization routes. This book therefore provides a multi-dimensional analysis 
of the Europeanization phenomena and a detailed explanation of the developments 
in Britain’s European defence policy. 
There is very little published analysis of the UK government’s role in the 
development of the EsDp (Dover 2005). the analysis that does exist has concentrated 
on the implications for transatlantic relations, the prospects for a so-called ‘Euro-
Army’ and the possible economic impact from a common defence policy. The 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy2
missing element within the literature is a study of the diplomacy and statecraft 
involved in developing the policy domestically within the MoD, fco and cabinet 
Office, bilaterally (between the UK and French governments) and at the Nice 
intergovernmental conference (December 2000). this empirically driven research 
looks further at the bilateral and often personal interactions between entrepreneurial 
officials and the extensive ‘back channel’ communications between the foreign and 
defence ministries of the respective member states. it then builds an analysis of 
how these interactions culminate in a Europeanized defence policy and the extent to 
which there is cohesion, at the European level, for these policies. 
This book centres on activities in the defence sphere between 1998 and 2005. 
the crucial moments in the development of a Europeanized British defence policy 
occurred between 1998 and 2000 and the early stages of this book are given over 
to a detailed exploration of the internal uK government and external negotiations 
between January 1998, and the Nice Intergovernmental Conference in December 
2000.  it pays close attention to the circumstances surrounding the development 
of the saint Malo policy particularly as the announcement in December 1998 was 
contrary to published labour party policy prior to and directly after the 1997 General 
Election. Moreover, the saint Malo initiative was also counter to the provisions of the 
amsterdam treaty signed by tony Blair. the policy initiative (emanating from the 
uK civil service) can therefore be seen in terms of it being a shift in uK government 
policy. this research provides an account of how such a shift emerged; and with 
it provides an important explanation of the politics of the core executive. More 
particularly it highlights the ‘Napoleonic’ style of Tony Blair’s premiership. This 
book demonstrates how Blair, in this policy sphere, added overwhelming political 
motivation and mobilization to the policy shift (performing a role of seeking win-sets 
and support from key stake-holding groups within Whitehall) for a policy initiated 
by an entrepreneurial group of policy officials in the UK MoD. 
The later sections of the book explore the challenges posed to the Europeanization 
of defence by the 2003 iraq war, and particularly how this manifested itself during 
the 2005 presidency of the Eu which was held by the British government. this 
chapter shows the problem of incohesion in an intergovernmental political system 
and the linkages between diverse issues areas are brought out starkly within this case 
study. 
The final section examines the Europeanization of the arms trade and in doing 
so argues that this element of defence policy represents the fast and slow track of 
Europeanization. the British government is wedded to an isolationist model of the 
trade that focuses on the success of national industries and the export of materials 
while the manuf cturers themselves pursue internationalization and the commission 
aggressively pursues the Europeanization of the trade. this example also highlights 
the potential for producer groups to gain overwhelming influence over policy 
formulation at the national and supranational levels.  
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Introduction 3
A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach 
this research approaches Europeanization from a liberal intergovernmentalist (li) 
perspective. It utilizes the work of Andrew Moravcsik to provide the framework 
around which explanations for why the British government sought to Europeanize 
their defence policy – something that most commentators would have judged 
unthinkable given the transatlanticist preferences of the British government since 
1945. Moravcsik claims, through LI, to offer an explanation of European integration 
from the formulation of domestic policies, the creation of national negotiating 
positions, the government’s conduct during negotiations and the motivations for 
transferring sovereignty to the EU (Moravcsik 1993, 1995, 1997, 1998; Moravcsik 
and Nicolaidis 1998). This research calls on this body of work to show the way in 
which Europeanization has occurred in the defence sphere. 
LI’s explanation of domestic politics rests on a dual concept of policies 
and preferences. In accounting for the British government’s development of a 
Europeanized defence policy these concepts, particularly the impact that preferences 
have on government policy will be closely examined, and it will be argued here that 
the British government’s preference for transatlantic defence solutions have not been 
breached by the policies of the previous seven years. indeed, in adopting innovative 
‘Europeanized’ policies the British government h s been able to secure a preservation 
of the pre-eminence of the nation state in European security and defence issues and 
the continued dominance of the NATO Alliance in Europe. Within ‘preferences’ are 
stable government policy paradigms that inform policies made in that issue area and 
a description of how government policies are formulated (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 
1998, 63). according to this conception government policies are created by pressure 
from issue-specific domestic producer groups who exert their preferences on the 
government. having received this domestic producer group pressure, the government 
aggregates the various policy preferences into a government policy. li also argues 
that positive and negative externalities impact on the formulation of government 
policy. A policy has ‘external effects’ when it has substantial positive or negative 
impacts, on people outside the territorial boundaries of the political system of the 
actor or actors pursuing th  policy. LI argues that these effects are taken into account 
by policy makers during the policy formulation process (Moravcsik 1998). These 
assumptions receive critical attention in chapter 2 and chapter 7, particularly where 
policy formulation lineage is traced. 
an intergovernmentalist approach also places governments as the principle 
units of analysis in Europeanization and particularly those in which developments 
are codified through negotiations. Further, that governments’ have issue-specific 
competencies and strengths to dominate particular international bargains. issue 
specific capabilities, finance, historical experience and institutional affiliations all 
contribute to a government becoming an influential actor in any particular set of 
negotiations. following on from this rationale, the negotiated outcomes between 
governments are the result of a convergence of governmental interests and occur 
when an internationalized policy has more benefits for a government than a unilateral 
solution. it is from these assumptions that the evidence of the anglo-french summit at 
saint Malo (4-5 December 1998), the pre-nice iGc negotiations and the negotiations 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy4
at the nice European council as well as the impacts of the iraq war and the arms 
trade will be used to explain the Europeanization of British defence policy. 
intergovernmentalist explanations focus on causal explanations for governmental 
behaviour in this area through a series of rational expectations. these expectations 
include the government’s wish to secure credible international action thus solving 
problems associated with intergovernmental policy co-ordination and the desire to 
transfer and pool sovereignty in the Eu. furthermore, when a government faces 
small costs in co-ordinating policies in an international forum there is a greater 
likelihood of further EU integration occurring. This book tests these explanations 
of why governments seek to transfer sovereignty through the prism of UK defence 
policy and UK government’s desire to co-ordinate elements of this policy within an 
EU framework.
Key Contests 
This book focuses on some key empirical and theoretical contests. It argues that the 
liberal intergovernmentalist framework is helpful in explaining the Europeanization 
of British defence policy between 1997 and 2005; particularly the uK government 
negotiating team’s approach to defence negotiations at the Nice European Council. 
Chapter 2 reformulates domestic policy making as a result of the evidence from 
1997-2000 and the negotiations over the EsDp, arguing that the core executive and 
policy entrepreneurs have a great deal of control over domestic Europeanization 
to the exclusion of domestic producer groups. the contrary is true in the case of 
the Europeanization of the arms trade.1 it is also argued that Europeanization has 
paradoxically removed and strengthened competencies and autonomy in security 
and defence from European member states. the internationalization of the arms 
trade and aggressive Europeanization by the European commission has removed 
state control whilst the negotiation of the ESDP solidified and enhanced member 
state sovereignty in this area; particularly for the British government who managed 
to successfully upload their defence and security preferences into the EU, locking in 
their partner governments. 
part of the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation for domestic policy 
formulation is that pressure from domestic interest groups are aggregated by the 
government into policy. in the case of the arms trade the pressure exerted by producer 
groups is imported directly into government policy whilst in the example of EsDp 
the government cr ated the changes in uK defence policy and then sought explicit 
or tacit support from domestic interest groups. this corrective adds an important 
level of understanding to the relationship between the uK government and domestic 
interest groups in defence policy. Moreover, it also helps to open the black box of the 
state to explore the internal dynamics of government involved in the policy making 
1 Moravcsik uses the term domestic producer groups to describe groups outside of the 
government with influence on government policy. Only the case study involving the arms 
trade has traditional ‘producer groups’; the Saint Malo process and the Iraq conflict did not 
involve domestic producer groups but instead involved interest groups like the armed forces, 
research institutes and think-tanks. 
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Introduction 5
process, illuminating the role of large personalities within the government and the 
role of international business interests in Europeanization. 
in exploring why the British government has pursued decisions that lead 
to a Europeanization of its defence and security policy this book argues that the 
motivation for change in UK defence policy was mostly driven by the influence 
of positive externalities. A key concern was to ensure that the EU had credible 
capabilities with which to intervene in humanitarian crises, like those in the Balkans, 
and similarly to encourage European governments to re-shape their ar ed forces as 
the uK armed forces had done following the strategic Defence review (sDr) of 
1998 and to support us-led coalitions of the willing in expeditionary warfare. the 
changes to the EU defence industrial base have come from the Commission’s desire 
to be engaged in the defence sector to promote high technology industries and from 
the manufacturers to improve the health of their order books. 
The second major area of contestation concerns international bargaining. 
intergovernmentalist approaches argue that international negotiations are dominated 
by major governments (in the European context Britain, France and Germany) and 
that the outcomes of intergovernmental negotiations are lowest common denominator 
agreements (Moravcsik 1998, 482). Revisions to this analysis focus on redefining 
what constitutes a ‘major’ government; LI suggests that a major government can 
exert considerable influence on an international negotiation through intrinsic 
factors, such as financial strength, population, and geographical location. However, 
this study adds issue specific factors, such as preference intensity, membership of 
relevant international organizations and the effect their unilateral action has on the 
international system (Moravcsik 1998, 476-478). Furthermore this research suggests 
that the intensity of preferences and influence of unilateral action are key aspects 
within the issue-specific factors and that these factors result in dominance of the 
uK, france and Germany in the Europeanization of defence policy and also explain, 
conversely, that when the ‘Big Three’ disagree on policies, like Iraq, the negative 
effect this has on Europeanization is very marked. 
the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of domestic policy formulation 
centres on a concept of preferences, which are historically stable government policy 
paradigms that inform policies, the everyday decisions, made in that issue area 
(Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1998, 59). The development of UK defence policy to 
include the pro-European dimension of the saint Malo initiative is said to threaten 
the sanctity of the nato alliance by some analysts and political opponents of the 
labour Government. however, chapter 2 argues that the British government pursued 
this policy shift within, and to strengthen, the preference for transatlantic solutions. 
it did so in order to strengthen the alliance by creating European based capabilities 
that could be used with or in the absence of us / nato capabilities, and/or when the 
us did not wish to be involved. the concept of preferences is therefore theoretically 
and empirically useful in explaining the development of uK defence policy and the 
continuity of the nato paradigm, but arguably requires tightening. it can be used 
to argue that the saint Malo process was either a fundamental shift in preferences 
or a tactical shift in policy that remained within the transatlantic paradigm. the 
concept of preferences in this case study remains contestable, but the overwhelming 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy6
weight of evidence points towards the saint Malo process being an innovative policy 
solution within the transatlantic framework. 
LI explanations are effective in explaining the codification of defence 
Europeanization at the 2000 nice iGc. the iGc and its outcomes demonstrate that 
governments are the principal units in the formal Europeanization of defence policy. 
the supranational component in the negotiations was largely absent as a consequence 
of the closed intergovernmental nature of this bargaining with governments excluding 
participation by the European Parliament’s observers.
Moreover, through a self-denying ordinance the European commission declined 
involvement in a subject it viewed as being the preserve of member governments, 
something it reversed after the nice treaty was signed. chapter 3 argues that the 
conceptualization of negotiations as the lowest common denominator of respective 
individual government positions is a simplistic view of international negotiating. a 
more accurate view is to challenge a ‘one-model fits all’ approach and to compare those 
governments with intensive preferences who do reach lowest common denominator 
agreements, with those governments with less-intensive policy preferences and 
who do not need to reach lowest common denominator positions. The key factors 
in shaping the intensity of preferences are the need to ensure domestic support for 
negotiated positions, the level of capabilities the government holds in the particular 
issue and the ability of the government to create coalitions in support of a particular 
policy area. however, the iraq case study shows that large disagreements between 
governments can scupper integration, even when there is preference convergence on 
that specific policy. The Europeanization of the arms trade demonstrates the potential 
for Europeanization outside of the control of member governments highlighting the 
complexity of Europeanization. 
The fourth core argument is that LI’s explanation of why governments 
seek to transfer domestic sovereignty to international institutions, one element 
of Europeanization, is validated by the example of British defence policy. 
intergovernmentalist explanations argue that the motivations for transferring 
domestic sovereignty are based on the ambition to secure credible international 
action on particular policy areas (Moravcsik 1998, 473). Within this general aim of 
securing credibility, the more specific objectives are to solve the problems associated 
with the international co-ordination of policy and governments. the result of this 
objective is to make the costs of co-ordination small and the benefits from joint 
working large. On a meta-level LI argues that the EU is an opportunity structure to 
achieve national government policies (Moravcsik 1998, 473; Correspondence with 
Moravcsik 2003).2 following on from this, the British government viewed the saint 
Malo initiative nd the Europeanized policy (EsDp) as a means to achieve three 
defence related objectives: to co-ordinate national defence and security policies 
within the EU, across a limited range of peacekeeping and peace-building issues; 
to improv  EU member states’ autonomous defence and security capabilities; and 
to strengthen the EU’s role within NATO. Moreover, the UK Ministry of Defence 
2 Moravcsik notes that the principal motivation is domestic commercial interests. He 
goes further to suggest, in correspondence that commercial interests are a primary motivator 
in defence integration with geopolitical issues also having an importance. 
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Introduction 7
was hopeful that a move towards a common Eu policy on defence and security 
would result in military reforms across the EU to reflect the changes made by the 
British military after the strategic Defence review (sDr), something which is now 
being done. The UK government’s desire to transfer sovereignty on the issue of the 
EsDp is best conceptualized as being based on a rational aggregation of uK national 
interests – the benefits of sovereignty transfer outweigh the potential costs to the UK 
because of the desire to create a framework for domestic policy co-ordination at the 
international level.   
the arms trade introduces tension into the transfer of sovereignty. this is an area 
in which chapter 7 argues that the commission and manufacturers have effectively 
consumed some state sovereignty. They now shape the state’s strategic direction 
through a research and development focus on homeland security and network 
centric capabilities. The Commission has successfully linked the arms trade to a 
cross-pillar agenda of improving and extending trade and industrial co-operation 
in the European area. Projects like the Eurofighter Typhoon and Airbus 400 that 
incorporate pan-European design and manufacturing aspects are good examples of 
where the trade dimension of the Eu can assist in spreading design and manufacture 
costs, output and risk and fit broadly within the Lisbon agenda. Similarly, the 
development of a European Defence agency (EDa) aims to improve cooperation 
between European member governments and their defence procurement efforts. the 
design and operation of the EDA has been dominated by the influence of a ‘state-
private’ network of manufacturer interests and national and supranational officials 
but has resulted in a pro-trade organization that dovetails with the export interests of 
member states like the UK. 
The arms trade provides an interesting take on Europeanization. In many 
ways the arms trade is a prime example of where national governments pursue 
increasingly isolationist policies and treat their fellow European member states as 
competitors; employing, in the case of the British government, covert measures 
against competitors in securing business for British companies. there are strategic 
and economic reasons for the isolationist policies pursued by Eu governments 
in the arms trade; strategically an independent defence industrial base is seen as 
essential to giving a country independent strategic defence capabilities (and thus a 
sensible off-set against t e financial savings that can be delivered through buying so-
called ‘off the shelf’ solutions from the United States, for example). Economically, 
governments and manufacturer lobbyists argue that the defence industries provide an 
essential economi  element to national and supranational wealth – the unit price of 
defence equipment being so large that the benefits to UK based defence companies 
are irreplaceable. Moreover, that electorally the number of defence jobs in key UK 
parliamentary constituencies are such that a reduction in the defence industrial base 
could have the affect of marginalising a key number of voters and thus the party 
political make-up of the House of Commons, a clear echo of American style ‘pork-
barrel’ politics. The net benefit to the UK economy of the defence manufacturers 
and those employed in the defence industries is subject to a large amount of debate 
which will be explored in Chapter 7. The extraordinary influence of the European 
commission and the manufacturers will similarly be examined to highlight the 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy8
alternative methods through which the Europeanization of British defence policy 
occurs.  
the diplomatic and military build-up to the us-uK led invasion of iraq is a case-
study in failure of the Europeanization of defence and security policy. in contrast, 
the aftermath of the Iraq war – the so-called Phase Three operations (post-conflict 
reconstruction and peace-keeping) – has shown greater levels of cohesion amongst 
EU member governments. The effects of the build-up to war brought into stark 
relief the effect and balance of the transatlantic alliance on the Eu and the very real 
divisions between, as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld put it, ‘new’ and ‘old’ 
Europe. the effect of the intra-Eu diplomatic schism has been seen in both defence 
and security terms – with the french government refusing further co-operation 
with the uK government on deepening defence and security policy integration and 
more widely with an obstinate approach to budget and common agricultural policy 
negotiations – seen as being directly related to a cooling of diplomatic relations 
around the iraq war. this case study will show in chapter 6 the positive and negative 
possibilities surrounding diplomatic Europeanization – particularly with the strong 
influence of a non-EU actor. Positively, the Europeanization of diplomacy serves 
as a multiplier of European influence on the world stage. Negatively it can produce 
‘blow-back’ that affects the progress of diplomacy within the EU on important issues 
such as negotiating the Union’s budget and the future of the CAP. 
Book Structure
This book is split into three case-study driven sections. The first chapter introduces 
the methodological and theoretical debates this book feeds into. It describes how the 
research for this book was collected along with the questions and challenges this 
has produced. Moreover, it outlines the theoretical premise and assumptions that 
underpin this book’s explanation of ‘Europeanization’. 
The structure of the first case-study – the development of the ESDP – is spread 
over chapters 2, 3, and 4 and echoes the structure of the formal Europeanization of 
British defence policy. chapter 2 explores the formulation of the British approach to 
the EsDp, including the instigation of the saint Malo process in 1998 and how this 
impacts on the concept of ‘national preferences’ (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1998, 
63). Established accounts of the formulation of government policies are achieved 
through a process of aggregating the policy positions and preferences of individual 
interest groups. this account of the domestic policy formulation process has been 
criticized as being weak by many notable commentators (Wallace 1999; Wincott 
1995). chapter 2 uses elite interviews, contemporary open source material, academic 
literature and quality news media reports, through a framework derived from liberal 
intergovernmentalist accounts, to argue that uK defence policy formulation is not 
created in accordance with these explanations and was, in this example, established 
by a small cadre of officials and politicians within the core executive of Number 10 
Downing Street, the Cabinet Office, and the Ministry of Defence and Foreign and 
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Introduction 9
Commonwealth Office and then officials tested the support for this policy amongst 
domestic interest groups and political supporters (rhodes and Dunleavy 1995, 2).3
chapter 3 explores the process of intergovernmental negotiating, more particularly 
the negotiations between 1998 and 2000, culminating in the nice iGc. Within the 
framework used by this book, the British government should be able to achieve more 
of its key aims within the negotiations as a consequence of its relative strength in 
voting rights, economic strength and perceived elevated status in foreign and military 
affairs. this chapter argues that the relative bargaining strengths of the British, 
french and German governments represented the strongest preferences within the 
negotiations. close contextual analysis of the negotiations showed that the three 
strongest governments dominated the proceedings through alliance building and link-
issue trade-offs to achieve the majority of their negotiating aims. Moreover, Chapter 
4 advances the argument that during the negotiations the European commission 
opted not to exercise its influence over the direction of ESDP, demonstrating the pre-
eminent position of governments in the formal Europeanization of defence. 
chapter 4 explores the outcome of the nice iGc negotiations and the decision of 
governments to transfer and pool national sovereignty on defence and security policy. 
the empirical and analytical elements of this chapter are the most straightforward of 
those tackled in this book. The reason for this is equally straightforward – analysis of 
treaty outcomes is a key test of how closely outcomes match initial policy preferences. 
In the context of this book, governmental preferences are discussed in the light of 
open sources, newspaper reports, government documents, and elite interviews. 
Chapter 4 argues that the outcomes of the Nice IGC matched UK government’s 
preferences very closely. It also shows that ESDP negotiations were not linked in 
any tangible way to other policy areas and therefore the uK government was not 
asked to absorb bargaining ‘losses’ in other policy areas in exchange for bargaining 
‘successes’ in the defence sphere. 
furthermore, chapter 5 focuses on institutional decisions to distribute 
sovereignty. this deals retrospectively with the decision of national governments to 
pool or delegate their sovereignty into supranational organizations. the rationality 
within this analysis lends itself to a decision to pool sovereignty based on the 
maximization of economic or issue-specific benefits (Forster 1998, 386). On the 
basis of the information and data available this research suggests that the decision 
to pool and delegate minor amounts of sovereignty and decision making apparatus 
to the ESDP was taken on the basis of global strategic ambitions, inter-European 
political ambitions and as a part of a recalibration of domestic economic and political 
necessity. 
chapter 6 focuses on the Europeanization of diplomacy with particular reference 
to the diplomatic build-up and fall-out from the us-uK led invasion of iraq in March 
2003 to the present day. it explores the levels of Eu-wide cohesion on this policy 
and the diplomatic efforts being made by the us-uK to secure European support 
for their actions. The chapter situates these diplomatic efforts within the UK’s 
3 The core executive is ‘all those organization and procedures which coordinate 
central government policies and act as final arbiters of conflict between different parts of the 
government machine’.
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy10
presidency of the Eu in 2005 to demonstrate the effects of diplomatic schisms on 
the Europeanization of issues even where there is pre-existing policy convergence. 
This chapter argues that the disparate EU policy areas are closely linked leading to a 
conclusion that the law of unintended consequences as regards the war in iraq has had 
a negative impact on Eu cohesion across the full spectrum of policy competencies. 
chapter 7 examines the Europeanization of the arms trade; through the political 
and economic drivers for this trade and also through an analysis of the politics 
of arms transfers. it explores the effect of the Eu as a trading bloc in providing 
a pro-trade discourse and incentives for manufacturers to continue producing and 
exporting military and dual-use equipment; particularly through the lisbon agenda 
and the European Defence Agency. It also explores the protectionist steps taken by 
governments to insulate and promote their indigenous defence manufacturers to the 
detriment of other EU based firms and the acceleration of Europeanization through 
the policy entrepreneurship of the commission and the manufacturers.
The concluding chapter deals with the three core concerns of this book; first, a 
critical evaluation of Europeanization and an explanation for how the phenomenon 
works in relation to defence and security policies. Second, an analysis of domestic 
British defence policy making as it relates directly and indirectly to the European 
union; and third, an analysis of the Europeanizing machineries of government both 
within the uK and within the Eu. 
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chapter 1
The Framework, Sources and Approach
This chapter seeks to set out how this research was conducted and its findings were 
established. The method employed by this book is straightforward and robust. 
The research within the book is based on over fifty elite interviews – conducted 
with officials and politicians directly involved with the domestic, bilateral and 
intergovernmental negotiations addressing the development of the European security 
and Defence policy, the transfer of arms to third countries and the development of 
the coalition efforts concerning iraq – and a large number of government documents, 
contemporaneous reports and secondary sources used to triangulate these empirical 
findings. 
Without dwelling on esoteric methodological d bates, this research has applied 
an ‘as-if’ positivist framework to the three broad case studies which are used to 
explain the Europeanization of British defence policy (Mann 1996, 222; Bartley 
1964, 5; popper 1963, 33-39). the basis of this approach is that there are at core, 
discoverable truths but that these are difficult to expose because of the presence of 
researcher and interviewee bias (Bettis and Gregson 2001, 8). as a consequence 
‘as if’ positivism retains an aspiration to ‘scientificity’ in social science research, a 
search for objective truths without the holesale rejection or problems with finding 
verifiable facts (Bettis and Gregson 2001, 12). Another significant approach that 
could have been adopted is post-positivism (smith 1996, 11-47). this approach 
includes a critical analysis of theory building as a practice in itself (Moravcsik 
1998, 77-85; King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 35-38). James Scheurich describes the 
difference between positivism and post-positivism in the following way: 
I take positivism (which I also call the ‘traditional’ or ‘conventional’ approach) to assume 
that the individual interview context (including, for instance, the personality or gender of 
the interviewer) is not a critical consideration and that a category-based reduction of the 
verbal text of the interview can be taken as a valid representation of the interview itself 
and of the perceptions of the interviewee. In contrast to positivism, I take post-positivism, 
following Mischler (186), to assume that interviews are highly contextualised events and, 
thus, the representations of such events must be contextualised. But both positivism and 
post-positivism make the modernist assumption that the appropriate research method will 
yield the real or best meaning of an interview. postmodernism, in contrast, suggests that 
there is a radical indeterminacy at the heart of the interview interaction which cannot be 
overcome by any methodology. (scheurich 1997, 75).
post-positivism is more sophisticated in its construction than positivism. it 
acknowledges that individual views are informed by experiences and biases and so 
‘knowable truths’ are difficult to observe and validate (Crotty 1998, 40). Through 
a process of triangulation, more secure evidence is sought to evaluate positions. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy12
furthermore, post-positivism draws our attention to a closer analysis of the 
motivations and biases of individuals or institutions and therefore provides a more 
nuanced and complete analysis. More particularly, a post-positivist approach leads to 
the conclusion that trying to theorize European integration is fraught with intellectual 
problems. indeed post-positivism suggests that facts are relative leading to situation 
specific comprehension, ‘This argument […] depends on the positivist assumption 
that a non-power-related truth game is possible. it is doubtful, however, at least in 
the social sciences, that such a power-free truth game has ever existed.’ (Scheurich 
1997, 35). Whilst positivism has been declared obsolete by Karl popper and Denis 
phillips there remains many useful aspects of this approach to theory testing; namely 
the aspiration of objectivity and a search for untainted and explicit evidence (Popper 
1974; Philips 1983, 4-12). The approach applied here – ‘as if’ positivism – adds 
critical nuances to positivism without accepting all the constructivist aspects of post-
positivism. 
In applying ‘as if’ positivism the high empirical standards demanded by 
Andrew Moravcsik, in his book ‘The Choice for Europe’ are met throughout this 
book (Moravcsik 1998, 10; Moravcsik and Nicolaidis, 1998, 58).1 The three key 
indicators established by Moravcsik for research that seeks to advance a theoretical 
understanding of European integration, 
in each case, a consistent set of competing hypotheses is derived from general theories; 
the decision is aggregated to generate sufficient observations to test those hypotheses; and, 
wherever possible, potentially controversial attributions of motive or strategy are backed 
up by ‘hard’ primary sources (direct evidence of decision making) rather than ‘soft’ or 
secondary sources (public statements and journalistic or academic commentary in which 
authors have less incentive to report motivations accurately) (Moravcsik 1998, 10). 
The research presented in this book follows these three prescriptions to produce 
a study that is acceptable, on these grounds, as a credible means to examine and 
explain Europeanization. 
Sources
This book tackles some sensitive and contemporary issues; which are documented 
through a small amount of extant documentation which is limited because of the 
various 30 and 50 year rules in operation for some British government documents. 
As a result this research has called upon a significant number of elite interviews with 
key actors to provide the primary research on which to build its analysis. In using 
the ‘as-if’ positivism as the methodological basis of this study it must be accepted 
that ‘facts’ are constructed through the biases and experiences of individuals and 
therefore to make judgements on evidence, then this evidence should be triangulated 
to minimize errors (smith 1996, 35).   
1 Indeed in ‘The Choice for Europe’ and associated articles Moravcsik calls for critiques 
of li but only from those who are prepared to reach the high empirical standards he sets.
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The Framework, Sources and Approach 13
the challenge of reaching sensitive information from people placed at heart of 
decision making frameworks is significant. The proximity between the events being 
explained and this research poses problems for several key stakeholder groups. Civil 
service officials from the Ministry of Defence, Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
and Cabinet Office are still engaged in the formulation and implementation of the 
ESDP, arms trade policy and the Iraq conflict and the UK’s approach to it. As a 
result, they might be unwilling to reveal the true nature of the policy negotiations or 
their role within them. the politicians involved might similarly be conscious that the 
issues being discussed in this book are ‘live’ political issues and as such a research 
publication exploring this policy in-depth might become subject to interest from 
the media and, by extension, electoral interest. The book overcomes this challenge 
through anonymising officials – with their consent – who held sensitive positions 
and also by triangulating their evidence through other interview and secondary 
evidence.  
The secondary accounts available about the UK’s approach to ESDP and the 
policy itself have been weak because of the lack of in-depth research on these areas. 
published investigations into the arms trade, for example, have been generated 
largely by NGOs and campaign groups, with there being only two major studies 
into the subject; one by Davina Miller on the Scott Report and the other by Mark 
phythian who explored the politics behind the British arms sales. the build up and 
prosecution of a war against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq has attracted a huge 
amount of news-media analysis and academic analysis – this book examines the 
specific policy formulation aspects of the campaign and the effect the build-up to 
war has had on the Europeanization of defence and other policy competencies.  in 
placing a large reliance on interview evidence this book aims to provide robust 
levels of corroborative evidence and also to conform to the professional standards 
on how researchers should approach collecting interview evidence established by 
both the institute for contemporary British history and the British sociological 
association.2  
2 the institute for contemporary British history have produced a set of guidelines 
for Officials participating in scholarly interviews and witness seminars. The Principles this 
document sets out for participation in interviews and seminars are first, compliance with the law 
– both Official Secrets Act and related obligations; and privacy and defamation considerations; 
second, compliance with the duty of confidentiality, including any employment contract 
terms; third, respect for the loyalty owed by officials in close working relationships with 
Ministers; fourth, primacy of the truth.  The general guidelines set down are that first, there 
is a balance to be struck between discretion and the need for accuracy and balance; second, 
that contemporary history carries some remaining potential for political controversy. this 
should not be regarded as an automatic bar on taking part but it requires careful judgement 
as regards the auspices of the interview, the track record of the institution and the standing of 
the interview; third, closeness in time to the particular event. Events which still concern the 
government of the day will for the most part make it difficult for former officials to participate; 
fourth, where the subject matter has attracted a high security classification, or is of lasting 
live political controversy, it may still be possible for officials to participate to some extent, 
although exercising discretion. ‘Guidelines for Former Officials at Scholarly Interviews and 
Witness Seminars’, Institute for Contemporary British History, 9 December 2002. Similarly 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy14
As previously stated, the common problem of access and ‘party line’ bias 
encountered when attempting to gain contemporary views of government positions 
from ministers or senior officials is partly overcome by the use of anonymous 
quotable sources.3 Establishing the UK government’s negotiating positions on 
EsDp, and operational positions on the iraq and arms trade case studies, is based 
on extensive triangulation of primary and secondary evidence. primary evidence 
has been obtained from the relevant desk and high-ranking officials in the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence, Cabinet Office, Number 10, the 
intelligence agencies, interest groups and industry.4 Evidence was also sought from 
government officials from EU member governments notably France and Sweden. In 
addition to these sources, interviews with officials from NATO, the CFSP secretariat 
(part of the Council’s Secretariat), and the European Commission are used to cross-
reference the UK government’s positions. 
the British Sociological Association have produced a ‘Statement of Ethical Practice for 
the British Sociological Association’ which deals with how social researchers should use 
interview evidence. the relevant sections for this study are: section 16 – as far as possible 
participation in sociological research should be based on the freely given informed consent 
of those studied. this implies a responsibility on the interviewer to explain in appropriate 
detail, and in terms meaningful to participants, what the research is about, who is undertaking 
and financing it, why it is being taken, and how it is to be disseminated and used. Section 17- 
research participants should be made aware of their right to refuse participation whenever 
and for whatever reason they wish. section 18 – research participants should understand how 
far they will be afforded anonymity and confidentiality and should be able to reject the use of 
data-gathering devices such as tape recorders and video cameras. section 19 – sociologists 
should be careful, on the one hand, not to give unrealistic guarantees of confidentiality and, 
on the other, not to permit communication of research films and records to audiences other 
than those to which the participants have agreed.  section 22 – interviewers should clarify 
whether, and if so, the extent to which research participants are allowed to see transcripts of 
interviews and field notes and to alter the content, withdraw statements, to provide additional 
information and to add glosses on interpretations. ‘Statement of Ethical Practice for the British 
Sociological Association’, The British Sociological Association, (London) March 2002.
3 this thesis quotes the sources in full. the published version will render these 
quotes anonymous in line with ‘Chatham House Rule’. According to the Royal Institute 
of International Affairs ‘…the new amendment means that participants are free to use 
the information received and can now also state that it was received at a chatham house 
meeting. this provides clarity for participants and will allow summaries of meetings to be 
prepared. The Chatham House Rule reads as follows: ‘When a meeting, or part thereof, is 
held under the chatham house rule, participants are free to use the information received, but 
neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may 
be revealed’. http://www.riia.org/index.php?id=14
4 The term ‘desks’ is often based on two or more officials and is used to describe a 
narrow but deep understanding of a particular issue area within the Departments. for example, 
within the MoD there are desks for every country in the world and each of these desks can 
provide detailed intelligence, information and analysis on their country of expertise. in this 
thesis the crucial ‘desks’ were the Security Policy desks in the MoD and FCO as well as the 
European policy desks in both institutions. Notionally a Grade 5 civil servant is in charge of 
that particular brief and is responsible to the policy director of the department and ultimately 
the permanent under secretary. 
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The Framework, Sources and Approach 15
Informed by the different level of officials involved in each phase and the various 
political and bureaucratic affiliations of the officials participating in these phases 
determined where the interview evidence for this book should arise. Interviewees 
were also selected from various levels of seniority within their institutional 
frameworks. The selection provided a breadth of experience from different 
institutional perspectives and insights into how each department viewed the issues 
under debate and external perspectives from different levels of seniority within the 
relevant departments. 
At the very centre of the UK decision-making framework on the issue of 
‘Europeanizing’ UK defence were key civil service and political appointments. 
Within the Downing Street Policy Unit, Roger Liddle the Prime Minister’s personal 
political advisor on European affairs, Cabinet Office officials ith responsibilities 
for European policy issues, and Sir Stephen Wall, the Prime Minister’s advisor on 
European issues, whose roles are substantially analysed (Downing Street Briefing 
2000; White, 2001). Cabinet Office officials are civil service appointments and thus 
had a duty of confidentiality to the government and the Prime Minister. Liddle was a 
political appointment and whilst paid by the civil service a Labour party spokesperson 
in close day-to-day proximity to the prime Minister. his interview evidence was 
inevitably informed by a desire to position his employer and party in a positive light 
(Mann 2001; Evans-pritchard 2001). Liddle’s position within the Downing Street 
policy unit overlaps in terms of scope and responsibilities with the role of Wall.5 
In answers given to the Lobby Briefing in June 2001 the Prime Minister’s official 
spokesman accepted that the two roles appeared close, but also stated that Wall and 
liddle had slightly different roles in advising the prime Minister about European 
issues and that Wall retained seniority over Liddle (Downing Street Lobby Briefing 
2001). The selection of Liddle and officials in the Cabinet Office as interviewees was 
based on a need to analyse evidence from those who most closely advised the prime 
Minister and who were directly involved in inter-departmental debates between the 
Cabinet Office and the MoD and FCO. Cabinet Office interviewees, who played 
key roles in co-ordinating a set of UK government positions to be negotiated around 
at Saint Malo, centred around the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office, with 
responsibilities for Eu public diplomacy and Eu institutions and stephen Wall 
the Head of the European Secretariat and the Prime Minister’s advisor on Europe 
(Cabinet Office 2002).6 
5 from 2002 called the strategy and innovation unit.
6 the main functions of the European secretariat, which is headed by the prime 
Minister’s policy advisor on EU matters, are to drive forward the Prime Minister’s European 
agenda, and to ensure that the Government’s policy on EU issues is co-ordinated across 
Departments. In doing this, the Secretariat provides the Prime Minister, his officials and 
other Ministers with advice on the substance and presentation of Eu issues, and supports 
the foreign secretary in his role as chairman of the Ministerial committee dealing with Eu 
matters. A feature of the Secretariat’s co-ordination work is a weekly meeting held with the 
UK’s Permanent Representative to the EU and senior officials in Whitehall Departments, to 
discuss the tactics and handling of key issues coming forward for discussion in the Council of 
Ministers and elsewhere in the week ahead and beyond.  
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy16
The interview strategy for this book was based on involvement and proximity 
of sources to the key debates surrounding the development of a Europeanized 
British defence policy 1997-2005. particularly important, in the chapters that cover 
the development of the ESDP, was the interviewee’s involvement in negotiating 
the policy objectives with other European governments both bilaterally and in the 
multilateral negotiations at the nice iGc. such interviewees included Grade 6 to 
Grade 3 officials within the MoD, FCO and Cabinet Office. Interviews also included 
officials who were part of the MoD team who initially proposed the Saint Malo 
initiative, those officials in attendance at Saint Malo and those present at subsequent 
negotiations, including at Nice. In some key aspects of the development of UK 
policy, this research has also used interview data from officials present at important 
meetings providing a rich empirical base to critically evaluate the development and 
negotiation of uK defence policy preferences. 
the process of triangulation and cross-referencing ensures that interview 
evidence is verified against information that can be gained from quality sources 
within the news media such as ‘Agence France Presse’, ‘Bulletin Quiotidien’, ‘The 
International Herald Tribune’, ‘The Guardian’, ‘The Daily Telegraph’, and ‘The 
Financial Times’ as well as UK government reports and press releases.  thus, a 
varied and extensive collection of primary sources are provided to triangulate and 
cross-reference the main contentions within this book (Schwandt 1997; Neuman 
2000).7 Nonetheless, the standard caveat for this sort of work should be adopted here 
too, namely that this research provides a provisional account of the Europeanization 
of British defence pending the opening of the archives under the 30-year rule in 2028 
and beyond. 
a reliance on elite interviews raises some notable methodological problems, 
which are more acute when dealing with sensitive areas of government policy, 
although only marginally more difficult than securing elite interviews within the 
mainstream of Whitehall (Dorril, 2000; Dover, 2005a). a considerable amount 
of government documentation, as with interview evidence, should however be 
viewed with some scepticism by the researcher; some government papers kept at 
the National Archives have been subject to ‘sanitization’ to remove evidence of 
individuals involvement in the cases they discuss (aldrich 2001, 6; Davies 2001, 
73-4). supplementary documentary evidence that might be shown to the researcher, 
such as cabinet committee or Departmental minutes, do not often reveal individual 
positions or areas of tension between politicians and officials and therefore miss 
some of the rich tapestry of bureaucratic politics. it is therefore necessary, as other 
scholars have done, to use elite interview data as a means to supplement sparse and 
7 triangulation is a research method used to establish the trustworthiness of both 
qualitative and quantitative data. The aim of triangulation is to ‘examine a single social 
phenomenon from more than one vantage point’. The triangulation approach argues that 
collecting data from different perspectives adds weight to the credibility of the analysis based 
on an foundation principle that no single source which is influenced by bias, priorities, and 
experiences can provide an accurate account of a situations but that by triangulating multiple 
sources contentions can be verified to a closer degree of accuracy. 
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The Framework, Sources and Approach 17
deliberately obtuse official documentary evidence (Scott and Jackson 2004, 153; 
smith 1996; hennessy 2002). 
constructing a usable set of interview sources is also problematic – the availability 
of research subjects is highly restricted and developing new avenues of enquiry often 
dependent on a ‘snowballing’ strategy – that is, each respondent recommends one 
or two additional points of contact (Davies 2001, 76; Scott and Jackson 2004, 140). 
all the interviewees in this research have been given a random serial number and the 
comments attributed to them are referenced accordingly (following Davies 2001, 77). 
interviewees were contacted more than once to ensure the accuracy of the comments 
attributed to them. in limited circumstances alternative primary sources were not 
available, but wherever possible interview evidence has been triangulated with 
additional primary and documentary evidence to provide corroborated accounts. 
How to Explain Europeanization 
This research has adopted an intergovernmentalist framework because this provides 
the most convincing available explanation of Europeanization. anthony forster 
argues that theorists have struggled with the complexity of Europeanization and 
that theorising has rather unhelpfully been split into considerations of institutions 
or policymaking (Forster 1999, 14). Anne Branch and Jorgen Øhrgaard take this 
criticism a step further by arguing that the focus of established European research 
should be on processes of governance rather than actors within government (Branch 
and ohrgaard 1999, 129). against established research and integration theories 
however, liberal intergovernmentalist theories fair very well. 
In the so-called ‘Classical Debate’ within European studies of neofunctionalism 
versus intergovernmentalism the focus is on the process of European integration. the 
main difference between intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists is the focus 
on different actors within the process. neofunctionalists believe that supranational 
entrepreneurs are key to integration, whilst intergovernmentalists believe that 
supranational entrepreneurs hinder, rather than facilitate European integration. 
Thus governments are the principal actors in European integration. The second key 
difference is that intergovernmentalists believe that Europeanization is a carefully 
controlled phenomenon with governments controlling the pace and direction of 
integration, while neofunctionalists believe that Europeanization has an internal 
momentum with functional effectiveness being the main drivers. The final difference 
concerns the perceived global aim of the integration process. neofunctionalists 
believe that the aim of European integration is to create a federal state, whereas 
intergovernmentalists see Europeanization as a framework through which national 
governments can be strengthened. neofunctionalism had been, according to roy 
Pryce, confined ‘to the dustbin of history’ in the 1980s (Pryce 1989, 2). Many 
academics have concluded that neofunctionalism offers no predictive capability 
because of the process of central institutions gaining more powers and competencies 
as a consequence of their existing competencies though it has had fleeting resilience 
in the last decade. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy18
Just as liberal intergovernmentalist theories have been subject to revised 
theoretical ambitions during the 1990s, neofunctionalism and its hybrids have been 
similarly revised so that it can now be said that there is a collection of hybrid theories 
that share common features. Scholars like Wayne Sandholtz and Paul Pierson 
argue that neofunctionalism convincingly explains the single European act (sEa) 
and the creation of the single currency whilst acknowledging that the theoretical 
aspects of neofunctionalism are subject to criticism (Sandholtz 1993; Pierson 1996, 
158). ultimately though, neofunctionalists see Europeanization as a means by 
which to replace national governments rather than as a framework to strengthen 
them, as li argues. importantly neofunctionalism is unable to explain the formal 
Europeanization of defence and foreign policy integration as these are areas that are 
subject to high political considerations and thus have remained in the preserve of 
member governments rather than, as neofunctionalism suggests, increasingly under 
the control of the EU’s supranational institutions. The obvious corrective to this is 
the case of the EU’s defence industrial base which has been Europeanized through 
the efforts of the manufacturers and the European commission (see chapter 7). 
Some analysts have proposed a diversification of theories and processes to 
explain Europeanization. for example, anand Menon proposes that a sensible 
resolution to the intergovernmental / supranational dichotomy is that li explains the 
processes and outcomes of iGcs, while neofunctionalism explains the processes and 
outcomes of everyday policy making (Kassim, Menon and Peters 2001; Menon and 
Weatherill 2002). However, if IGCs really do codify everyday policy making, it is 
counter intuitive to suggest that neofunctionalism can be completely separated from 
LI. If IGCs codify everyday policy making, as LI argues, there is logically no need 
to analyse this dynamic. LI’s explanation assumes that all the important elements 
of routine policy making are included in the outcome of the IGC, this necessarily 
obviates the need for neofunctionalist studies of everyday policy making. 
a more recent theoretical contender to li, and a development of neofunctionalism, 
is what might be termed the supranationalist explanation. the supranationalist 
debate focuses on non-governmental supranational actors, but notably highlights the 
European Commission, and places these at the heart of the integration project. The 
rationale for this is that the European Commission is the broker between national 
governments and central institutions (Sandholtz 1992; Majone 1993). Similarly, 
as a result of policymaking concerning highly specialized and technical issues, 
the European commission is also perceived to hold dominance over the supply of 
information, a point that it arguable validated by the cross-pillar approach to the 
arms trade (Kohler-Koch 1996). 
Further recent theoretical contributions that attempt to supplant LI’s dominance 
in this field, have sought to change the focus of EU research from explanations 
routed in governmental actors to explanations based around a political process. 
consequently, they switch focus to research questions concerning why and how 
integration occurs rather than who formulates and implements the policies (Branch 
and ohrgaard 1999). By changing the research focus, the governance-led debate 
seeks to explain why there are varying speeds of integration across different policy 
areas. The conclusion to this book picks up these threads and provides a basis for 
further research.  
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The Framework, Sources and Approach 19
of the main theoretical approaches to Europeanization a liberal 
intergovernmentalist framework remains the strongest in an increasingly congested 
field. The advantage of this framework for the study of the Europeanization of British 
defence policy is the clear, as are its explicit foundations. these foundations identify 
important institutions and actors in the Europeanization process and similarly 
provide clear lines of causation. An intergovernmentalist framework pushes the 
researcher to examine Europeanization in three stages: domestic policy formulation, 
intergovernmental bargaining and pooling of sovereignty into supranational 
institutions. the next three chapters do this whilst examining th  formulation, 
negotiation and codification of the ESDP. The final two case studies adopt a liberal 
intergovernmentalist framework to analyse government and supranational behaviour 
in the Europeanization of British defence policy more widely. 
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chapter 2
Domestic policy formulation:  
pörtschach and saint Malo1
This chapter explores the British government’s intra-departmental debates and 
preparation of the so-called saint Malo process. in doing so it will evaluate the 
argument that the Labour Party sought to project its pro-EU preferences with a 
proposed defence policy initiative as a direct trade-off to not being able to pursue 
the single currency project. It will argue that the Europe nized UK defence policy 
originated in the UK MoD, the product of an entrepreneurial policy official in the 
ministry, in response to a Cabinet Office memo seeking pro-European policies across 
Whitehall. Moreover, it argues that the prime Minister drove this policy forward, 
providing key political motivation, whilst leaving trusted officials to negotiate the 
detail of the policy both within Whitehall and then without with the french and 
other Eu governments (ultimately at the nice iGc 2000). this chapter shows how 
Europeanization can strengthen and entrench the interests of national governments 
– thus enhancing, rather than degrading the interests of sovereign governments as 
per Alan Milward’s ‘European rescue of the nation state’ thesis (Milward 1999).
the chapter also argues that the actors within the uK core executive, including 
the Prime Minister Tony Blair, took the decisions to ‘Europeanize’ British defence 
policy because they believed it provided the best option for strengthening nato 
(their key defence preference). They thought that by providing key European support 
and thereby removing the mainstay of the burden for European security from the 
Americans that it would effectively lock-in continued American support for NATO. 
Moreover, ESDP would improve the EU’s independent military capabilities (a much 
needed and strong reaction to a failed policy in the Balkans) and as a reaction to 
the perception that if Britain did not lead on this project then it was likely that the 
french and German governments would shape it to suit their preference. this fear 
was based on pressure from French and German officials during the 1990s on UK 
government policy makers to act positively on formulating deeply integrated EU 
external relations policies. These three factors provided significant motivation for 
the UK government’s core executive to engage pro-actively on these issues (Dover 
2005a).  
This chapter particularly focuses on whether the UK government’s preference for 
collaborative defence to be conducted through the transatlantic status-quo remained 
1 A version of this chapter has appeared in Robert Dover (2005), ‘The Prime Minister 
and the core Executive: a liberal intergovernmentalist reading of uK Defence policy 
Formulation 1997-2000’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7(4), 
508–525. Many thanks to Blackwell Publishing for the permission to use this material. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy22
stable between 1997 and 2000 (howarth 2002, 1). this includes an analysis of whether 
the saint Malo process represents a radical change in governmental preferences or 
merely a tactical shift of policy to achieve other European policy goals.2 interview 
evidence is used to describe how the British government developed the saint Malo 
initiative that led to the EsDp. this evidence convincingly shows that the uK 
government stayed within established preferences and sought to find an innovative 
policy solution to meet its ideological, strategic and geopolitical ambitions.  
the liberal intergovernmentalist approach argues that governments aggregate 
domestic pressures into governmental policy and preferences (Moravcsik 1998, 3). 
It draws a subtle difference between the concepts of governmental ‘preferences’ and 
governmental ‘policy’ (Moravcsik 1998, 3-9). Preferences are the stable positions 
held by governments, traceable over a large number of years, regardless of the 
political hue of the government, as discussed in the introducti n (Moravcsik 1998, 
5-6; Wallace in hogwood and Gunn 1984, 19; hogg and hill 1995, 98). to discover 
that core uK government preferences changed during the saint Malo process would 
be significant within LI’s framework, as it would suggest that the Saint Malo process 
was a radical departure from the fifty-year history of the transatlantic paradigm. 
Examining the sixty year post-war history of British defence policy leads to 
the following suggestions for what core British government defence preferences 
are: first, Europe’s positive and engaged role in global affairs (McElvoy 1997, 27; 
Mcinnes 1998, 828; Blair 1995; robertson 2004; Bailes 1996, 55-64); second, 
Britain’s preparedness to engage in the fluctuating balances of power and to 
intervene militarily as part of international coalitions. this is a demand led analysis 
of European security and a desire for collectivism within defence which, for the 
last 50years, has been through nato (Bailes 1996, 56). this latter preference, a 
security guarantee underwritten by the transatlantic alliance is, according to mainly 
conservative party politicians, strained by the saint Malo process as it has the 
potential to adversely affect the relationship between the Eu and the us (redwood 
2002; Rifkind 2004; Hunter 2002, 73; White 1999; Hatfield 2000; Lindley-French 
2002, 67; George 2003, Key 2003). as will be later shown by later chapters of this 
book the strain on the transatlantic alliance, did not manifest itself through the ESDP, 
indeed just after the attack on New York in 2001, there was an unparalleled degree 
of Eu-us unity. these good relations were subsequently eroded by the war on iraq 
(chapter six) because of the levels of disagreement and opprobrium heaped on both 
sides by each other. 
In contrast to preferences, policies refer to the issue specific positions 
of governments that, in Europeanization terms, are rationally pursued at 
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) (Moravcsik 1998, 3). Liberal conceptions 
of Europeanization also argue that governments are rational actors who bargain to 
maximize their national interest (Moravcsik 1993, 480). Moreover, that governments 
2 The ‘Saint Malo Process’ describes the bilateral negotiations between the British 
and French governments between July and December 1998 that resulted in a joint ‘Letter of 
Intent’ declaring that both governments would work towards improving European military 
capabilities. The ‘Saint Malo process’ also includes negotiations between governments up to 
and including the nice intergovernmental conference (iGc). 
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Domestic Policy Formulation: Pörtschach and Saint Malo 23
aggregate the policy preferences of domestic interest groups into their national 
policy (Moravcsik 1993, 481). Government policies are thus shaped by the value 
of the benefits to be gained from co-operation with other governments, the certainty 
of these costs and benefits and the relative influence of the interest groups on areas 
of policy formulation (Moravcsik 1993, 481). Thus, co-operation at the EU level 
only occurs when governmental interests converge and furthermore argues that 
negotiations concerning EU policy areas are disconnected (Moravcsik 1998, 74; 
olsen 2000, 191-198; richardson 1996, 3-23; Key 2003; redwood 2002). 
This chapter calls on the work of Charles Lindblom to illuminat  the processes 
behind British defence policy formulation and argues that the Europeanization of 
this policy sector conforms closely to Lindblom’s ‘successive limited comparisons’ 
framework (Lindblom 1959, 76-8). His thesis was a reaction to the growth of studies 
offering rational explanations of policy-making. Lindblom highlights the flaws 
with rational accounts: that policy makers are very rarely f ced with neat problems 
described by rational theories, they do not have all the necessary information to 
make a rational choice, they do not necessarily have the time or resources to consider 
all the possible policy options, nor might they be sufficiently objective to make a 
rational decision (lindblom 1959, 76-8). Moreover, once a policy has been made, 
rational choice theories do not allow for the possibility that the policy might fail or 
might need amendment. thus, lindblom argues that an alternative approach might 
consider policy making as a process of successive limited comparisons – that is the 
development of policy through successive trial and error (lindblom 1959, 79). 
This chapter advances five central contentions. First, that the Saint Malo initiative 
reflected a tactical shift of UK defence policy within fixed government preferences 
concerning the transatlantic security guarantee. second, that the pM centralized the 
defence policy decision making process within a core executive that comprized the 
PM and his senior political advisors, the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office, 
the secretaries of state for Defence and foreign and commonwealth affairs, and their 
respective Policy and Political Directors, Richard Hatfield and Emyr Jones-Parry. 
third, that the prime Minister was central to the development of the pro-European 
British defence policy, motivated as he was by the geopolitical and exogenous factors 
of the external security situation in Kosovo and by the desire to place Britain ‘at the 
heart of Europe’ but did not tightly control the detail of the policy. Importantly, 
the PM gave his support to the direction of the policy and left officials, on trust, to 
negotiate the detail of the policy within the parameters he was prepared to support. 
fourthly, that the presentation of the pro-European defence policy to the domestic 
electorate, other European governments, the us president, Defense Department and 
the us state Department was conducted by advocating the elements of the policy 
that appealed to the lowest common denominators between all the parties. fifth 
and finally, that liberal intergovernmentalist explanations of Europeanization fail to 
encapsulate the exact nature of domestic policy formulation. the Europeanization of 
British defence policy and the parallel development of common European security 
and defence policy can be seen as a process of ‘successive limited comparisons’. 
short term politically expedient goals were met with pragmatism and efforts to 
find alternative policy areas to the single currency were pursued and in which the 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy24
government could positively engage with Europe followed by the development of a 
pro-European defence policy to meet this overall aim. 
The Saint Malo Initiative as a Tactical Policy Shift 
the contention that the saint Malo initiative was a tactical shift of policies, is 
important to labour party politicians engaged in the policy formulation process 
– because it underplays the risks they took with a policy area that tou hes on core 
national sovereignty as well as being a necessary element of continued transatlantic 
diplomacy. The ‘special relationship’ between the UK and US, for politicians and 
officials on both sides of the Atlantic, has to remain ‘special’ in the public discourse 
in order to serve as a useful political tool, justifying some of the decisions taken 
in relation to some homeland security measures associated with the ‘Global War 
on Terror’, and wars on Afghanistan and Iraq following the terrorist attacks on 
New York. UK-US co-operation on homeland security measures have continued to 
publicly emphasize the closeness of the ‘special relationship’, the Europeanization 
of British defence policy continues to put some strain on the relationship between 
some sections of the us and uK defence and foreign policy bureaucracies. indeed, 
a former high-ranking official, said in conversation about EU initiatives to acquire 
intelligence related satellite imagery, that ‘any support from your government on 
this or other Eu measures will ensure that the special relationship becomes very 
un-special’ (Interview S). His critique of the UK’s Europeanization was that the 
government had lost sight of the importance of the transatlantic alliance and that 
american security hegemony provides the uK and the Eu with the best form of 
collective defence available. for the labour Government and prime Minister Blair, 
in particular, who has made particularly strong efforts to be the bridge between 
the Eu and america the perception of undermining the alliance are damaging, 
particularly in the context of the us-uK actions on iraq (see chapter six) where 
British diplomacy served to alienate a large number of European governments and 
reinstated the UK to the position of ‘awkward partner’ in Europe. 
this section examines the argument that the saint Malo initiative was a tactical 
shift in policies rather than a shift in core government preferences. the factors that 
appear in support of the argument that this was a policy shift were the speed of the 
decision, absence of economic considerations, and that the initiative ran contrary 
to explicit labour party policy. these are attractive factors but not strong enough 
to amount to a preference shift. further, positive evidence that this initiative was 
a tactical shift of policy can be found in the need to find alternatives to the single 
currency that the uK government could support. the geopolitical and security 
rationale behind the policy in addition to the careful negotiations conducted by uK 
officials makes the case for these being a tactical shift of policy a strong one.   
the saint Malo initiative was announced with a perception of undue haste, 
especially in the context of defence policy being seen to be a traditionally slowly 
evolving policy area, subject to long policy reviews and internal consultations. The 
vast majority of policy initiatives are rigorously analysed for their strategic and 
economic implications before being brought before parliament and implemented 
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Domestic Policy Formulation: Pörtschach and Saint Malo 25
(Hopkinson 2003; Rifkind 2004). The Prime Minister, by contrast, gave a speech 
that provided the motivation for greater anglo-french defence cooperation and 
therefore effectively announced the saint Malo initiative, at the pörtschach press 
conference on 25 october 1998 at a time when the debate between the MoD and 
FCO concerning the policy remained unresolved, but did allow the FCO an ‘elegant 
withdrawal from the debate’ (Interview A 2002; Robertson 2004). 
the initiative was formally announced at saint Malo (6 December 1998) with a 
similar perception of haste. this was partly because it ran contrary to published labour 
party policy both before and immediately after the 1997 general el ction (labour 
party 1996, 11-15). these two factors suggest that the initiative was not under active 
consideration until the spring of 1998 (Clark 1997; Interview B 2002; Interview C 
2003). Furthermore, major changes in defence policy, from 1946, had their origins 
in the government’s desire to reduce or maintain the defence budget. (Dorman 2001, 
192). indeed many, including former chief of Defence staff charles Guthrie argue 
that the primary motivation for defence reviews are the desire to reduce defence 
budget spending within a framework of changing strategic considerations (Garden 
2003; Guthrie 2003).  In the context of the historically identifiable imperative of 
budgetary considerations – particularly equipment and manpower budgets – it would 
be reasonable to assume that these factors would play a role in the Europeanization 
of British defence policy in 1998, as they have done in arms trade policy more 
widely (chapter 7).
The Labour party’s approach to defence policy leading up to the 1997 election 
had been to place a great emphasis on the economic benefits that could be derived 
from a revised defence policy, to be realized through an improvement to the 
defence and high technology industrial bases they argued had been neglected by the 
conservative government (labour party Manifesto 1997, 11-15). to commentators, 
notably stefano silvestri and Matthew uttley, the continued success of the defence 
industrial base is the key to the ‘Europeanization’ of the defence sphere (Silvestri 
1999, 20; uttley in croft, Dorman, rees and uttley 2001, 126-7). they argue that 
the uK, french and italian governments have guarded their defence industries and 
as a result failed to produce a pan-European defence industrial base to rival the 
dominance of the american military industrial complex (silvestri 1999, 19; uttley 
2001, 126-7). such a failure results in the collective Eu defence capability being 
significantly lower Euro for Euro than that of the United States; of course this belies 
a political reality that there is no united states of Europe as there is a united states 
of america, and therefore the comparison is arguably false. consolidation across 
Europe would however produce an estimated cost saving of some 10-12% (hartley 
in House of Lords Report 2000, 38).  Indeed the likely result of failing to address 
diminishing defence budgets (produced through year on year stability of the budget 
coupled with a rising equipment cost base) is to see uK military capabilities eroded 
‘beyond which the maintenance of a military capability for anything other the most 
local defence requirements will become impossible.’ (Alexander and Garden 2001, 
513-515: Ministry of Defence performance review 2000, 43; Garden 1989, 38-39; 
Sandler and Hartley 1995, 185-7; Taylor 1998, 41). Projections show that if British 
GDp grows at 3% for the next 15 to 20 years and defence spending is maintained 
at current levels, the defence budget as a share of GDp will have decreased from 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy26
2.4% in 2000 to 1.3% by 2015 against the historic nato aspiration of defence 
spending to be 5% of GDp but an established actual commitment of 2% of GDp 
(alexander and Garden 2001, 520).  this analysis is supported by interviewees such 
as Lord Brittan and Pol de Witte from NATO, who take it to its logical conclusion 
that greater defence co-operation should lead to a more cost-effective provision of 
defence across the Eu (Brittan 2003; interview c 2003; de Witte 2004). 
Economic analyses of European defence fail to take into account the very strong 
influence of historical contingency, strategic reality, national pride and military 
independence when considering the current configuration of European defence 
forces and procurement practises. the separation of the Eu into component nation 
states presents a large barrier to the Europeanization of defence policy across 
the union. Eurosceptics cite the numerous wars between Eu states in the last 
three hundred years of European history, the proximity of the second world war 
to the present day in relative terms and that the European project is post-conflict 
reconstruction project and thus subject to potential failure. Moreover, it is an article 
of faith within the armed forces that it is necessary for sovereign governments to 
ensure the security of defence equipment supply through developing and retaining 
an active defence industrial base. It is possible to buy ‘off-the-shelf’ equipment from 
american manufacturers, for example, but the security of maintenance contracts 
and spare parts are dependent on the goodwill of the american government – which 
adds complications to a government’s foreign policy preferences, although not 
insurmountable ones (page 2006, conclusion). thus many European governments 
seek to maintain and independent defence industrial base not only to retain their 
foreign policy independence and security of equipment supply, but also as part 
of their wider economic and trade policy to sell equipment and thereby garner a 
positive defence equipment trading balance. consolidating defence industries does 
not provide a long-term fix to the gap between European and American capabilities, 
which are primarily financially focussed, the ‘Europeanization’ of British defence 
policy might delay the erosion of domestic defence capabilities and would produce 
a greater level of capabilities for comparable funding. 
achieving budgetary savings from the defence budget would have been electorally 
rational, as it would have also allowed labour to focus spending on electorally 
significant issues notably the National Health Service, education and pensions 
(Denver 2003, 100). With voter concern on defence only coming seventeenth out 
of nineteen priority areas, securing financial savings from the defence budget would 
have been rational and expedient (cowley and Quayle 2002, 58). however, there is 
very little evidence that budgetary considerations played a significant or even minor 
role in the formulation of uK defence policy between 1997 and 2000, including 
in the strategic Defence review (sDr), feeding into a conclusion that the saint 
Malo initiative was a shift of policy rather than of preferences (interview a 2002; 
interview B 2002; interview i 2002; interview M 2002). 
The most significant policy issue facing the EU in 1997 was the development of the 
single currency. The UK government’s defence initiatives can be seen as a pragmatic 
response to the politically untenable single currency project; the tenability of which 
is a highly contested point and one that appears to have been decided internally 
within the cabinet level of the government. standing on a pro-Eu election platform 
Copyright material
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
 
Domestic Policy Formulation: Pörtschach and Saint Malo 27
Labour had been keen to show principled support for the project but had added 
important economic caveats regarding membership, borne of treasury concerns over 
convergence criteria and public dissatisfaction with the Eu (young 1999; Milner 
2002). this meant that in the big Eu policy area of 1997 the labour government 
felt that is was unable to demonstrate its pro-European credentials. this perception 
led to the consideration of alternative policy areas in which the uK government 
could demonstrate European policy entrepreneurship (Duncan-smith 2001, 3-4; 
interview a 2002; interview D 2003; interview M 2002; redwood 2003). the pro-
European defence initiative should, therefore, be seen as part of the government’s 
broad European policy rather than a solely defence based initiative, although one in 
which the government believed that real benefits to collective European defence and 
security capabilities could be accrued. 
Strategic considerations formed a large part of the UK government’s, and 
particularly the PM’s willingness to support the Saint Malo initiative. Not only did 
the policy demonstrate the government’s willingness to engage positively with the 
Eu and its member governments but also to build up real capabilities that could be 
used to intervene in humanitarian crises such as those in the Balkans. The escalation 
of serbian hostility towards the ethnic albanian population in Kosovo population 
in 1997 caused the British government to contemplate possible actions against the 
yugoslavian government in Belgrade in December 1997 and then again in september 
and october 1998 (interview c 2002; interview i 2002; Garden 2003; Wallace 
2003). A realization within the FCO of President Clinton’s unwillingness to engage 
with this issue, without onerous conditions being placed on military operations3 
and further, with the President’s attention being drawn towards the fallout from 
the ‘Lewinsky affair’ at home, led British policy makers to consider alternatives 
(interview E 2003). 
in confronting the frustrations over Kosovo, and the realization that the 
EU governments were unable to act to prevent and extinguish conflict on their 
geographical backdoor, the Prime Minister announced at the informal EU meeting 
at pörtschach a revolutionary message that he claimed would strengthen European 
defence and the transatlantic Alliance (Silvestri 1999, 14; Lichfield 1998; Cole 1998, 
5; Rutten 2001, 1-3). Thus, in the context of the situation in the Balkans, the Saint 
Malo initiative was a reaction to strategic stimuli and not a radical departure from 
the stable governmental preferences founded in the transatlantic alliance.  
The Centralization of Roles to Number 10 and the Cabinet Office 
A key feature of the Europeanization of British defence policy in the post-1997 
era was the way the prime Minister centralized uK European defence policy 
formulation within the core executive; a select group of politicians and officials 
drawn from Number 10, the Cabinet Office, FCO and MoD. This centralization is 
3 the american conditions on military action were broadly that the campaign should 
be conducted predominantly from the air and that the use of infantry should be highly 
restricted; indeed it is not clear that the american president, Department of Defense and state 
Department, acting as one, would have not vetoed this as a policy option. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy28
particularly notable as it places the Europeanization of this policy area firmly away 
from ‘standard policy formulation’ thinking which highlights routine aspects of the 
defence policy making process and into a debate which views it as representing a 
‘centralized’ or ‘Presidential’ form of policy making. 
that a change to the strategic direction of defence policy was allowed to be 
nurtured at all is somewhat surprising given the context of the Labour Party’s 
recent historical electoral legacy of ‘unilaterism’ in the early 1980s.4 the policy 
entrepreneurship of officials like Richard Hatfield must, therefore, have emanated 
from alternative sources than a supportive party political environment as part of the 
Labour party’s success in the 1997 election was to remove defence as a major area 
of debate during the campaign, whilst retaining a commitment to a defence review 
(interview i 2002; interview M 2002). this may have been surprising as the armed 
services were severely overstretched – but relatively under-utilized in comparison 
to 2003-6 – unable to retain personnel and were similarly un ble to re-equip due to 
major equipment programmes being both late and over-budget (McInnes 1998, 829). 
once in power the government signalled a strong desire to be positive on defence. 
this included the announcement of the strategic Defence review and statements 
that major savings would not be immediately sought from the defence budget (Clarke 
1998; freedman in seldon 2001, 289-305; Ministry of Defence Expenditure plans 
2003)5 During the 1997 labour party conference, the pM in his headline speech 
argued that Britain should fulfil its historic legacy ‘…to lead at the heart of Europe’ 
(anne McElvoy 1997). this statement of intent presented an opportunity for astute 
civil servants, like Richard Hatfield, to bring the MoD and the defence agenda to the 
forefront of the government’s policy making agenda, with a Europeanizing core, and 
also to please their new political masters early in the new term of government. 
The ‘Presidential’ style of government, as described by Anthony Seldon and 
Peter Hennessy, has produced a heavily laden top-down approach to policy making 
(seldon 2001, vii-viii; hennessy 2000, 477; liddle and Mandelson 1995, chapter 9; 
hennessy 2003; White 2003). the use of small cabinet sub-committees and informal 
meetings between cabinet ministers, senior civil servants (Grade 3 and above) and 
special advisors routinely take favoured subjects out of the sphere of normal civil 
service decision-making processes and into small centralized policy making for a, 
which emphasizes the role of the prime Minister or the Minister in charge (interview 
M 2002; Blunkett 2006). This centralized style of government is particularly 
pertinent to defence policy formulation. Government and opposition politicians and 
officials close to the process highlighted the centrality of the PM’s role in this policy 
development (interview i 2002; George 2003; palmer 2002). 
Following Blair’s ‘Heart of Europe’ speech at the 1997 Labour Party conference 
there was a meeting of key Cabinet Ministers and senior civil servants engaged 
4 unilateralism being the discursive shorthand for the range of anti-nuclear armaments 
policies the labour party included in its manifesto for the 1983 General Election and is 
referred to as being one of the key reasons Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party won a 
large majority in that particular election. 
5 The MoD’s resource budgets in Financial Years 99-03 are: 1999-00; £31,967, 459,000; 
2000-01; £32,949, 615,000; 2001-02; £34,299, 438,000; 2002-03; £34,257, 993,000.  
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Domestic Policy Formulation: Pörtschach and Saint Malo 29
in co-ordinating EU policy within the Cabinet and Foreign Office (Interview A 
2002; interview B 2002). this meeting was in response to a memorandum sent 
round Whitehall by Number 10 asking for areas in which the UK could positively 
engage with EU policy initiatives. At this meeting Tony Blair asked the assembled 
permanent under-secretaries to implement a change in operating rationale 
(Interview B 2002; Interview I 2002; Robertson 2004). Blair’s instructions centred 
on finding policy areas in which Britain could be more co-operative or, indeed, lead 
in the Eu (interview B 2002; White 2003).6 One Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
interviewee said this process aimed to put ‘water into the policy wine’, that is to 
say, to take a bold statement of pro-European intent from the PM and to use this to 
seek possible ideas from senior civil servants that would lead to European initiatives 
without compromising core British interests (interview B 2002). 
this process was managed through a version of the (E)D p committee whose 
remit was to review the approach of each government department to the Eu.7 
this committee agreed with the view of secretary of state for Defence, George 
Robertson, primed by Richard Hatfield, who had identified defence as being an area 
in which Britain could usefully lead. this was partly to reduce the pressure on the 
government from European colleagues about their reticence both on the issue of the 
single currency and to act positively on defence integration issues (interview B 2002; 
interview M 2002). the treasury and cabinet committees reviewing British Eu 
policy had quickly concluded that the government could not join the single currency 
project for electoral and economic reasons (Black 2003; White 2003; Interview M 
2002). The civil service officials interviewed for this research argued that there was 
no link between the decision to adopt a conservative approach to the single currency 
and the decision to act positively on defence policy (interview B 2002; interview D 
2003; Interview G 2002; Interview M 2002). These officials are, in the main, still 
engaged in defence policy making or diplomatic careers and therefore may have felt 
constrained in the responses they could give. Roger Liddle, the Prime Minister’s 
then personal advisor on Eu issues, was decidedly more strident in arguing that 
there was no link between the Europeanization of defence and a reticence towards 
the single currency project – this interview evidence is heavily tainted by political 
bias and the desire, in a very small way, to assist in securing a particular view of the 
Prime Minister’s historical legacy. Other interviewees did not adopt such absolute 
positions. robertson, for example, argued that the saint Malo initiative was worthy of 
being followed in its own right but that the unwillingness to join the single currency 
had made the political atmosphere more permissive and therefore more conducive 
for such suggestions (interview i 2002; robertson 2004). 
the principle reason for the focus on defence as an area in which Britain could 
play a leading role was a result of the MoD being the only Department to answer the 
call for areas of policy that could be ‘Europeanized’ (Interview A 2002; Interview 
6 Michael White said this was made clear to him on a lobby journalist basis.
7 The best information this research could find on the membership of (E)DOP was that 
the membership was the prime Minister, the foreign secretary, peter Mandelson, colin Budd, 
Brian Bender, and stephen Wall from the permanent representation to the Eu. it should be 
noted that interviewees were not keen to reveal the membership of this committee. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy30
I 2002). It also reflects British strategic thinking in the context of the crisis in the 
Balkans where military dependency on the US was seen as a contributing factor to an 
ineffective European response to the civil war. pan-European political embarrassment 
about the response to yugoslavia has channelled itself into an accepted discourse 
that the union should do more to engage in military and quasi-military activities that 
promotes and enforces peace in its near-abroad and wider.   
the centralized account of the Europeanization of domestic policy formulation 
runs contrary to the liberal intergovernmentalist account which prefaces the important 
of domestic interest groups exerting pressure on government to pursue policies that 
they support. this is partly because the interest groups engaged in this issue did 
not include the arms manufacturers (see chapter 7), and only included advisory 
interest groups. the leverage these interest groups hold against the government are 
in the electoral and media pressure they can exert. in the saint Malo case study 
such groups have fed into the policy formulation process with varying degrees of 
success. Groups who have influenced the Europeanization of British defence or who 
are considered to have done so by informed commentators have been very closely 
linked with the Labour party. This is particularly true of the Centre for European 
Reform and The Foreign Policy Centre who, despite being officially apolitical are 
given regular access to high level officials and politicians and are routinely included 
in Cabinet Office policy committees (Interview A 2002; Grant 2003).8   
some analysts argued that the centre for European reform, headed by charles 
Grant, had initially suggested the pro-European defence policy (spear 2001). Grant 
puts his role more modestly as having given external validation to a policy already 
under consideration (Grant 2003). The role of consultative bodies like the European 
institute for security studies (part of the now defunct WEu), riia, rusi and other 
research organizations is to provide the government with a means to consult widely 
on defence issues. the effect meetings and seminars by these organizations had on 
policy making are difficult to discern but what is clear is that the advisory output 
followed on rather than preceded the saint Malo decision, and therefore cannot be 
said to have triggered it. Moreover, whilst officials attending these seminars can test 
whether certain policy initiatives are acceptable to key domestic producer groups no 
officials interviewed were able to quantify how much influence these events have on 
UK government policy making (Interview D 2003; Interview G 2002; Interview M 
2002).9 
The Armed Forces are a key interest group in defence policy formulation and 
thereby in the Europeanization debate; significant opposition from the Forces would 
have had a serious impact on the government’s ability to pursue this policy (Menon 
2000, 139; Interview C 2002; Garden 2003; Interview I 2003). Of further significance 
8 Interview A sat on several Cabinet Office committees exploring EU issues. These 
committees included think-tank analysts like Charles Grant and Heather Grabbe and 
academics, for example, anand Menon. 
9 interview M and interview E argued that it was useful to test ideas on groups of 
informed commentators but that decisions were not made by a committee of the knowledgeable. 
Interview D argued that informal discussions held under the ‘Chatham House rule’ often 
produced the most fruitful results in terms of policy ideas. 
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Domestic Policy Formulation: Pörtschach and Saint Malo 31
is the position and role of the chief of the Defence staff who advises the pM directly 
– it would be, similarly, politically difficult for the PM to proceed in the face of 
vociferous opposition from the Chief of the Defence Staff.  Lord Guthrie’s role in 
the formulation process was therefore important, and between october-December 
1998 the prime Minister was in close contact with him concerning the saint Malo 
initiative. Guthrie felt that it was in the best interests of the services to be engaged 
in this process, so long as nato was not undermined, in order that they could help 
shape the policy to best reflect the Services interests (Interview A 2002; Interview 
c 2002). those close to Guthrie say he gave his support to the saint Malo process 
having come to the opinion that a restructuring of the British armed forces was 
necessary to better reflect the operational capability of Britain and in securing better 
value defence forces across Europe (interview c 2002; intervie  D 2003; interview 
i 2002). the support Guthrie provided demonstrated a level of acceptance within the 
uK defence establishment, including from groups that might have been expected to 
have reservations about the Europeanization initiative. 
the saint Malo initiative was, in terms of competency and responsibility, an 
area of interest for both the MoD and fco. the interdepartmental relationship 
between the MoD and fco is interesting in terms of the bureaucratic politics 
surrounding such developments and is also a key area of contested opinion within 
the history of the saint Malo initiative. the balance of the available evidence is 
that the Europeanization of this policy was ‘centralized’, which suggests that the 
Saint Malo process was driven by officials within Downing Street and the Cabinet 
Office who finalized the details of the policy and then sought agreement amongst 
domestic interest groups. Further, that the fortunate positioning of and good working 
relations between Richard Hatfield and Emyr Jones-Parry, as Policy Directors of 
the MoD and fco respectively, enhanced the development and negotiation of the 
EsDp provisions into the nice treaty (Grant 2003; interview D 2003; interview G 
2003). Following the Prime Minister’s declaration at Pörtschach in October 1998 the 
debate between the fco and MoD ended with both accepting the substance of the 
initiatives (Interview A 2002; Robertson, 2004). The collaborative work of Hatfield 
and Jones-Parry focussed on crucial issues and negotiating strategies. Where one 
might normally expect there to be institutional roadblocks erected to halt or divert 
proposals, the personal relationship between these two officials ensured that the 
departments worked to a relatively unified agenda (Interview A 2002; Interview M 
2002). This key inter-departmental relationship helped to inform a wider bureaucratic 
context, determined by civil servants, where a common goal was established and 
institutional interests were put to one side, or negotiated with a presumption for the 
agreed policy. 
To try and argue that the Saint Malo initiative fits into a standard policy 
formulation approach means to highlight the historical continuation of certain 
practices to emphasize the absence of radicalism in British defence policy. further, 
it suggests that the stimulation for the saint Malo initiative should have come from 
within the MoD where defence policy is an area where decisions are made by a 
small number of individuals, often in the light of incomplete information and as 
such decisions are made more by accretion than by selection. Moreover, that the 
MoD should have come to a position of agreement with the FCO towards a joint 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy32
approach in policy making in recognition of the FCO’s pre-eminent role in European 
policy negotiation. There is not significant evidence for either of these positions 
within the domestic policy formulation of the saint Malo initiative; but substantial 
evidence that the uK European defence policy was pursued from the core executive 
with its leading advocates being tony Blair, George robertson (and subsequently 
Geoffrey hoon who became secretary of state for Defence on 11 october 1999) and 
their respective political and civil service advisors (interview D 2003; interview 
M 2002). this lends weight to a core argument advanced in this chapter that the 
core executive determines the formal Europeanization of British defence policy but 
that in other areas of defence Europeanization, interest groups gain a much larger 
influence over the process. 
perhaps somewhat surprisingly, given the sensitivity of defence issues within 
Parliament, the scrutiny function of both Houses was given a l w profile during the 
formulation of the saint Malo initiative.  the house of commons parliamentary 
select committee on Defence and the house of lords committee on European 
affairs, did try to scrutinize the initiative, but these efforts were largely lost on 
both public and political audiences. the political focus at the time was on Eu tax 
harmonization and other public service debates, rather than on defence. parliament, 
via the European and Defence select committees, both heavily atlanticist in 
membership, contributed to the Europeanization debate through seventeen reports 
between 1998 and 2001 (George 2003). In particular, the ‘Report on the ESDP’ 
by the house of lords committee on the European union demonstrated the depth 
and reach of parliamentary scrutiny on the emerging European security and defence 
policy (house of lords 15th report 2000). the leverage the committees had on the 
prime Minister and the core executive during the development of defence policy 
between 1997 and 2000 was muted because of the extent of the government’s 
Commons majority (George 2003; Rifkind 2004).10 
the evidence from the saint Malo initiative is that the core executive was able to 
effectively bypass parliament through use of several consultation meetings targeted 
at government backbenchers with the aim of countering fears of the PLP that Saint 
Malo would undermine nat . such a meeting was held of the plp on 2 December 
1998, hosted by the pM and the secretaries of state for Defence and foreign and 
commonwealth affairs to launch the initiative within the party and met with broad 
agreement (palmer 2002; George 2003).11 In short, Parliament had neither a significant 
effect on holding the government to account on this initiative, because it was not as 
politically significant as public service reforms in 1998, nor did it play a significant 
role in the formulation of the policy. furthermore, opposition to the policy from 
10 From the Defence Select Committee’s perspective they aimed to exert media, public 
and political pressure through the production of reports. Former Defence Secretary Rifkind 
said that the Committee has influence to a limited degree. Questioning by the Committee 
could be awkward but would never be enough to dissuade the adoption of any particular 
policy.  
11 Both interviewees stated that the Prime Minister and Secretaries of State took as many 
questions as there were from the plp members who were given reassurances that this did not 
undermine nato.
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Domestic Policy Formulation: Pörtschach and Saint Malo 33
PLP and Conservative party members was subdued because of the government’s 
‘honeymoon’ period and because the PLP were content to allow the government 
to proceed on trust whilst the conservative opposition were attempting to regroup 
following their very heavy electoral loss in 1997. parliament, insofar as it can be 
seen as an interest group, scrutinized – rather than initiated – defence policy, through 
parliamentary debates, the routine scrutiny of the sDr legislation and the reports 
of both the house of commons and house of lords Defence select committees, 
further supporting a conclusion that policy formulation was concentrated in the core 
executive to the exclusion of parliamentary processes.  
the absence of parliamentary initiation and scrutiny of defence policy has a large 
impact on what can be learnt from the phenomenon of Europeanization, and is a trait 
factored across the iraqi and arms trade case studies as well. Europeanization appears 
to take place, politically, in the realms of the core executive and in public discourse – 
which is fuelled by a predominantly ‘eurosceptic’ media, and commercially, through 
the globalization of capital and culture, and bureaucratically, through developments 
within government departments and in the relationship between Whitehall and Eu 
institutions. What this tells us about Europeanization is that it is a technocratic 
process, with public policy outputs. it is controlled at a policy level that is one step 
removed from what the public might consider ‘democratic’ and therefore has a wide 
ranging and important implications for the public to consider. 
the Departmental debate between the MoD and fco, in which a large number 
of issues – including those on the impact this would have on the transatlantic 
relationship, was ended by the PM’s announcement at Pörtschach. The way this 
legitimate departmental debate was handled was akin to the ‘Napoleonic’ style of 
government that White and hennessy claim Blair adopted after the 1997 general 
election (White 2003; Hennessy 2001). The term ‘Napoleonic’ was coined by 
the Prime Minister’s advisor Jonathan Powell, informed by a classical education, 
rather than one accepted by the prime Minister himself – although this term was 
disclosed via a private lobby briefing at which White and Hennessy were present. 
The ‘Napoleonic’ system meant that the Prime Minister and the core executive 
steered the strategic direction of the policy and then officials resolved the details of 
this policy. The policy process gave MoD Policy Director Richard Hatfield a great 
deal of influence over t e direction of the policy – once the Secretary of State for 
Defence George robertson had persuaded tony Blair of the wisdom of the policy it 
took on an enhanced credibility. The resolution of an interdepartmental debate by the 
PM and the core executive is not exceptional, particularly in the context of Blair’s 
government. this adds further weight to the argument that the Europeanization of 
British defence policy that occurred at saint Malo was not a shift in core government 
preferences but was a tactical shift in defence policy. 
The Centrality of the Prime Minister to the Saint Malo Initiative
tony Blair was, to put it baldly, central to the development of the saint Malo 
initiative and the formal Europeanization of British defence policy between 1997-
2000, and that this policy is indicative of the method of governance pursued by the 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy34
pM. it was the pM, rather than the secretary of state for Defence, George robertson 
who announced the saint Malo initiative. interviewees from the fco and cabinet 
Office argue that this demonstrates the centrality of the PM and Cabinet Office in 
the process and the temporary marginalization of the MoD and fco (interview a 
2002; Interview B 2002; Interview M 2002). Even within the first four years of the 
Labour government the Good Friday Agreement, and public private finance initiative 
schemes (pfi) are further examples of where the pM has got closely involved with 
driving key policies through and shows a general trend towards a central role in a 
diverse range of policies (forster and Blair 2002, 68-9).
an examination of the informal conference at pörtschach (21 october 1998), 
which was effectively the public introduction to the saint Malo accords, adds 
some important context to Blair’s public announcement. The PM’s aircraft was 
delayed, reducing the time available to discuss strategy for the informal meeting 
with key officials, whilst the debate between the MoD and FCO was unresolved 
(interview c 2002; robertson 2004). surrounding the pörtschach meeting was the 
Prime Minister’s desire to make a pro-EU statement at the conference to signal the 
difference between his and the previous conservative government but on the single 
policy area identified for entrepreneurship, defence, he appeared to be hampered by 
a prolonged debate between the lead departments. on the advice of stephen Wall, 
and from a presentational perspective, the Prime Minister’s communications advisor 
alistair campbell, the pM decided to override the interdepartmental debate and 
make an announcement signalling the UK’s decision to be positive on EU defence 
capabilities (interview a 2002; robertson 2004). this set in train a change of policy 
without seeking full agreement between the two departments (Robertson 2004). 
Blair’s announcement at Pörtschach was deliberately underplayed to the UK media 
by the Prime Minister’s communications officers, a strategy that ensured that the 
subtle change in the official emphasis in UK defence policy was not subject to a 
wider debate in the uK media and thus potential revisions.
The Prime Minister’s role, in this instance, is indicative of the extent to which 
this policy was a crucial early element of the government’s first term programme. 
Moreover, by remaining so closely involved and associated with the initiative Blair 
invested a great deal of his most valuable asset, his personal credibility, in a policy 
with very easily measurable successes and failures. By pursuing this policy, he also 
took a number of political risks. The first of these was with the transatlantic alliance 
itself. If the policy had been perceived by the US State Department or key NATO 
allies in a negative way there is a possibility that EsDp could have destabilized 
nato. from the perspective of the conservative opposition and transatlanticist 
sections of the parliamentary labour party, the labour government seemed to be 
reversing a long history of British defence preferences being vested exclusively 
in the nato transatlantic alliance (freedman 1999, ii; robertson 2004; redwood 
2002; Key 2003; George 2003; interview D 2003). the previous conservative 
government had believed that nato was more than a military organization also 
containing a political dimension, through ‘Partnership for Peace’ that assisted defence 
transformation in ex-communist central Eastern European states. in contrast, the 
labour party position under Blair, who notably was without a great deal of personal 
experience of defence issues, seems to have provided a division of labour whereby 
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Domestic Policy Formulation: Pörtschach and Saint Malo 35
security issues are vested in nato and political competencies concentrated in the 
Eu (portillo 1996, 3). 
Whilst Blair may have provided the political motivation and impetus for the 
Saint Malo initiative he did not involve himself with resolving the fine detail of the 
policy (Hague 2002, 3; Interview D 2003; Interview M 2002). This task was left 
to those pro-European policy advisors and politicians employed within number 10 
and the Cabinet Office following the 1997 General Election which included George 
robertson to secretary of state for Defence,12 sir stephen Wall who was moved from 
UKREP to Head of the European Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, Peter Mandelson 
to the rank of Cabinet Minister without Portfolio and Roger Liddle as the PM’s 
personal political advisor (robertson, 2004; ahmed and hinscliff 2000, 4; Groom 
2001, 23). The Prime Minister’s use of his power of patronage was contextually 
significant to the extent that European policy expertise was predominantly in favour 
of further European integration and likely to drive this agenda focussed through 
Labour’s first term of office. Furthermore, the close involvement of the Prime 
Minister marks this policy out as a significant initiative in the first term of the Blair 
government but does not mark it out as being unusual. 
Lowest Common Denominator Agreements 
The presentation of the pro-EU defence policy used ‘successive limited comparisons’ 
to try and convince external actors of the uK position and to negotiate around this 
position.  the presentation of this policy to the clinton and Bush administrations, the 
us state Department, the us Department of Defense, the french government, and 
the domestic British audience was more akin to finding lowest common denominator 
positions. For example, the policy was presented to the US State Department, at desk 
officer level, as strengthening NATO, to the French President as a genuine advance 
towards a more closely integrated Eu and to the domestic audience as a policy 
that did not mean a loss of core national sovereignty nor one that would see uK 
armed personnel being forced into a European army controlled by a supranational 
Eu organization (tweedie 2002, 2; interview a 2002; interview E 2003; de Witte 
2004). 
the process of attaining lowest common denominator agreement allowed the 
headline goal of the policy – the improvement of Eu co-operation on defence 
issues – was to be advanced whilst not resolving the minutiae of policy detail. indeed, 
it is notable that the minutiae of the policy detail was entrusted to the two policy 
Directors of the MoD and FCO, Richard Hatfield and Emyr Jones-Parry, to negotiate 
with European governments within the confines of a framework established by the 
prime Minister and his secretaries of state (interview D 2003; interview G 2003). 
Whilst the pro-Eu uK defence policy arose partly in the absence of alternatives 
to meet the UK government’s short-term EU strategy and longer term UK defence 
ambitions in 1999 and 2000, the government invested a great deal of effort through 
12 Robertson was a leading figure in the pro-EU section of the Labour party. He was also 
a member of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and a Labour Party spokesman on 
Defence and foreign affairs, 1982-93.
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy36
bilateral negotiations with all Eu government in ensuring that the integration of 
defence policy was a success (interview D 2003; interview E 2002; interview 
G 2003). these efforts concentrated on securing agreement on operational and 
institutional arrangements and similarly ensuring that the smaller countries within 
the Eu were fully involved in the development of EsDp in the lead up to the nice 
IGC. (Interview A 2002; Interview E 2003; Jonson 2003). Gaining agreement on the 
Berlin plus provisions, which ensured Eu access to nato assets, and ensuring that 
smaller member governments remain actively involved in the process was described 
by a Cabinet Office official as being the only measure of success or failure the UK 
government holds for the saint Malo initiatives (interview M 2002; interview a 
2002). The official added that the importance for the UK government was that the 
EsDp became operationally credible once the Berlin plus provisions were signed 
(interview M 2002; interview a 2002). 
By using careful diplomatic presentation skills and avoiding negotiating on 
precise policy details UK government officials were then able to negotiate with a 
wide range of internal and external actors to reach a lowest common denomination 
agreement that allowed the saint Malo initiative to progress. in this respect a liberal 
intergovernmentalist framework accurately accounts for the process by which, in 
this instance agreement is reached.  
Conclusion: The Dominance of the Core Executive
the saint Malo and pörtschach examples, examined in this chapter demonstrate 
that the Prime Minister and his close advisors, on the basis of a desire to make 
a positive statement of intent at pörtschach, implied an aggregation of domestic 
policy pressures. the formulation of defence policy in the 1997-2000 period was 
completed on a narrow reading of national interests as defined by this small group of 
politicians and officials, within the core executive, who were motivated to achieve a 
particular aim and did so in a manner reminiscent of Lindblom’s ‘successive limited 
comparisons’ (Lindblom 1959). 
the saint Malo initiative amounted to a tactical shift of uK defence policy within 
established core preferences. this tactical shift aimed to meet a series of short-term 
Eu policy goals, the need to become engaged in European integration and to a far 
lesser extent maximize budgetary efficiencies within UK defence policy to focus 
finance on core government preferences. Furthermore, these initiatives aimed to 
meet long term defence policy goals of improving uK and Eu capabilities to meet 
military crises in the near abroad like the Balkans, but also to confront the long term 
problem of keeping the United States involved in EU security whilst still bearing the 
brunt of the burden of European security.   
in terms of bureaucratic processes, this chapter has highlighted the extent to 
which the domestic formulation of the Saint Malo process is similar to the ‘success 
limited comparisons’ model and therefore shows up a weakness in the liberal 
intergovernmental model. The ‘routine’ policy formulation processes were bypassed 
by the pM and the core executive to expedite the development of a Europeanized 
defence policy. Blair’s adoption, explicitly, of the ‘Presidential’ style of government 
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Domestic Policy Formulation: Pörtschach and Saint Malo 37
meant that the policy was directed by the pM and the core executive rather than 
being managed by the respective Whitehall departments. similarly, the pM ended the 
debate within Whitehall – that between the MoD and fco – with the announcement 
at Pörtschach, demonstrating, above all else, the influence of the PM on this 
particular policy. the detail of the policy and managing negotiations with other Eu 
governments were then entrusted to key officials particularly the Policy Directors of 
the fco and MoD, the security policy Directors of the fco and MoD and cabinet 
Office officials.  
the saint Malo process is also an example of the presentation-focussed politics 
that the Blair government is said to pursue (allen 2002, 6: shrivesley 2002, 20). 
Whilst alastair campbell was central in co-ordinating the presentation of the saint 
Malo initiative to the media at pörtschach and saint Malo, he as not, importantly 
key to the development of the policy itself. The presentation of the European UK 
defence policy to the MoD/fco post-pörtschach, to the french government and 
us president, state Department and Department of Defense, all focussed on lowest 
common denominator aspects of the policy that would result in broad agreement. 
this presentation technique aimed to advance the Europeanization of defence to a 
‘near finished stage’ where differences of policy objectives could be managed within 
the confines of new institutional structures.
interview evidence showed that important impacts of the saint Malo initiative 
were not considered by the Prime Minister and Cabinet Office officials, before 
announcing the policy shift at pörtschach, and then, latterly saint Malo.  uK policy 
makers did not consider the strong manpower, equipment and budgetary efficiency 
arguments that could be made to justify Europeanization. Such an omission highlights 
several weaknesses in LI’s explanations of domestic policy making. The first of 
these weaknesses was that the decision to adopt a pro-European defence policy 
was principally taken by the PM in the absence of domestic interest group pressure. 
Moreover, domestic interest groups merely provided support for this policy after the 
decision had been taken. Second, LI does not attribute priorities to influencing factors 
like budgetary efficiencies versus international positive or negative externalities. 
yet, the balance of evidence in respect of pörtschach and saint Malo is that positive 
externalities (geopolitical considerations and the desire to appear pro-European) 
were the principal motivations for a tactical change in policy.
thus, the balance of evidence is not that domestic policy formulation is based 
upon the aggregation of interest group preferences by the government, but that the 
MoD responded to a call from the PM to look for policy areas that the government 
could be effective with on the European stage. The PM’s desire was based on 
ideological motivation and the influence of positive and negative externalities. In 
contrast, the MoD’s motivations were geopolitical. Thus, while LI provides a useful 
framework to explore domestic policy formulation – it highlights the value of interest 
groups and the role of governments in aggregating these interests – it provides an 
inaccurate explanation of domestic policy formulation in this example. What this 
chapter also highlights is the utility of Lindblom’s ‘successive limited comparisons’ 
framework – which emphasizes the atomized nature of intra and inter-departmental 
negotiations, an important dynamic in this policy area. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy38
in sum, this chapter has demonstrated that the formal Europeanization of British 
defence policy formulation by the ‘new’ Labour government was done by a very 
small number of officials within the ‘core executive’ and at great speed to satisfy the 
twin short-term political needs of the government’s EU policy and to improve the 
EU’s autonomous military capabilities. Importantly the chapter has highlighted the 
salience of personal relationships within the core executive on uK defence policy 
formulation and its speed, and offers this as a contrast to the somewhat ponderous 
pace of much defence policy reform. the vital difference in this case was that defence 
policy was adopted as a Prime Ministerial project and became subject to extra 
political pressure and opportunism by key officials. As will be shown in Chapter 7, 
the rapid Europeanization of the arms trade has resulted from very different drivers, 
which are just as salient within Europeanization as the pre-eminence of the core 
executive in deriving Europeanized domestic policy. 
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chapter 3
intergovernmental Bargains:  
concepts and preparations
The next two chapters explore what this book terms ‘formal Europeanization’ 
as it occurs at the intergovernmental level – more precisely the codification of 
supranational provisions that entrench Europeanized policies. this chapter focuses 
on the example of the negotiation of the EsDp at the nice iGc (february-December 
2000) and particularly the role of officials and politicians. Nineteen elite interviews 
with the UK and French IGC negotiating teams as well as officials from the European 
commission provide the basis upon which patterns of negotiation are drawn out as 
well as their implications for Europeanization. 
this research demonstrates that British government negotiators effectively 
managed the EsDp negotiations and therefore ensured the Europeanization of 
defence occurred with the maximum number of British preferences uploaded into 
the European level. The British government’s success in uploading its defence 
preferences goes against much of the Europeanization literature that suggests that 
preferences are downloaded from the supranational to national level. Moreover, 
the government’s success in locking in British preferences to the European level 
demonstrates the UK’s relative strength over defence and security policy. Moreover 
it shows the effectiveness of the British government’s co-ordinating machinery 
within the FCO and Cabinet Office to ensure that British preferences prevailed. This 
chapter further highlights the extent to which diplomatic effort and issue-specific 
negotiations was done outside of the formal IGC structures; specifically in terms of 
the bilateral meetings between government delegations to agree ‘win-set’ positions 
before the formal iGc process. the chapter further argues that negotiations on issues 
that can be construed a  forming part of a Europeanization agenda are a process of 
‘successive limited comparisons’ between negotiators who were trying to secure a 
position that met with all their respective lowest common denominator aspirations. 
in providing evidence for this the chapter examines the tactics that were used and the 
positions that were conceded to reach consensus between the states parties. 
liberal intergovernmentalist explanations of intergovernmental negotiating 
are particularly helpful to examining the Nice IGC’s codification of ESDP. This 
analysis progresses through a liberal intergovernmentalist framework and examines 
seven factors, namely: governments are the principal units in the international 
system; negotiations are dominated by governments who have intense issue-specific 
preferences and capabilities; effective international bargaining is only viable if there 
is preference convergence; geopolitical and exogenous factors were significant in 
the negotiations; governments act as ‘gate-keepers’ between domestic electorates 
and international negotiators; negotiated outcomes are lowest common denominator 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy40
agreements; and the Eu is an international regime for the co-ordination of national 
policies. These seven factors are used to provide a framework for the chapter and for 
the analysis of this set of negotiations. 
this chapter argues that liberal intergovernmentalist explanations of international 
bargaining are convincing. it further argues that national governments were the 
principal actors in the negotiations, to the exclusion of the EU’s supranational 
institutions – this being partly a facet of the nature of defence policy, and partly a 
feature of structural position of governments in the Eu. furthermore, a number of 
governments who held strong issue-specific preferences and capabiliti s dominated 
the negotiations and the final outcome reflected a convergence of these governments’ 
preferences. This chapter also argues that negotiators retain a ‘gatekeeper’ role 
between domestic public and political audiences and other member government 
negotiators and, furthermore, that the EU’s primary function is to serve as a co-
ordinating forum for national policies. 
International Bargaining 
By way of a review, liberal intergovernmentalist explanations of international 
bargaining revolve around the following central elements. that lobbying from 
domestic interest groups creates pressures on the government to change domestic 
policy. then, if governments decide that a collaborative Eu policy is in the national 
interest it then tries to coordinate the policy through international negotiations. 
Moreover, governments enter international negotiations with the aim of achieving 
a more favourable outcome than if they had continued to pursue an independent 
national policy. international negotiations provide a supply side solution to member 
governments’ demands for international policy solutions and further LI assumes that 
negotiations pose practical challenges in the need to ‘create’ and ‘claim’ value (Lax 
and sebenius 1992, 50).
the optimum negotiating position remains un-theorized – all that existing 
European integration theories are prepared to do is assert that a negotiated outcome 
will be optimal. the ability to pinpoint the settlement area would be an important 
aspect of creating a formal theory of Europeanization. however, what we are left with 
is a hypothesis that iGcs resulting in treaty amendments produce better outcomes 
than could be achieved by the government acting unilaterally. To ‘create value’ 
negotiators must reach a mutually beneficial consensus and to claim it they must 
reach an agreement. the outcome might not conclude at the most optimal point for 
the government, because of strategic decisions taken during negotiations to concede 
particular issues on tactical or ideological grounds or to change policy proposals 
during those negotiations but it must produce a benefit for them.  
the distributional outcomes of the negotiations are the principal focus of 
negotiators when they attempt to ‘claim value’. This assumes that the political costs 
of failing to reach an agreed outcome outweigh the distributional costs of agreeing to 
a disadvantageous agreement. logically then, this means that the analytical focus is 
on the problem of claiming rather than creating value. However, on issues of ‘high’ 
politics, like defence and security, where governments hold intense preferences, there 
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Intergovernmental Bargains: Concepts and Preparations 41
may be a demand for compromise but governments are likely to be more sensitive 
to their interests and therefore be more willing to resist when they perceive that a 
negative sum game exists. so, there is a general principle that negotiations try to 
claim value in negotiations; but with the substantial caveat that if the policy under 
negotiation touches upon issues of ‘high-politics’ and core sovereignty governments 
are more likely to choose to end negotiations without agreement than to agree to a 
suboptimal conclusion. 
there is a further assumption that iGc negotiations are non-coercive and 
therefore negotiators can veto or ‘opt out’ of agreements and are not forced to 
comply (forster and Blair 2002, 108). Moreover, iGc negotiators are aided by an 
information-rich system. negotiators in Eu bargaining are aware of the preferences 
and constraints of other negotiators, and are also aware of the technical implications 
of enforcing any particular outcome – this set of information is made available by 
the Commission, in particular. The free flow of information between negotiators 
is further assisted by the permanent representations (corEpEr) and European 
Council that bring negotiators within close everyday working proximity of each other 
(forster and Blair 2002, 108).1 the value of these interactions is often disregarded 
by Eu studies scholars. the interaction between the permanent representatives, 
the commission and the European council is important however, as a part of the 
process of intergovernmental bargaining that codifies the salient element of informal 
integration that occurs on an everyday basis (Moravcsik 1998, 490). 
Moravcsik argues that the transaction costs within intergovernmental bargaining 
are relatively low because of the efficiencies that are generated through the IGC 
infrastructure, which facilitate flows of information between negotiating parties 
(Moravcsik 1998, 479). Transaction costs are similarly reduced by lengthy 
negotiations and therefore the flow of information through regularized channels, 
rather than channels created specifically for that set of negotiations. 
the nice iGc lasted ten months (19 february to 11 December 2000), during 
which negotiators were able to table numerous proposals and counter-proposals with 
few attached costs. indeed, this chapter argues that a great deal of EsDp negotiations 
were conducted outside of the formal IGC frameworks. Conversely proposals made 
in the last four days of the iGc, 7-11 December 2000, regarding institutional reform 
imposed costs on negotiating time and entailed opportunity costs, because of the 
1 corEpEr (comité des représentants permanents) is based on article 207 of the 
treaty of rome. Every Member state has a permanent representative in the Eu with the 
rank of ambassador. The fifteen Permanent Representatives together form the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives, better known as COREPER. When the ambassadors meet, this 
happens in COREPER II. COREPER I consists of fifteen deputy Permanent Representatives. 
Under COREPER, there are numerous functional working groups with officials who prepare 
the subjects in the various policy fields. The Permanent Representatives prepare the activities 
of the council and carry out the assignments given by the council (article 207). corEpEr 
makes its decisions on the basis of the findings of the functional working groups. In these 
matters, the permanent representatives have a certain margin of negotiation granted them 
by their governments, with which they also continually hold consultation in the course of the 
negotiations. Pieter Jan Boon (information specialist, European Documentation Centre based 
at the tilburg university library).
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy42
finite time to analyse and respond to these proposals. Side-payments and issue 
linkages (both of which are negotiating strategies that tie one set of negotiations 
to another) are similarly tools used by negotiators to facilitate agreement during 
iGc bargaining, although there is little evidence that these tools were used in the 
EsDp negotiations. these negotiations were left in isolation precisely because the 
British government, in particular, tried to secure agreements on key terms before 
the December round of the IGC. The importance of being the first negotiator to 
move, sequencing, strategic misinterpretation, the use of coercive threats, and 
unilateral commitments are negated as important factors by the assumptions liberal 
intergovernmentalist explanations make.2 
the operating assumptions outlined above limit the scope for negotiators to 
conclude radical and path-breaking deals. Therefore the cost of not ratifying an 
agreement provides a focal point for predicting negotiations. Moravcsik notes this 
pressure as ‘...the simple but credible threat of non-agreement provides rational 
governments with their most fundamental form of bargaining power’ (Moravcsik 
1998, 65). This can be reduced to a cost-benefit analysis of whether advantage lies in 
co-ordinating national policies into Eu policy or retaining national policies. 
Domestic pressures and the size of potential domestic ‘win-sets’ informs 
judgements about whether to pursue a co-ordinated EU policy or an independent 
policy.3 Moreover, international bargains can influence the views of domestic interest 
groups. these groups can change their preferences in the light of international 
negotiations to create a greater opportunity to effective ratification of the negotiated 
output (putnam 1992, 457-8). thus the process of bargaining is not a static process 
of international negotiations followed by a process of seeking a domestic win-set, 
but is conceptualized as a process of reactions to negotiations that have effects 
at the domestic level which in turn re-informs the government’s negotiators as to 
whether they can secure domestic support for the negotiated outcome (putnam 
1992, 457-8). 
the assumption that governments behave rationally leads to a position that these 
governments will not accept collective Eu policies that they perceive to be inferior 
to autonomous national policies. a further and somewhat reductive assumption that 
follows on from this is that collective policies that are subject to negotiation are 
already deemed to be to the advantage of those Eu governments willing to negotiate 
subject to the output meeting the win-sets of all negotiators; if policies were not 
part of a positive sum analysis they would not have made it to the negotiating 
table (Moravcsik 1998, 492). Thus, because IGC negotiations must conclude with 
2 Side payments are payments or benefits in kind to achieve a mutually acceptable 
balancing of benefits between negotiators. Side payments are used by those governments 
with intense preferences to overcome the objections or reservations the reluctant negotiating 
party might have about the particular issue under negotiation. Issue linkage is the connection 
of multiple issues within a negotiation to broaden the bargaining so that a greater range of 
issues and, therefore, a higher percentage of the total bargain. By broadening negotiations to 
incorporate multiple issues, the negotiating parties find it more problematic to reject a linked 
negotiation over multiple issues than on a single-issue basis.
3 Win-sets are achieved when policies meet the approval of relevant constituencies and 
form an essential part of Putnam’s two level game analysis. 
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unanimous support from the member governments, iGc outcomes can only be driven 
beyond the lowest common denominator through the construction of coalitions, the 
use of ‘opt-outs’ and the threat of exclusion from the bargain. 
a dominant view within European studies is that iGcs are the turning points 
of Eu history. this rationale leads to the conclusion that Europeanization and 
European integration are intergovernmental, and negotiations are liber l to the 
extent that governments have no uniform national interests (Moravcsik 1993, 480). 
placing governments at the centre of Europeanization develops limits their role to 
that of a conduit through which domestic actors influence domestic government 
policy rather than directly influencing international bargaining. T e separation of 
domestic producer and interest groups from international bargaining is crucial to an 
understanding of how negotiations proceed and why governments retain primacy in 
the formal Europeanization of policy. thus, in the formal policy area governments 
are able to perform a gate-keeper role between domestic politics, producer group 
pressure and international bargaining.  
The analogy of a gate-keeper role is strong in the context of an intergovernmental 
negotiation – politicians and officials from national governments are the lead actors 
in any bargaining round. Where this account begins to lose some of its strength is 
in placing the negotiations, the experience of officials and recent nation to nation 
diplomacy in context. to situate Eu intergovernmental negotiations within these 
contexts immediately throws open the prospect that informal routes of Europeanization 
that are arguably formed from the continental European experiences of officials 
having embassy placements in the early stages of their careers, working alongside 
continental colleagues on Eu related problems and issues, right up to nationally 
instituted structural frameworks that promote a Europeanized way of thinking 
and working. Whilst it can be said that all of these informal routes are to a greater 
and lesser extent informed by formal methods of integration; there is considerable 
analytical value in exploring them separately.  
if one views international bargains as the product of a convergence of member 
governments’ interests and are often the expression of the lowest common 
denominator between governments, then possible linkages between issue areas 
dramatically effects what a government will view to be in its core interests. this 
links back to the previous discussion about where negotiators view the optimum 
bargaining outcome occurs. In particular, linking multiple issues makes it far more 
difficult to accurately plot where a negotiations settlement area will fall. However, 
all of this analysis leads to the conclusion that the Eu is an international regime that 
facilitates the co-ordination of national policies, rather than providing a political 
system – a higher level of government, which is undermined by the conclusions of 
Chapter Seven that the EU has adopted state-like attributes in formulating policies 
about the European defence industrial base.   
States are the Principal Units in the International System 
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist framework suggests that governments 
are the principal units in the international system, international negotiations and 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy44
specifically the EU. In the latter two cases this is because the EU and its institutions 
derive their legal framework and legitimacy from the member governments. 
Moreover, significant developments to institutions and constitutional treaties are also 
determined by the member governments. the superiority of member governments 
in the Eu is contested because of the developing role of supranational institutions 
(Moravsik 1998, 491; cf Arnold 2002; Boswold and Oppermann 2006). These 
institutions add a layer of decision-making and authority that some, including Jeremy 
richardson, argue undermine the primacy of member governments (richardson 1999, 
5). However, as Moravcsik argues, governments are the principal actors in treaty 
negotiations, giving them primary significance over the EU and EU integration. 
the Eu is founded on international treaty bargains in which the member 
governments are the sole signatories. iGcs are conducted in a political system in 
which governments are able to veto the entire package of deals being negotiated 
(Putnam 1992, 457). Indeed vetoing a single element of the package has the effect 
of vetoing the entire package unless provision is made for a government to ‘opt 
out’ as the UK government did at Maastricht, with the social chapter provisions 
(Forster 1999, 351-2). The ability to ‘opt out’ offers a substantial challenge to the 
conception that the most compelling reason to negotiate is the fear of not agreeing as 
they effectively insulate negotiators from these effects. thus, the main consideration 
for discontented governments is a cost benefit analysis of vetoing the entire package, 
versus the cost of accepting a disadvantageous policy. 
the EsDp negotiations were almost the sole preserve of governments. the 
negotiations were dominated by the member governments from the saint Malo 
Accords, through the Cologne and Helsinki Councils in 3-4 June and 10-11 December 
1999 and then through to the nice iGc, 7-11 December 2000. the European 
parliament and WEu through debates, research and public pronouncements tried to 
exert pressure and influence on the member governments between the Saint Malo 
accords and the iGc (European council regulation 2000; European parliament 
1999). 
European Parliament (EP)
MEPs find themselves unable to strongly influence the British government’s 
policies and preferences through an institutional exclusion from domestic politics. 
The links between UK MEPs and their domestic political parties are not as close as 
uK Mps with their party political machineries. MEps do not have a right of access 
to the houses of parliament or their research facilities and are not included in the 
consultation processes of the three major UK political parties (Newton-Dunn 2002; 
clegg 2002; White 2004). the Ep was restricted to a lobbying role between saint 
Malo and the final stages of the Nice IGC, 7-11 December 2000. The EP lobbied 
extensively with government negotiators to enhance the communautaire elements 
of EsDp, and to give a greater role to the Ep in initiating foreign policies that might 
necessitate a military element (newton-Dunn 2002; clegg 2002). 
the Ep was, as an institution, excluded from the negotiations at nice, sending 
instead two official observers, Elmar Brok and Dmitris Tsatos. At previous IGCs 
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Intergovernmental Bargains: Concepts and Preparations 45
Ep observers had no formal voting powers, but were consulted by negotiators.4 the 
unwritten understanding of this arrangement is that whilst the Ep cannot formally 
negotiate, if the observers express a very strong disagreement on an issue this will 
have a bearing on the negotiations (interview M; interview h; interview D; interview 
G). the Ep has to ratify new treaties and as a result retains some generalized leverage 
over the integration process, although the consequences of an Ep veto would have 
far reaching consequences for the EU (Evans-Pritchard and Jones, 2000). Agence 
Europe reported that the EP observers at the Nice IGC, particularly Elmar Brok, were 
‘upset’ at the lack of consultation but with little practical effect (Bulletin Quotidien 
7863, 2000). 
the European commission voluntarily played a limited role in the negotiations 
of the EsDp. former Vice-president of the commission lord Brittan noted that there 
was an institutional taboo surrounding the commission discussing or promoting 
greater integration in the security or defence spheres as this is a policy area in 
which governments have exclusive control (lord Brittan 2002). according to lord 
Brittan the commissioners are conscious of their supplicant position to governments 
because the commission derives its legitimacy, role and function from treaties 
agreed between member governments (cini 1999, 20-1 and 224; christiansen 2000, 
11; lord Brittan 2002). 
Between 1998 and 2000 the commission was sceptical about whether the Eu 
member governments would provide a credible security and defence policy with 
associated capabilities (lord Brittan 2002; lord Garden 2002). During the iGc agence 
Europe reported that the commission publicly expressed preferences concerning 
EsDp (Bulletin Quotidien 7865, 2000).  further evidence from negotiators suggests 
that the EsDp was negotiated and shaped through ministerial meetings in addition 
to regular meetings between foreign and Defence ministries, not as a response to 
European commission pronouncements (interview E; interview f).5 
The strength of evidence is that supranational institutions like the EP and the 
commission playing a highly marginalized role – in the case of the former because 
of its structural position and in the latter because it opted to remain a supplicant party 
to the intergovernmental bargaining. however, the Ep and European commission 
did play a role in forming the wider, informed debate on the subject. Interviewees 
like Lord Robertson and Lord Brittan argued from different positions that these 
institutions had raised the profile of the ESDP debate (Lord Robertson 2004; Lord 
Brittan 2002).6 
4 Both interview M and Bill newton-Dunn have previously been closely involved with 
iGc negotiations. 
5 Interview E came to this view from the perspective of having worked on the Saint 
Malo initiative and the bilateral negotiations with the french and other Eu governments 
from 1998. he viewed this more in terms of a routine exchange of policy ideas. interview 
f was particularly involved in the iGc negotiations and thus was able to point to the 
relative exceptionalism of conducting an entire policy negotiation outside of the formal iGc 
framework. 
6 Lord Robertson said they had raised the profile of the debate but were often wide of the 
mark in addressing key issues whilst Lord Brittan felt that they brought positive contributions 
to the debates.  
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy46
one observation that results from the role of the commission and the parliament 
is that not only do the supranational institutions not help in advancing European 
integration in areas that they intervene in, but that they can also serve to slow or 
reverse processes of formal Europeanization. however, the two institutions did play 
a role in shaping an informed debate amongst the policy community about EsDp 
and European integration. Key UK officials argue that this did not have significant 
effects on the direction and outcome of their negotiations with other Eu governments, 
although the real effect of this intervention is very hard to measure. the hypothesis that 
governments were the principal actors in the EsDp negotiations is highly persuasive. 
Furthermore, the existing literature on EU bargaining under-specifies the extent to 
which the flow of information between supranational institutions and negotiators 
impacts on the negotiations, and as this relates to the example of Nice the flow of 
information between the European commission, Ep and the bargaining governments 
had a very limited impact on EsDp negotiations. however, as chapter seven will 
show the European commission and European parliament can generate the effect 
of rapidly deepening and widening Europeanization given conducive circumstances 
and pre-existing agreement that establish an exploitable policy framework. 
International Structural Factors do not Shape National Interests. National 
Interests and Preferences are Shaped Through the Domestic Policy Process
in asserting that governments are the leading actors in the international system, 
one must then conclude that domestic political processes, rather than international 
systemic pressures, drive national interests. this section explores the domestic and 
international pressures on the British government to pursue a Europeanized defence 
policy. 
there are three broad contentions concerning the domestic pressure on the British 
government to pursue a pro-European defence policy. the pre-determinist argument 
is that the Labour party’s 1997 manifesto informed its desire to show leadership in a 
European policy area (Key 2002; redwood 2002). the conservative party politician 
John Redwood is a leading advocate of this argument: 
My view, in general, is that the Government wrongly offered defence an area where it 
thought it could lead, and divert attention away from its failure to join the Euro, as part of 
its posturing over Eu policy (redwood 2002).
this position is supported by, former conservative party leader and opposition 
Defence spokesman, Iain Duncan Smith in testimony to the House of Lords Select 
committee on European issues sub-committee concerning Defence (Gourlay 
2002; house of lords select committee on the Eu 2000; George 2002; Key 2002). 
In addition to these politically motivated opponents who are naturally keen to be 
critical of government policy there was also media commentary claiming that the 
Saint Malo initiative was linked to the government’s reticence to be positive on the 
single currency (livingstone 1998; Daily telegraph 2000). the pre-determinist view 
is not only held by members of the conservative and liberal Democrat parties, but 
also some members of the parliamentary labour party (plp) who were a quiet and 
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Intergovernmental Bargains: Concepts and Preparations 47
acquiescent minority to the pM and the core executive. these Mps believe that the 
government pursued the policy as an end in its own right but that this also saved 
the government from having to take a politically dangerous decision regarding the 
single currency (George 2002; Palmer 2002; White 2004). The government’s plans 
for Europeanizing British defence did not face substantial opposition within the 
plp beyond a desire to secure guarantees that the saint Malo initiative would not 
undermine nato.
International pressure on the UK’s domestic policy can be seen, for example, 
through the scepticism that exists about how reliable the United States’ commitment 
to European security is. This discourse states that to retain America’s involvement 
in European security Britain has to persuade European allies to bolster their military 
capabilities to ‘share the burden’ of European security (Daily Telegraph 2000; White 
1998; Eastham 2000; Berger 1999). the concern over us presidential and state 
Department’s attitudes towards the EU ran parallel to the UK government arguing 
for military action in Kosovo (Parker 2003; Peel 2003; Brogan 2000). The Prime 
Minister was convinced by George robertson and his European policy advisor, 
stephen Wall that the government could act to bolster the transatlantic alliance and 
also fulfil the Labour party’s election manifesto pledge to become a ‘force for good’ 
in the world (robertson 2004; George 2002; interview M).7 saint Malo was a timely 
initiative as it extended the anglo-french co-operation that had operated in Kosovo 
(Wallace 2002; interview c). Military collaboration provided the context in which 
the UK MoD felt confident in promoting closer a Europeanized defence policy 
(andreani, Bertram and Grant 2001; Grant 1998; interview i). 
charles Grant, Director of the centre for European reform, spent a great 
deal of time discussing these issues with FCO, MoD and Cabinet Office officials, 
particularly with the policy units of the MoD and fco and the European secretariat 
of the Cabinet Office as well as with Tony Blair’s personal political advisor Roger 
Liddle (Grant 2002). The evidence is that Liddle was impressed by Grant’s case for 
European defence integration and similarly that liddle conveyed these arguments to 
the Prime Minister. The fact that the policy was taken forward is strong evidence of 
the persuasiveness of these views (Wallace 2002; interview i; interview M).8 Grant 
supported the idea of Eu based defence as a means to strengthen the nato alliance 
whilst promoting a serious french defence contribution in the eyes of the alliance 
through the Saint Malo initiative (Schake, Block-Laine and Grant 1999). Grant’s 
7 The balance of the evidence suggests that Hatfield and his Policy Unit created drew up 
the Saint Malo initiative and potential impacts and presented it to George Robertson. Hatfield 
convinced robertson of the merits of the policy who then brought it forward to the prime 
Minister. Robertson’s divergence from this view comes from his account that he instructed 
Hatfield to produce this policy. It is not clear from the evidence which of these views is the 
strongest. Officials were not keen to suggest explicitly that they had worked on this without 
instruction although they were happy to strongly infer this.  
8 This point is linked to a broader issue about how Tony Blair has conducted his 
Premiership. Lord Wallace and Interview M argued that Blair was keen to seek views outside 
of the confines of Whitehall but with the caveat that these views came from ‘trusted’ sources – 
hence the relative importance of roger liddle and charles Grant who are informed European 
commentators with the confidence of the PM. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy48
role is perceived to be a strong external validating influence on Blair’s opinions on 
this policy, although as discussed in chapter 2 a multitude of actors and institutions 
were included in the consultation process to provide validation for a policy direction 
already settled by Downing Street (White 2004; Black 2003).9
Those who view Saint Malo as a ‘unique opportunity’ argue that negoti tions 
took place in the context of converging disparate motivations that culminated in 
the saint Malo accords (Gnesotto 2002; lord Wallace 2002; lord Garden 2003). 
these converging motivations were that the pro-European preferences of the labour 
government resulted in government departments developing policy ar as that could 
be Europeanized and that pro-EU defence policies were linked to UK government 
intransigence on the single currency. The linkage of these two motivations implies 
the co-ordination of domestic policies within a European framework that all EU 
member governments engage in (lord Brittan 2002; lord Wallace 2002).10 
the unique opportunity argument also suggests that the labour government 
made a step-change in thinking from previous governments in deciding there were 
tangible benefits in Europeanizing a policy issue from inception rather than joining 
once the framework of the policy had been established as they had done with every 
other significant EU project including the inception of the Union itself (Interview D; 
interview G; interview M; sowemimo 1999, 349).  furthermore, the development 
of nato, coupled with the increasing reticence of the united states to intervene in 
so-called ‘out-of-area’ operations and the reluctance of America to intervene in the 
case of the Kosovo Albanians contributed to the ‘unique opportunity’ of Saint Malo 
(Dunn 2001, 151; Clarke and Cornish 2002, 777-8). 
Richard Hatfield convened a working group within the MoD from December 
1997 to June 1998, to develop policy proposals around EU based solutions for 
European security and defence issues. Detail of the membership of the working 
group is restricted information.11 This working group concluded that European 
security and defence could be strengthened to the benefit of both the UK and NATO 
(interview B; interview D). the rationale for this conclusion was that the us is more 
likely to want to act in conjunction with a militarily strengthened EU (Grant 2002; 
lord Garden 2002; interview c). EsDp should militarily strengthen the Eu because 
it provides a framework through which to engage in a multilateral defence initiative 
and also to share the US’ burden of European security (Dunn 2001, 146). This line of 
thinking was successfully promoted by Richard Hatfield to both George Robertson, 
the secretary of state for Defence and then onto the prime Minister, core executive 
and the cabinet. 
9 Michael White described Grant as being part of Blair’s inner circle and confirmed that 
rumours around Westminster at the time were that saint Malo had been inspired by him. ian 
Black also supported this view.   
10 Although this concept was expressly rejected by the Prime Minister’s personal 
political advisor Roger Liddle who maintained that each policy area was taken and negotiated 
on its own merits to the exclusion of any potential linkages, this is a minority view of the 23 
relevant interviewees in this book.    
11 The author was refused information as to the membership of this working party.
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The policy work completed by Richard Hatfield’s working group was exceptional 
in its range and scope, taking in possible outcomes and scenarios as a response to the 
Prime Minister’s request for departments to find areas in which the UK government 
could be pro-active in Europeanizing. the exceptionalism of this group comes from 
the extent to which Hatfield drove this work forward and was able to present the 
Secretary of State with a very well developed set of proposals (Hopkinson 2002; 
Garden 2002).12 William Hopkinson (former Assistant Under Secretary of State in the 
MoD) argues that it is not necessarily exceptional to have working parties examining 
areas of policy, but it is exceptional for that working party to devise a marketing 
strategy for the policy as well as scoping all possible counter proposals and obstacles 
that might be made by negotiating parties and the United States (Hopkinson 2002). 
Hopkinson argues that the particularly enthusiastic work of the Hatfield working 
party was because of Hatfield’s personal view that Europeanized solutions should be 
sought (Interview C; Interview D, Hopkinson 2002). This MoD working group was 
also one part of a federation of competing bureaucratic interests that were distilled 
by the prime Minister and his close advisers – an aggregation of domestic interest 
groups akin to the liberal intergovernmentalist conception of policy formulation. 
Those close to Lord Guthrie argue that towards June and July of 1998 senior 
military officials, including Guthrie himself, viewed the UK’s Strategic Defence 
review (sDr) as facilitating closer collaboration with other Eu governments 
by gearing the British armed forces to the ‘small and flexible’ roles of peace 
enforcement and humanitarian missions which were to become part of the EsDp 
(nice treaty 2000, annex ii to Vi). Moreover, the sDr made clear that the British 
government was taking the potential of the EU’s CFSP seriously as a useful tool of 
foreign policy (house of commons select committee 1999). the sDr established 
a change in uK strategic preferences that would allow a more effective use of the 
defence budget (Interview D; Interview G; HM Treasury 2002; Rogers 1998; Clarke 
1998a; house of commons Defence select committee Evidence 1998). Moreover, 
despite hostility towards policies that might undermine the transatlantic alliance, 
senior military officials were broadly in favour of policies that would encourage 
European allies to increase their domestic defence spending and improve capabilities 
(Interview C; Hopkinson 2002). Indeed, one interviewee believes that the Petersberg 
tasks and ESDP provides a more realistic range of tasks for the British military in 
the twenty first century (Interview C). Despite reticence towards a policy that might 
undermine nato the chief of the Defence staff steered the services into a position 
of constructive engagement with the government offering conditional acceptances 
to their policy proposals (interview c; interview D). thus, evidence suggests that 
the national interests that guided Britain’s approach and negotiating strategies for a 
Europeanized defence policy were derived from domestic pressures, but there are 
several notable counter-factual arguments to this view.
Howarth suggests three key exogenous factors that shaped the development of 
EsDp: the degree of political will generated in the Eu from the saint Malo conference 
12 Hopkinson and Garden as former senior MoD officials argued that the prominence 
of a single individual in this process was unusual. a more usual route would be that the 
consideration of the policy be widened to a greater number of MoD officials. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy50
in December 1998; the emergence of a military industrial base, which occurred 
outside of any British government entrepreneurship; and transatlantic consensus 
on NATO and the British commitment to the ESDP project (Howarth 2000, 93). 
Elizabeth Pond argues that the EU’s impotence in the Kosovo crisis was the key 
driver in the ESDP negotiations (Pond 1999, 77). The UK government’s position on 
the saint Malo initiatives and EsDp can be attributed to exogenous factors and the 
belief that EsDp strengthens transatlantic relations (interview D; interview G; lord 
robertson 2004). this was the position of the government before, during and after 
the Saint Malo negotiations and indeed this book argues was an innovative response 
by the government to the problem of retaining nato and us interests in European 
security.
a further intergovernmental negotiation that assisted the development of EsDp 
was a parallel development in NATO. The NATO framework document of 24 
april 1999 produced a new defence role for the European members of nato. the 
announcement produced a formal link between EU military initiatives and internal 
NATO restructuring (Rutten 2001, 29). This link aimed to modernize the Alliances 
military forces for ‘out of area’ and ‘peace enforcement’ tasks but was a modest 
and unsuccessful endeavour (rutten 2001, 29 and 54-59). at the nato summit, 
the British government representatives praised ‘...the determination of both EU 
members and other European allies to make the necessary steps to strengthen their 
defence capabilities’ (Rutten 2001, 26).  
the nato summit, 23 and 24 april 1999, produced agreement amongst the 
Heads of State and government on NATO conducting ‘out of area’ operations (Hura 
et al 2000, 1). American officials were keen that NATO could conduct out of area 
operations without the need for a united nations mandate. Despite military operations 
in Kosovo having a formal un security council resolution mandate European 
governments refused to agree to the new strategic concept practice of conducting 
‘peace-enforcement’ operations without UN approval (Rutten 2001, 24-25). NATO 
members acknowledged ESDP developments and particularly the EU governments’ 
enthusiasm for being able to conduct autonomous actions (rutten 2001, 22). the Eu 
negotiators, principally the UK and German government officials, secured agreement 
from america on access to nato capabilities, based on the following principles:
 
assured Eu access to nato planning capabilities able to contribute to military 
planning for Eu-led operations. 
The presumption of the availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO 
capabilities and common assets for use in Eu-led operations.
Identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations, 
further developing the role of DsacEur in order for him to assume fully and 
effectively his European responsibilities. 
The further adaptation of Nato’s defence planning system to incorporate more 
comprehensively the availability of forces for Eu-led operations (rutten 
2001, 22). 
Pressure for the UK government’s initiative on European defence might at least in 
part have stemmed from the reform in NATO during the 1990s (Grant 2002; Rifkind 
a.
b.
c.
d.
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Intergovernmental Bargains: Concepts and Preparations 51
2004).13 if this is the case it leaves interest formulation in a conceptually problematic 
position, as it would suggest that developments within international institutions can 
drive both domestic policy formulation and the creation of negotiating strategies. 
however, the evidence suggests that uK government preferences within nato and 
the Eu were determined by the pressure exerted by policy groups within the MoD 
and ‘new’ Labour’s wider policy circle whose views were informed by a conducive 
political agenda and the experiences in the Balkans during the 1990s.   
The EU is an International Regime for National Policy Co-ordination 
Moravcsik argues that the EU is an international regime for national policy co-
ordination (Moravcsik 1998, 20-21). His analysis is that as governments are the 
principal actors in international negotiations, as a result of the pre-eminence of 
intergovernmental bargaining in Europeanization and this leads to the position that 
the EU’s institutions are merely co-ordinating and regulating institutions (Moravcsik 
1998, 19-21). The ECJ and Commission’s outputs in terms of legal judgments and 
regulations and directives are cited as counter-factual arguments to this view. the 
ECJ, in certain key judicial decisions, has extended the policy remit of the EU beyond 
the point where the Eu co-ordinates domestic policies determined by member 
governments. The ‘Factortame’ series of cases both in the House of Lords and the 
ECJ extended the judicial principle established in the so-called ‘Costa’ (1967) case 
that the ECJ was the superior court to the UK’s House of Lords (Factortame 1990-
2001). the importance of these examples is central to the debate about what the 
European Union is and how it treats Europeanized policies. LI’s view of the EU, 
is that it is a regime for coordinating and regulating the transfer of fifteen and now 
twenty-five governments’ sovereignty, reducing transaction costs and preserving 
governmental sovereignty on an issue specific area. 
the federalist view of the Eu is that it provides a higher form of government than 
national governments and thus on policies in which it has competencies it behaves 
as a replacement for national governments. However, in a policy area like ESDP, 
where governments dominate, the institutional framework of the EU as a way of 
coordinating government policies. security and defence are areas of core national 
sovereignty – the importance of this case study to Europeanization as a political 
phenomenon is in its symbolism as an area in which many commentators argued 
competency would remain outside of EU frameworks.   
the EsDp negotiations and treaty articles provide strong evidence of the Eu as 
a co-ordinating forum for domestic policies. the tight constraints on the direction of 
EsDp, through negotiations by the uK and three other governments, partly explains 
why the Eu is limited as an actor in the case of EsDp. to ensure parliamentary 
ratification would be forthcoming after the negotiations had concluded, UK 
government negotiators judged that they had to ensure that any operational element 
13 charles Grant argued that the discussions in nato about EsDi and the following 
reforms had provided an additional motivation for the saint Malo initiative. Malcolm 
Rifkind countered this with his opinion that greater efforts should have been sought to keep 
Europeanized defence within a strictly NATO framework.  
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy52
of EsDp remained under the control of governments rather than providing the Eu 
with the ability to take decisions under delegated authority (Interview D; Interview 
E; interview G).14 in the example of EsDp, the Eu has been used as a means by 
which to coordinate national policies without the need to recourse to individual 
bilateral agreements, which would bring considerable transaction costs. 
The ESDP negotiations provided UK officials with a forum and framework for 
advancing their preferences for enhanced co-operation on security and defence 
within the Eu, which they could coordinate through close liaison with the other 
negotiating parties prior to the formal negotiations at Nice. The framework provided 
by the EU allowed UK officials to advance an agenda of security preferences that 
provided for the transfer of modest amounts of sovereignty to the Eu on security and 
defence. This would be a transfer that did not undermine the EU’s NATO maintained 
security provision. EsDp established an innovative way of using nato capabilities 
when the alliance as a whole is not involved in the proposed military action. 
Conceptually, this chapter has highlighted the dynamics within ‘formal 
Europeanization’ and the processes at work behind the preparation for 
intergovernmental negotiations, processes that are unique to the formal 
Europeanization of defence, but not necessarily to other Europeanization processes. 
the next chapter advances these themes through the nice negotiations to explore 
the exceptional way ESDP negotiations were kept separate and distinct from other 
issues areas and the patterns of negotiation that occurred there. 
14 this was never really a danger in EsDp negotiations as the issues as had been 
thoroughly rehearsed through all the intervening summits between saint Malo and the 
European council at nice. interview h argued that the only danger of supranational control 
being suggested came from the french government trying to exert control over negotiations; 
however he argues that the uK government would have threatened the other negotiators that 
they would not sign the treaty articles if this had been seriously proposed.
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chapter 4
saint Malo and nice:  
the Machinery of negotiating
this chapter examines the negotiations at saint Malo and at the nice intergovernmental 
conference (iGc). Building on the previous chapter, which focused on the conceptual 
elements of international bargaining, this chapter explores the who, the how and 
the why of the formal Europeanization of British defence policy. in doing so this 
chapter advances the argument that ‘major’ governments, with intense issue-specific 
preferences and capabilities, dominate the formal Europeanization of policies. 
the main driver for including the EsDp provisions in the nice treaty came from 
the anglo-french meeting on 4-6 December 1998 that produced the saint Malo 
Accords (Rutten 2001). UK and French government officials were also heavily 
involved in the conferences that followed on from Saint Malo and further clarified 
and extended the principles established at Cologne (3-4 June 1999), Helsinki (10-11 
December 1999) and sintra (28 february 2000), and where for example capabilities 
were prioritized as an area of focus for negotiations (interview E; interview swedish 
MoD Official 2003).1 
EU defence co-operation had been suggested as far back as 1954 but had become 
a lower priority for European integration following the creation of nato. the 
Maastricht negotiations had reignited the issue of a common defence policy, through 
the framing of the cfsp, but it was the uK government in 1998 at pörtschach 
(october) and saint Malo (December) that provided the political impetus to this 
initiative. a considerable number of bilateral meetings were held between the uK 
and French MoD and Foreign Office officials between 25 October and 4 December 
1998 to ensure that the two governments were able to find a common policy that met 
win-sets in both countries domestic political systems (interview D; interview G).2 
The Policy Directors of the MoD and FCO, Richard Hatfield and Emyr Jones-
Parry were the lead negotiators of the Saint Malo Accords. Hatfield and Jones-
Parry simultaneously negotiated with the French Foreign Office negotiator, Phillipe 
1 Interview E revealed that the UK negotiators had written the ‘toolbox paper’ document 
that had been adopted at the meeting in Sintra. A Swedish MoD official also reports that 
the UK government’s role in creating this paper had caused some friction between the UK 
government and the Finnish government who felt that they had been prevented from making 
the level of contribution they should have been making as hosts. 
2 Many of these meetings were routine meetings between Eu governments on defence 
and foreign policy issues. however, because of the public announcement of the saint Malo 
accords greater credence was given to the detail of the accords and how these might 
develop. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy54
Errera, mindful of what might be acceptable to him, whilst also being mindful of 
the need to secure agreement in the domestic constituencies of the fco, MoD and 
Cabinet Office. The British negotiators had been given clear instructions of where 
the UK government’s red-lines existed and Hatfield and Jones-Parry were very 
well aware of these red-lines having been so closely involved in the development 
of the initiative (Interview D; Interview G). Hatfield and Jones-Parry were given a 
great deal of freedom to negotiate the detail of the policy with french government 
negotiators, within a broad framework of ‘red-lines’ established by the PM, and the 
secretaries of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs and Defence, robin 
Cook and George Robertson. They told Hatfield and Jones-Parry that negotiations 
should not conclude at a point where the EU would seek to replicate or undermine 
NATO’s role in European security nor seek to decouple the EU from NATO.3 George 
robertson and other interviewees noted that the negotiated agreements at saint Malo 
and the Nice Treaty output on ESDP were remarkably similar (Interview D; Lord 
Robertson 2004). One of the key UK government negotiators argued that the Saint 
Malo accords were not substantively changed between 6 December 1998 and the 
final signatures on the Nice Treaty on 11 December 2000: the language had been 
refined whilst the concepts had remained stable (Interview D).
The Saint Malo Accords gave ESDP a significant momentum because of the 
perception that the uK and french governments had diametrically opposed views 
on European security. this meant that agreement between these two on closer 
defence ties within Europe was highly significant. Similarly, the Saint Malo Accords 
provided the scope and a framework for the further negotiations at Sintra, Cologne, 
and Helsinki culminating in ESDP provi ions being included in the Nice Treaty 
(interview D; interview h). 
it is a widely held received truth that the uK and french governments hold 
intense and opposing preferences on security and defence. as a consequence uK 
officials felt that gaining French government agreement for a Europeanized defence 
policy ensured that a critical mass of militarily strong governments in the Eu were 
in support of this initiative and therefore would be difficult for less influential 
governments to oppose, from a purely practical negotiating position (interview h; 
interview M). Moreover, the agreement between uK and french governments on 
issues of principles and substance before putting security and defence proposals to 
the other EU governments was key to ensuring that ESDP would remain within UK 
and french red-lines. 
There were also practical advantages for UK officials in negotiating with French 
officials before the Nice IGC (7-11 December 2000). These advantages lay in 
ensuring that french government preferences were stable and secured before the 
3 The ‘red-lines’ system establishes constraints on negotiators. The red-lines are placed 
at the point of the last acceptable policy outcome and should not be breached by British 
negotiators. Negotiators can strike a deal anywhere within these ‘red-lines’. At complex 
negotiations where multiple issues are being negotiated the ‘red-lines’ system offers a unique 
opportunity for British negotiators to move within several policy areas to give ground to 
foreign negotiators on certain issues to ensure the largest win-set possible on an area of 
particular interest or importance to the British government. 
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Saint Malo and Nice: The Machinery of Negotiating 55
IGC negotiating took place so that the French government would not seek to use its 
political leverage over the policy against the UK government’s interests (Interview 
E; interview M).4 The close working relationship between UK and French officials 
continued throughout the preparation for and during the nice iGc with close 
coordination between uK and french foreign and defence ministries by corEpEr 
(interview a; interview f; interview M). the British and french negotiators also 
coordinated the responses to the uK / french government view in the negotiations, 
enabling challenges to this view to be managed.
The British and French governments held intense defence-specific preferences 
and capabilities that they sought to enshrine at the European level. the saint Malo 
accords were important to the development and negotiation of EsDp as they 
established an agreed framework through which the UK and French officials could 
develop the policy with other Eu partners, and ultimately in iGc negotiations. What 
the liberal intergovernmentalist approach fails to appreciate is the importance of 
negotiations that occur outside of the iGc structures. the evidence from the EsDp 
negotiations is that the saint Malo accords provided the basis for EsDp and were 
where the ‘real’ negotiations took place. Viewed, in this light an emphasis on IGC 
negotiating in isolation is, on its own terms, reductive and under-specifies a key part 
of the process.   
Formal Europeanization is a Product of National Convergence 
from the assumption that governments are rational, it follows that these governments 
only pursue common policies if these initiatives secure greater opportunities than 
independent approaches (Moravcsik 1998, 3&8). Defence is a paradoxical policy 
area in this respect. Defence strikes at the heart of the autonomy of a government 
because of sensitivities to territorial defence and committing national human 
resources and national identity. owever, defence is also an area of international 
cooperation, albeit intergovernmental in nature, where the article V provisions of 
the Washington treaty that established nato confers responsibilities on signatory 
governments (Washington Declaration 1949). 
Defence and security policy has been long established as an intergovernmental 
area in which policy is ultimately guided by autonomous governments but subject to 
co-ordination to achieve agreed ends. The convergence of EU governments’ defence 
interests to form ESDP was ultimately codified at the Nice IGC, but can also be 
seen to have emerged through a series of political and military developments from 
the 1990 Maastricht negotiations onwards. this bargaining reactivated the issue of 
defence as a reaction to the EU’s inability to react to the conflict in the Balkans and 
the increasing insularity of the united states government which led to demand for 
an Eu defence and security policy (Duff 1997; Dover 2005).
The first meeting where there was a convergence of views between the French 
and German governments occurred at potsdam (1 December 1998). at this meeting 
4 the french government tabled amendments to the EsDp provisions on the evening of 
3 December 2000 that were rebuffed by the uK government as being outside of their red-lines 
and would provide a justification for UK government to not sign the Nice Treaty.
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy56
the governments announced they were working together to try and define the CFSP 
more closely and to include a defence dimension (rutten 2001, 4-6). the french 
president and German chancellor also stated that the WEu should be integrated 
into the Eu and emphasized the importance of capabilities in driving Eu external 
relations policy (rutten 2001, 4-6). Eu capabilities should be developed using 
existing national capabilities or by calling on pre-existing nato cap bilities 
identified for this use, something that was subsequently enshrined at Nice (Rutten 
2001, 4-6). The Potsdam declaration states that both countries believe that the EU’s 
conflict prevention measures ought to be improved (Rutten 2001, 4-6). This meeting 
was significant in establishing common positions between two of the three major 
EU states took the work at Pörtschach forward by a couple of short steps providing 
a small measure of momentum to the process.    
the second event that saw a publicly announced convergence of government 
interests was the saint Malo accords (3-4 December 1998) that added a credible 
agreement to Prime Minister Blair’s Pörtschach announcement two months earlier.5 
the convergence announced at saint Malo had been extensively negotiated, in 
preparation for the meeting, by British and French officials. The British delegation 
consisted of the Prime Minister, Richard Hatfield (Policy Director, MoD), Emyr Jones-
Parry (Policy Director, FCO), Paul Johnston (Director of the FCO Political-Security 
Department) and the Prime Minister’s communications advisor Alastair Campbell, 
who met with their french equivalents. the British delegation brought several texts 
to Saint Malo, one of which they knew would not find support amongst French 
officials. This document proposed dividing NATO into two sections, the first section 
would transform the Eu into the political wing of nato and the second section 
would form the military wing extended to incorporate tasks from the Petersburg list 
(interview D; interview G).6 This document was not put to the French officials partly 
because they felt it would politically untenable for the french president, who was 
concerned about ‘Anglo-Saxon’ dominance of NATO, and also because negotiators 
quickly agreed that there was too little common ground between governments to 
try and revise proposals leading them to negotiate from first principles (Interview 
D). french proposals included greater levels of military autonomy for the Eu, in 
line with the historical Gaullist position (interview D; interview G).7 this proposal 
was not accepted by the uK government because the fear of us withdrawal and 
the potential damage to nato were overriding priorities for the uK government 
(Johnson 2001; Lord Robertson 2004). 
the gap between the negotiating positions of the uK and french governments 
left the lead UK negotiators Hatfield and Jones-Parry with tighter constraints on 
5 interviewees argued that this was the next logical stage for the initiative, a phased 
integration of more details gaining momentum across Eu governments, or a means to end a 
debate concerning Eu defence between the fco and MoD whilst saint Malo was the public 
announcement of an anglo-french initiative.
6 this document is not currently in the public domain.
7 As with the UK government’s positioning papers brought to Saint Malo the French 
government’s papers are not in the public domain either. The only evidence for their existence 
or content comes from elite interview evidence.   
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Saint Malo and Nice: The Machinery of Negotiating 57
‘claiming value’ at the negotiations. The UK PM and the core executive were 
committed to a more positive stance on European defence. they had invested a great 
deal of time, through routine meetings, convincing the french government that an 
initiative to be launched at saint Malo was credible and worthwhile (interview D; 
interview E; interview G). the saint Malo meeting represented the last politically 
viable chance for either the uK or french governments to withdraw from negotiations 
of collaborative defence initiatives. a statement had been prepared, as is standard 
practice, by the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office in recognition of the 
prospect that the negotiations might fail (interview D; interview M). 
Instead of announcing failure, officials agreed to a final attempt to draft the 
agreement from fresh throughout the evening, having withdrawn from the formalities 
of the summit dinner on 3 December. the dynamics of the negotiations between 
Policy Directors was particularly important. The lead UK negotiator Richard Hatfield 
worked with Emyr Jones-Parry on the British side of the negotiations, whereas the 
French MoD negotiator barred the French Foreign Office Policy Director from the 
negotiations, underlining the difference between British and French policy making 
styles and bureaucratic interaction (interview D; interview G). the absence of 
planning for the negotiations that did occur meant that the negotiators had to provide 
their own secretarial skills and even a computer to type the agreed text (Interview 
D; interview G). 
the authority for these negotiations was tenuous; neither the MoD nor the 
fco had authorized them, nor had they planned or discussed any supplementary 
positions.8 the authority for the negotiations came from the prime Minister, but there 
was a considerable risk to Hatfield and Jones-Parry if they strayed too far from the 
originally agreed ‘red-line’ positions of their departments. Cabinet Office officials 
periodically observed the proceedings and were able to report to the prime Minister 
how the negotiations were progressing and officials from the French President’s 
Office did likewise (Interview D; Interview G). The final document was produced at 
around 3am on the morning of 4 December and was ‘written in a strange Franglais’ 
that allowed an acceptable agreement to be struck on broad principles whilst carefully 
side-stepping the problematic issues of human resources and procurement, the detail 
of which could not be resolved in one evening’s negotiations (Interview D). The 
first principles of collaborative EU security and defence were potentially the most 
problematic area for UK and French officials to reach agreement. In doing so, and 
particularly in one evening, represented a significant advance. 
the uK and french government negotiators then slipped the single sheet of a4 
paper that contained the proposed Joint Declaration under the doors of the UK Prime 
Minister, foreign secretary, Defence secretary and french president, who had only 
8 The personal risks inherent in proceeding from this standpoint were obvious but both 
negotiators believed that they knew their respective Departmental views well enough to be 
able to continue without referring back. Moreover, the Prime Minister was providing the 
authority for these negotiations, further insulating them. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy58
a very short time in the morning to agree or reject its content.9 as one interviewee 
put it 
Very considerable risks were taken by both the British Prime Minister and French President 
in accepting a document that went to the heart of national sovereignty with only five or ten 
minutes consideration. no doubt there were many moments over the next two years when 
they wondered whether they’d done the right thing that morning (Interview D). 
Despite the different interpretations placed on key phrases by the UK and French 
governments at that stage and then during the next two years, the text agreed at 
saint Malo was fully understood in terms of its scope and its implications by the 
negotiators who had drafted it on 3 December. the different interpretations placed 
on the text by the two governments were motivated by political positioning by both 
governments appealing to domestic audiences (Grant 2002; lord robertson 2004). 
the agreed document was, between saint Malo and nice summits, continually used 
to bring both the UK and French governments back to the agreed line when their 
individual interpretations threatened to take the debate beyond the agreed boundaries 
(interview D). overall the saint Malo declaration was ade in order to ensure that 
the EU could ‘..take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as 
a whole is not engaged’ and shows a tangible step towards the Europeanization of 
defence policy (rutten 2001, 8). 
The outcome of the Saint Malo negotiation is significant because of the absence 
of detail in the accords that established the EsDp process. finding common 
interests between the uK and french governments on European defence policy was 
not as problematic as some have asserted, but it was challenging (Walker 1999). 
the french government had a long history of support for the notion of creating a 
European defence capability and were also motivated by the need to address the 
perception of anglo-saxon imbalances in the leadership of nato (howarth 1995, 
17-40). The reform and then break up of the Soviet Union gave further impetus 
to analysts who had envisaged a distinct European military capability. however, 
discussing an autonomous Eu defence capability was still taboo, which provided for 
a renewed focus on the anglo-saxon dominance of nato (asmus et al 1996, 79-
101). The majority of EU governments prefer to ensure European security through 
NATO largely because such reliance is financially and operationally expedient for 
many of them. the reluctance to improve military capabilities was evident from the 
Maastricht and amsterdam negotiations where foreign and security outcomes were 
‘exceedingly modest’ (Heisburg 2000, 5). Thus Maastricht and Amsterdam created a 
pressure on the British government to become entrepreneurial on Eu defence. this is 
a pressure that the Major government resisted but that George Robertson maintained 
was an important one for the labour government to respond to. the rationale for this 
position was that minimized the opportunity for other EU governments to take the 
lead on this issue and entrench their preferences at the supranational level (robert 
Key 2002; interview M).
9 interviewees argued that this was not a satisfactory situation but that there was a 
positive atmosphere to try and get a positive result from the summit, which is why such 
circumstances were permitted.
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Saint Malo and Nice: The Machinery of Negotiating 59
The French government’s continued desire to rebalance NATO away from the 
perceived control of the UK and American governments was clear in the June 
1999 Cologne Council and the December 1999 Helsinki Council which implied a 
rebalancing towards control of nato by European member governments (rutten 
2001, 82). Richard Hatfield argued that the removal of the UK veto on defence 
and security within the EU had ‘let the genie out of the bottle’ and automatically 
prompted discussions on more ambitious plans for EU defence structures (Hatfield 
2000). for agreement to be reached between the french and uK governments on 
defence policy, convergence was needed between the UK’s preference for NATO’s 
security guarantee and the French government’s preference for greater EU autonomy. 
the compromise reached at saint Malo of greater Eu capabilities but within a 
NATO context was, according to Lord Robertson and Malcolm Rifkind, an attempt 
to satisfy both governments (Lord Robertson 2004; Rifkind 2004). 
The extent to which the French government is keen on pursuing policies that might 
lead to an autonomous Eu defence and security structure as a replacement for nato 
was disputed amongst interviewees (Bruce George 2002; interview c; interview 
M). This was a subject that drew very strongly worded responses from interviewees 
for this research. For example, Bruce George MP and Sir Malcolm Rifkind stated 
that there was no debate to be had on this issue – the french government clearly 
supported the saint Malo initiatives as a means by which to advance a decoupling 
agenda from nato. More moderate views came from Whitehall interviewees who 
argued that the french government did hold such preferences but were constrained 
by the realities of the pre-eminence of nato and limited European defence budgets. 
FCO and MoD officials argued that the French government was broadly supportive 
of the transatlantic alliance but were unable to overtly support it because of domestic 
political considerations. Two key UK government negotiators at the Nice IGC 
strongly argue that the French MoD and Foreign Office were in full agreement with 
a process that reinforces rather than undermines nato (interview D; interview h). 
the presentational focus on autonomy from nato was purely a device to 
appeal to a Gaullist domestic audience (interview E; interview h). as noted above 
other commentators are more sceptical about french intentions. Bruce George 
Mp, longstanding chairman of the house of commons Defence select committee 
and robert Key Mp, former shadow Defence Minister, believe that the french 
government is actively seeking in the medium term to create an autonomous EU 
force that undermines NATO (George 2002; Key 2002; Rifkind 2004). Lord Brittan, 
former Vice-president of the commission, and lord Garden offer some support to 
this view by arguing that it was the absence of support across the Eu for such a 
move prevented the french government pursuing this policy seriously (lord Brittan 
2002). the saint Malo accords provided a compromise where both positions were 
acknowledged and put to one side for the sake of efficient policy making and to 
improve Eu defence capabilities (interview D; interview M). 
The UK and French governments’ divergent views concerning defence policy 
highlight the dynamics of issue convergence within the Eu. the two governments 
sho ed common interests in preserving the nato security guarantee, independent 
defence policies and improved capabilities for Eu external relations policy sphere 
(froehly 2000). the election of the labour party in 1997 on a manifesto that 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy60
encouraged Europeanization provided an important catalyst to the uK government 
becoming entrepreneurial on EU policy making. In particular, the Labour government 
wanted to position the UK at the ‘heart of Europe’ and in doing so sought to improve 
European capabilities outside of strictly NATO frameworks, unthinkable under the 
previous Conservative government (Key 2002; Rifkind 2004). 
if one follows the liberal intergovernmentalist view that Europeanization only 
occurs when rational governments agree to collaborative policies when these offer 
tangible benefits to the national interest over and above independent policies, then 
the EsDp negotiations are an interesting case in point. this and chapter 2 have 
outlined the budgetary, equipment and strategic reasons why EsDp would be 
more beneficial to the UK than an autonomous policy. The task for government 
negotiators was to ‘claim value’ in finalising a collective policy, whilst retaining 
national independence and the transatlantic security guarantee. the saint Malo 
accords achieved agreement amongst government negotiators and did, therefore, 
produce a convergence of national interests.   
The Gate Keeper Role 
part of the liberal intergovernmentalist conception of Europeanization is that 
governments act as ‘gate-keepers’ between the domestic political system and the 
international bargaining table (Mbaye 2001). The gatekeeper metaphor is drawn from 
Putnam’s account of bargaining behaviour that is cited in ‘The Choice for Europe’ 
(Moravcsik 1998, 65). Both Moravcsik and Putnam agree that domestic interest 
groups lobby governments in pursuit of their own interests (Moravcsik 1998, 473; 
Putnam 1992, 436-7). They also agree that political parties seek electoral victories 
through constructing coalitions between interest groups and foster continued interest 
group support through meeting these groups’ expectations once in government 
(putnam 1992, 434).  
The formal Europeanization of policies occurs when governments take the 
aggregated preferences of domestic interest groups, which they adopt as policy, 
forward to international negotiations. Putnam asserts that the government’s 
negotiators must seek to maximize the satisfaction of domestic interest groups whilst 
minimising the adverse consequences that might result from the absence of negotiated 
output between governments (Putnam 1992, 457). The tension that Putnam’s work 
adds to the business of negotiating at the intergovernmental level is that he believes 
government negotiators are conscious of domestic developments and of attaining 
agreements that meet a ‘win-set’ within the domestic system (Putnam 1992, 456-7). 
on the liberal intergovernmentalist reading of Europeanization once the domestic 
pressures have been aggregated into government policy and preferences, the ‘win-set’ 
has already been established. Government negotiators must remain within this ‘win-
set’ without reference back to the domestic interest groups for ratification (Putnam 
1992, 450-1). this tension is further borne out by the process by which international 
agreements are ratified. Each government’s negotiating officials brings the agreed 
bargain back to the domestic political system to seek ratification; in the case of the 
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Saint Malo and Nice: The Machinery of Negotiating 61
UK government the Treaty of Nice was ratified by both Houses of Parliament.10 not 
all governments will requite votes in their respective Parliaments to gain ratification, 
although the method of ratification affects the size of the potential available ‘win-set’. 
For instance, a requirement for a two-thirds Parliamentary majority for ratification 
necessarily require a broader agreement than if a simple majority is required, and 
therefore affects the behaviour of negotiators. 
Putnam argues that the ability of the negotiators to achieve domestic ratification 
determines the extent to which the negotiator can manoeuvre to ‘claim value’. 
Negotiator’s judgments are not captured at one moment in time but are subject to a 
continual iterative process of review during the negotiations. negotiators therefore 
have to make judgments during the entire negotiations about whether an individual 
measure will be ratified by the UK Parliament and accepted by key domestic groups. 
An inability to secure approval from key groups in the domestic political system, 
and a resultant inability to guarantee ratification, gives negotiators some freedom to 
try and secure concessions from the other negotiating teams (Moravcsik 1998, 441-
6). in this respect international negotiations are iterative, rather than sequential, and 
whilst ultimately treaty negotiations are ratified post-facto, the negotiators have to 
be aware of the effect various negotiated permutations have on the ability to secure 
both Parliamentary ratification and domestic acceptance. 
in the case of the treaty on European union, in 1992, the uK conservative 
Government had a majority of seventeen in the House of Commons and nine MPs 
who were willing to vote against the Government on ratifying the treaty and who 
went on to lose the Government whip in 1994 because of continued rebellious 
behaviour (cowley and norton 1999, 88-9).11 Prime Minister John Major could 
legitimately claim at the iGc negotiations that he was constrained by the size of the 
possible ‘win-set’ in Parliament.12 If Prime Minister Major and his officials did not 
negotiate a treaty at Maastricht acceptable to the majority of his MPs and Peers then 
the treaty would not have been ratified in the UK Parliament. In practice, John Major 
was reliant on the work of his officials to negotiate within agreed red-lines and he 
provided the authority within which they were able to do this. the prime Minister 
argued strongly with his negotiating partners that the uK government would be 
unable to ratify the treaty without several key concessions from them including social 
chapter opt-outs (forster 1999, 352). this reinforces the liberal intergovernmentalist 
view that one of the key motivators for bargaining officials is the fear of not reaching 
a positive negotiated outcome. Moreover, it demonstrates the leverage governments, 
who struggle, for whatever reason, to ratify the agreement in their domestic system, 
have over negotiations, thus jeopardising the entire treaty. 
10 European communities amendment act was passed in the house of commons on 18 
July 2001. A treaty can be made law by Crown prerogative and therefore does not need a vote 
in parliament unless it changes domestic law, as was the case with the nice treaty, though not 
the defence clauses. 
11 the relevant Mps were: sir richard Body, theresa Gorman, iain Duncan smith, 
Richard Shepherd, Sir Trevor Sheet, Toby Jessel, Christopher Gill, Ann Winterton, Sir Teddy 
taylor. 
12 The Conservative government’s majority in 1992 was 21.
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy62
EU governments do, therefore, act as gate-keepers between the domestic 
political system and international negotiators during formal Europeanization. the 
government’s negotiating team is the only group empowered to make offers and 
counter offers at the intergovernmental bargaining table, and government ministers 
are the only actors that can agree to proposals they feel that the government will 
get ratified in parliament. The gate-keeper role is further entrenched by the bsence 
of supranational negotiators at the international level. this role allows negotiators 
to assess domestic win-sets without the domestic audience being affected by 
international influences and also to extract concessions from other government 
negotiators. in EsDp negotiations the labour government had a large potential win-
set, through its Parliamentary majority, but maintained self-imposed constraints 
– managed through careful coordination by corEpEr, the European secretariat of 
the Cabinet Office and the FCO. 
Lowest Common Denominator Outcomes 
To reach agreement across fifteen autonomous governments, all of whom wield 
a veto over the whole package of negotiated agreements, requires the agreement 
of even the most reluctant negotiator.  Moravcsik argues that the number of EU 
negotiations, its political system and the consequences of the member governments 
failing to agree lend themselves to the production of lowest common denominator 
Europeanized policies (Moravcsik 1998, 482-3). This section explores the substance 
of negotiations to assess the extent to which the presidency conclusions at the nice 
iGc were merely the lowest common denominator policies or whether the anglo-
French coalition, log-rolling, side payments or threats of exclusion took the ESDP 
beyond this point.13
Between December 1998 and December 2000 the uK, french and German 
governments attempted to advance EsDp negotiations with independent policy 
initiatives. The German government used its Presidency of the EU (January to July 
1999) to try and advance the EsDp agenda in accordance with its own preferences. 
the German government initiative became a formal Eu process embodied by the 
Cologne Council June 1999 (Rutten 2001, 41). The German government’s EU 
presidency produced a set of guiding principles for the council that incorporated a 
desire for CFSP and ESDP to be credible policies, and for the EU not just to have 
military capabilities, but also a decision making structure to authorize actions across 
the full range of conflict prevention, crisis management tasks and the Petersburg 
tasks as defined in the Treaty of European Union (Rutten 2001, 14-19). Moreover, 
the nato council communiqué (24-25 april 1999), stated that the alliance 
13 Bargaining seldom involves a single issue at a time. politicians, diplomats and the 
like are forced to balance their preferences on some issues against their preferences on others, 
given th t they probably won’t get their way on all of them. A concession may be made to 
another party on a less important topic in exchange for that other party’s support on a more 
vital issue. This process is known as log rolling. Side payments can be typified as distributing 
the benefit of a policy to all partners, whilst threat of exclusion is effectively a promise to be 
excluded from the benefits of any negotiation.
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Saint Malo and Nice: The Machinery of Negotiating 63
supported the development of EsDp and shared the aspirations of the uK and 
french governments that EsDp should provide the Eu with the capability to act 
autonomously, when the alliance as a whole is not engaged. it also stated that there 
should be a formalization of Eu rights to nato planning facilities and that the 
availability of pre-identified NATO assets for use in EU led operations should be 
similarly codified (Rutten 2001, 20). 
The Cologne Council (3-4 June 1999) occurred in the context of the Kosovo 
crisis. The effect of the crisis on ESDP negotiations is a keenly contested issue. 
alyson Bailes, former political Director at the WEu and former D puty head of 
the Policy Planning Unit in the FCO (1984-1986), claims that the Kosovo conflict 
played a leading role in galvanising Eu Member governments to support the 
measures outlined at the cologne council (Bailes 2000). Bailes contends that the 
Kosovo conflict brought the French and UK governments together in agreeing 
that they should be active in persuading the Eu into a more effective foreign and 
defence policy and similarly that the Eu should be endowed with greater military 
capabilities (Bailes 2000). this view is supported by nato publications concerning 
Kosovo, and the work of informed security commentators who have argued strongly 
in favour of the catalysing role played by Kosovo (nato 2000; roth 2000). this 
view also builds on those discussed in Chapter 2 that the experience of the Balkans 
in the 1990s had convinced the British and French governments that they could work 
profitably together in the defence sphere. The literature also suggests that Kosovo 
played a motivating role in the creation of EsDp and also fed into a debate about 
how enhanced capabilities would have been used by the uK in the Kosovo theatre 
(Bailes 1998; hoogland 2001). 
While Kosovo polarized the debates about autonomous Eu defence capabilities 
and whether collaborative policies were more advantageous than unilateral actions, 
it did not resolve the debates concerning how this military role should be developed 
(Moens 1998). the division of opinion concerning the approach towards Kosovo is 
that on the one hand the french and italian governments viewed the military action 
in Kosovo as an anglo-american venture that was saved from disaster by extensive 
diplomatic efforts made during the bombing raids (Bulletin Quiotidien april 1999). 
on the other hand the us president made the bombing strategy a condition of the 
US military’s involvement to minimize casualties and to try and avoid a ground 
campaign completely (Fisk 2002; Harries 1999; Lewis 2000).  
the development of planning capabilities and assets, essential to the 
Europeanization of defence, was advanced by the french and German governments 
in consultation with nato (rutten 2001, 40). in toulouse on 29 March 1999 the 
French and German governments agreed to reform the ‘Eurocorps’ into a rapid reaction 
force capable of ‘out-of-area’ operations and with headquarters capable of being used 
for international peacekeeping and peace support operations (PSO) (Rutten 2001, 
40). parallel to this spain, Belgium and luxembourg also agreed to restructure their 
military forces to make them more mobile and rapidly deployable too (Pond 1999). 
these developments show how Europeanization can occur outside of formal iGc 
structures, and through the entrepreneurial behaviour of individual governments and 
even further down, through the behaviour of chiefs of Defence staff. the cologne 
meeting (3-4 June 1999) was dominated by efforts to define ESDP more closely. The 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy64
summit reaffirmed that the EU should be given the capacity for autonomous action, 
backed by credible military forces and established a precise timetable for action 
(rutten 2001, 41). this timetable consisted of the heads of government deciding 
that by the end of 2000 the WEu would have completed its function and would be 
subsumed into the Eu. they also agreed that governments should have regular and 
ad hoc meetings of the General affairs council which would incorporate Defence 
Ministers, to create a permanent Eu political and security committee (psc), and 
that an EU military committee should make recommendations to the PSC as should 
an Eu military staff. 
the psc is based in Brussels and is composed of national representatives at senior 
Official / Ambassador level. The PSC deals with all issues concerning CFSP and 
ESDP in according with treaty provisions and without prejudice to the Commission. 
in cases of military crisis management operations the ps  ensures under the 
authority of the council, political control and strategic direction of all operations, 
by evaluating options for response. the psc also provides guidance to the military 
committee. the Military committee is composed of member governments chiefs of 
Defence staffs as represented by their military delegates and only at the most senior 
level when it is absolutely necessary. it provides a military consultancy function and 
makes recommendations for the PSC as well as ensuring the military direction of all 
Eu related military activities. the Military staff are situated within the council and 
provides advice and support for the EsDp in the military sector including Eu-led 
crisis management operations. the Military staff provide assessments of military 
situations and also strategic planning services within the framework of the Petersburg 
Tasks including the identification of appropriate forces (Dover 2007a). 
the cologne council also concluded that WEu assets should be transferred to 
the EU and that Javier Solana should be designated as High Representative for CFSP 
in line with the decisions taken at the Amsterdam IGC (Rutten 2001, 40-45). The 
meeting gave the EU a military capability, but did not define the political or military 
doctrine that underpinned the policy. this failure to agree was caused by divergent 
agendas between the uK and french governments who wanted the Eu to be given 
more autonomy to act when nato was not involved and the italian and German 
governments who were concerned about the consequences of greater Eu powers 
(Wilson 1999; Bennett 1999). This highlights the assessments governments make 
about the utility of collaborative versus unitary policies. German foreign Minister 
Joschka Fischer attributed a lack of progress in the ongoing action in Kosovo to the 
different views between member governments; the uK government was in favour 
of continued military action, the German government was against and the italian 
government had requested a pause (Walker 1999). Without agreement on even the 
strategic response a lowest common denominator agreement was highly unlikely. 
This evidence reinforces LI’s analysis that formal Europeanization is often a 
facet of lowest common denominator outputs although it might equally be said 
that the ongoing action in Kosovo made it impossible for governments to agree 
on institutional and operational military issues. this further shows the precarious 
nature of formal Europeanization in the foreign, security and defence spheres where 
the intergovernmental nature of the policy means that independent positions from 
states can undermine European cohesion. from this perspective, and one held by 
Copyright material
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
 
Saint Malo and Nice: The Machinery of Negotiating 65
the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, the most important output from 
cologne was to secure agreements in principle rather than agreements of minutiae 
– a distinction that helps to qualify the extent to which this evidence validates li 
(interview E; interview f). 
The Saint Malo Accords were adopted at the European Council at Helsinki on 11-
12 December 1999. The Helsinki Council added details to the Saint Malo Accords by 
establishing the psc from 1 March, 2000 the Military committee and Military staff, 
establishing ‘headline goals’ by 2003 that would commit the governments to commit 
60,000 troops capable of executing the full range of Petersburg tasks (Rutten 2001, 
82-3). these forces would be capable of being deployed in 60 days and sustainable 
for up to a year. The post ‘neutral’ EU Member States, most notably Sweden, insisted 
on improving the non-military crisis management of the European union, a position 
that affected what is the lowest common denominator position (interview swedish 
MoD Official 2002).14 The main outcome of the Helsinki Council, the progression 
from a general commitment to a defined process with a specific set of objectives 
aimed at providing capabilities and institutional underpinnings to the policy. these 
outcomes did not cover the precise details of how European capabilities would be 
improved nor signalled the objectives of the military and political committees that 
had been established.  as a result Eu external relations negotiators, nato delegates 
and the fifteen national Chiefs of Defence Staff still had to negotiate these details 
after the conclusion of the cologne council (interview f; interview h).
Many of the gaps in operational and institutional details left over from cologne 
were bridged at a meeting of the Eu defence ministers on 28 february 2000 in 
Sintra. The shape of ESDP doctrine was tackled by the ‘Toolbox paper’ drafted by 
the UK FCO (Interview D; Interview E). The ‘Toolbox paper’ gave weight to the 
UK Prime Minister’s desire for the ESDP to be a capability driven policy to make 
collaboration more attractive than unilateral policies (interview D; interview E). 
The ‘Toolbox paper’ argued that the Helsinki Headline Goals should be adopted 
as a part of EsDp. it omitted military planning issues, geographical operational 
scope and the constitution of EsDp forces (rutten 2001, 94-111). to counteract 
deficiencies emanating from the Helsinki goals the ‘Toolbox Paper’ proposed some 
key planning assumptions e.g. ‘(EU governments) will carry out tasks in and around 
Europe but have to be able to respond to crisis world-wide…. (the EU should also 
be involved in executing) complex peace enforcement tasks in a joint environment 
in or around Europe’ with a timetable leading to a Capabilities Conference that 
should meet by the end of 2000 (rutten 2001, 94-111). the British involvement in 
drafting the ‘toolbox paper’ points strongly towards a log-rolling strategy though the 
uK government tried to ensure the success of the EsDp negotiations by creating a 
significant momentum towards the policy, and also to ensure that British preferences 
were fully reflected in the Europeanized policy (Interview E; Interview M).
14 The reason why the Swedish Government were so keen to push the softer, policing 
aspects of the EsDp was due to the domestic political situation which gave the views of the 
communist and Green parties great credence and produced a scepticism about the wisdom of 
potentially undermining Sweden’s independence and neutrality in the defence sphere. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy66
The significance of the ‘toolbox paper’ was that it allowed UK MoD officials 
to agree the political framework for the defence initiative and planning elements 
of EsDp. however, by December 2000 the relationship between nato and the 
EU’s ESDP had not been resolved by member government negotiators. The British 
government argued that nato should remain the mainstay of European security 
with EsDp acting as a means by which the Eu could share the burden of the security 
effort. after intense lobbying of the pentagon and state Department this position 
was supported by the american administration (interview E; interview i).15 
The French government rejected the need to formally link ESDP with NATO until 
such time as the capabilities and institutional shape of the ESDP were finalized, and 
this was eventually done in 2003 (rutten 2001, 94-111; Vulic 2004)16 the french 
government’s position was that ESDP should be free from American involvement 
to avoid the EsDp pursuing american foreign policy aims (la Guardia and smith 
2000; Acquantine 2002). The US State Department rejected the French government’s 
characterization of America’s influence in Europe and viewed this as further evidence 
of the French government’s desire to ‘de-couple’ from NATO (CNN 2000; Maples 
1999; tisdall 2000). these concerns echoed those of Madeline albright in 1998 
when she raised three concerns about closer Eu cooperation on defence which were 
the need to avoid ‘de-coupling, duplication and discrimination’ against non-EU 
members of nato within a potential autonomous Eu defence capability (albright 
1998). 
Albright’s concerns particularly focussed n the prospect of the EU duplicating 
NATO tasks, structures and capabilities and which might lead the EU to discriminate 
against non-EU NATO members like Turkey (Sloan 1997). The potential reaction 
of the us administration was an important factor in the EsDp negotiations. Whilst 
the American administration was not an official negotiator at the Nice IGC, the UK 
negotiators placed great credence in the policy preferences of the us (interview E; 
Rifkind 2004). The presence of US administration preferences in the negotiations, 
albeit tacitly, made the ESDP more likely to conform to a lowest common denominator 
policy. 
The ‘Toolbox Paper’ suggested that NATO’s Deputy Supreme Commander 
Europe (DsacEur) should participate when appropriate in the Eu Military 
committee although not as a full member which met us state Department concerns 
(rutten 2001, 102-106). similarly, the paper suggested that the Eu Military staff 
would not act as a military headquarters but would 
…[C]o-ordinate and stimulate the development of European military capabilities, 
developing an appropriate relationship with NATO’s force planning process… organise 
and co-ordinate operating procedures with national, multinational and nato hQs 
15 Johnston, Hatfield and Jones-Parry were all involved in the negotiations and meetings 
with the us state Department whilst liddle advised the pM on how the saint Malo initiative 
should be advanced in the light of us views. 
16 Alexandre Vulic did, however, say that the French government’s acceptance of NATO 
as the central security institution was a large concession and one that demonstrated their 
commitment to EsDp. 
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Saint Malo and Nice: The Machinery of Negotiating 67
available to the Eu; liase with national hQs, European multinational force hQs and 
nato (rutten 2001, 102-106). 
These measures moulded the ESDP to fit within the NATO paradigm (Interview E; 
Interview H; International Herald Tribune 1999). However, the UK government’s 
negotiators although having written the ‘toolbox’ paper did make a number of 
concessions, notably by not specifying too closely the levels of capabilities expected 
by each contributing member government and avoiding formalising the relationship 
between EsDp and nato (interview E; interview f).17 the intense negotiations 
between national defence officials led to the establishment of four ad-hoc working 
groups that were established to examine capabilities and the permanent arrangements 
between the Eu and nato, spreading Europeanization across institutions (rutten 
2001, 120-139).  The ad-hoc working groups covered security issues, capability 
goals, modalities for EU access to NATO assets, and the definition of permanent 
consultation arrangements (rutten 2001, 120-139). at this council progress was 
made were key concessions to gain support of the Irish and Swedish governments 
for the agreement (rutten 2001, 120-139; interview E). 
to resolve the issues surrounding the capabilities dimension of the EsDp defence 
ministers met informally on 22 September 2000 at Ecouen where the ‘Capabilities 
Catalogue’ was discussed. Prior to this meeting the defence ministers and chiefs of 
defence staff drafted a more complete version of the catalogue but excluded ‘...tasks 
of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ (Rutten 2001, 143-
146). the catalogue included four types of petersburg operations that the Eu might 
engage in. these were: 1) separation by force of the belligerent parties; 2) prevention 
of conflicts; 3) delivery of humanitarian aid; and 4) evacuation of nationals (Rutten 
2001, 143-146). The development of the Petersburg tasks into the four operational 
hypotheses provides clear evidence of negotiators manoeuvring to meet win-sets 
across the fifteen governments. This reappraisal of the ESDP tasks allowed the UK 
government to stay within its negotiating ‘red-lines’ which excluded ESDP being 
engaged in ‘hard-security’ issues (Interview D; Interview G; Interview M).18 the 
purpose of these negotiations were, therefore, to find the lowest common denominator 
positions between negotiating parties and to draft an acceptable agreement that took 
this into account. 
the defence ministers agreed that a conference on capability commitment 
would take place on 20 November, 2000. At the Capabilities Conference 
governments voluntarily committed themselves to making national contributions 
that corresponded to the capabilities required for the Helsinki Headline Goals. The 
member governments confirmed that they would be able to meet the Headline Goals 
and went further to pledge a pool of 100,000 persons and approximately 400 combat 
aircraft and 100 vessels (Rutten 2001, 158-163). The UK’s contribution to the 
Headline Goal figures were 12,500 land component personnel, 18 warships and 72 
17 The FCO and COREPER would have liked to have made this link clear but could not 
do so within the confines of the negotiations and French government preferences.
18 The UK government perceived the need to more tightly define the range of capabilities 
that could be performed by the Eu under EsDp, this meant gradually writing out roles that 
breached uK preferences. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy68
combat aircraft (MoD 2001). the voluntary aspect of the commitment was a direct 
consequence of unwillingness amongst Eu governments to advance the process and 
policy beyond the lowest common outcome (centre for Defence studies 2001; house 
of lords 2000). indeed, the capabilities conference provided an important context 
to the nice iGc negotiations adding important details to the EsDp. Evidence from 
the UK government negotiators is that ESDP negotiations were finalized before the 
last few days of the iGc at nice and thus avoided the somewhat frenetic negotiating 
reported from the final days negotiating at Nice (Norman 2000; Peel 2000; Graham 
and Groom 2000).
the culmination of the iGc was the European council meeting, held at nice 
7-11 December 2000. this dealt with institutional reforms, preparations for the 
enlargement of the Eu and EsDp provisions (secretary of state for the foreign 
and Commonwealth Office 2000). The negotiations concerning institutional reform 
had, in the context of the pre-iGc negotiations, deliberately been under-discussed 
(Bulletin Quotidien 7854, 7855, 7856 2000). in contrast to EsDp which had been 
fully negotiated by December 2000, institutional reform had been ignored although 
a considerable number of governmental positions were made public before the 
negotiations began (peel 2000; Groom and norman 2000). Despite this, many 
governmental negotiators came to the international negotiations without sufficient 
knowledge about the preferences of the other negotiators or where win-sets could be 
achieved (interview f; interview h). the main pressure to reach agreement was the 
threat of the treaty failing through an inability to agree; which provided negotiators 
with a choice of accepting an imperfect treaty or getting no agreement at all (Bulletin 
Quotidien 7854 2000). uK government negotiators argue that the timing of the 
French government’s Presidency was fortunate in this respect, since the prospect of 
a treaty not being signed at nice was the largest political motivation for the french 
government’s negotiators to ensure that institutional reform was secured (Interview 
E; interview h; Vulic 2004).19 
The negotiations concerning ESDP were markedly different to those concerning 
institutional reform because EsDp clauses had been negotiated in successive forums 
from December 1998, whereas the negotiations concerning institutional reform were 
largely conducted in the last four days of the iGc (interview E; interview f; interview 
h). as this chapter shows, much of the EsDp negotiations and formalization of this 
Europeanized policy, were conducted in bilateral meetings before nice leading to 
agreement well in advance of the final reading of the ‘Presidency Report on ESDP’ 
that was ratified at Nice. The protracted negotiations and paragraph by paragraph 
intergovernmental agreement ensured the ESDP articles could find support in all 
15 member states. As a result the Presidency report was agreed on the first day of 
the nice iGc (7 December 2000) without any further negotiations (interview f; 
interview h).20 
19 lexandre Vulic argued that this was the case for the french government because they 
felt that such significant advances had been made a Saint Malo.   
20 Interviewees noted that the ESDP provisions were the first to be signed and that this 
reflected the advanced state of completion resulting from the number of bilateral meetings 
between UK officials and other EU government officials. 
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Saint Malo and Nice: The Machinery of Negotiating 69
one of the main areas of contention in EsDp negotiations was the relationship 
between the Eu Military committee (EuMc) and nato. three issues dominated 
this debate: first, whether NATO has the right of first refusal on crises; second, how 
far the Eu could act autonomously with nato assets; and third, the extent to which 
the Eu should build its own military planning institutions or use nato facilities. 
none of these issues were conclusively resolved during negotiation (interview f; 
interview h). the operational provisions negotiated at nice established a close 
working relationship between the EU and NATO (Rutten 2001, 168). For example, 
one provision establishes extensive meetings at the psc level and between nato 
and EuMc biannually whilst another states that in a time of possible deployment 
liaisons between the Eu and nato would be increased (rutten 2001, 174).21 
The negotiations clarified the autonomous capability of the EU and access for EU 
governments to pre-identified NATO assets (Rutten 2001, 168). Whilst the creation 
of an autonomous EU capability seems radical, the lack of military planning facilities 
or assets means that the EU is unable to act without NATO’s assistance. UK officials 
would have preferred to have formalized NATO as the institution of first choice for 
all EU security issues. Richard Hatfield said, in evidence to the House of Commons 
select committee on Defence, 
The key thing that is autonomous is the ability to take political decisions. The only 
independent input that the Eu will have in terms of machinery is a small-ish military 
staff, about the same size the WEu had which has been abolished, which can frame the 
questions that will be sent off to the nato planning staffs for preparing options for them 
to consider. Beyond that, it will depend on drawing on capabilities either from nato or 
from the Eu nations, so there will not be anything else independent being created for the 
EU as such (Oakes 2001).
the British emphasis on the Eu developing closer relations with nato is indicated 
by the amount of detail devoted to the subject in the Annexes of the Presidency 
report on EsDp (rutten 2001, 168-209). the annexes outline the procedure to be 
followed when the psc consults the EuMs with a view to determining whether 
military options should be produced and how the EU then consults with NATO’s 
planning capabilities (Oakes 2001).22 leading on from this the automatic right of 
21 Closer working provisions also included creating ad hoc EU / NATO working groups 
on capabilities issues and less regular groups focussing on particular areas of expertise. 
nato representatives are also invited to meetings of Defence Ministers. regularized contacts 
between the secretaries-general, secretariats and Military staffs of the Eu and nato and 
exchanges of information are also planned. 
22 in this instance the following procedures would be followed: on the recommendations 
of the EuMc assisted by the EuMs, the psc will send the designated operation commander, 
via the EuMc, strategic directives enabling him to draw up the necessary planning documents 
for the operation, making use of the guaranteed access to NATO planning capabilities. These 
plans will then be submitted to the psc for approval. Experts from the two organizations, 
in liaison with DsacEur as strategic co-ordinator will meet to specify the predetermined 
nato assets and capabilities concerned with this option. once the assets and capabilities 
to be used in the operation are specified, the EU will forward a request to NATO. The hand-
over of predetermined assets and capabilities used in the Eu operation together with the 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy70
access to NATO capabilities was fiercely negotiated outside of the confines of the 
IGC (Hunter 2003, 73). The Turkish government, as a non-EU NATO member, raised 
considerable objections to the provision of an automatic right of access to NATO 
assets. Turkish officials argued that non-EU NATO members would be excluded 
from the decision making process on the range and scope of any operations involving 
nato assets (hunter 2003, 113). they were also concerned that the Eu might use 
nato assets to act in the Eastern Mediterranean area (rutten 2001, 164). British 
and American negotiators concluded an agreement with Turkey on 16 December 
2001 that provided guarantees over the geographical scope of Eu operations and 
also gave Turkey the right to be consulted, but not to veto operations (Joshi 2002). 
George Robertson invested a great deal of his own time, as NATO’s General 
Secretary, on this issue in bilateral meetings with the Turkish Prime Minister 
persuading the PM and his officials that this would not compromise Turkish national 
security (Lord Robertson 2004). Robertson’s role is interesting – as a former British 
government Minister and the Defence secretary who brought the Europeanization 
of defence forward, he was then engaged in persuading a nato member to allow 
a credible policy to be formed. the role of important bureaucratic actors in formal 
Europeanization has been highlighted through the domestic policy formulation and 
IGC chapters of this study and is a profitable avenue for future research. 
The Nice Treaty modified the CFSP sections in the Amsterdam Treaty and added 
annexes relating to the EsDp. the presidency conclusions stated that the result of 
the saint Malo initiative was:
to give the European union the means of playing its role fully on the international 
stage and of assuming its responsibilities in the face of crises by adding to the range of 
instruments already at its disposal an autonomous capacity to take decisions and action in 
the security and defence field (Rutten 2001, 168).
the practical implications of the nice treaty were to subsume the WEu and its 
defence competencies into the Eu (treaty of amsterdam 1998; treaty of nice 2001). 
the amalgamation of WEu functions into the Eu has created new institutions. 
arrangements for making them available and any recall conditions will be identified at a PSC 
/ NAC meeting. Throughout the operation the Alliance will be kept informed of the use of 
nato assets and capabilities, if necessary by convening a meeting of the psc and nac. the 
commander of the operation will be invited to the EuMc meetings to report on the progress of 
the operation the presidency may invite him to attend meetings of the psc and Gac. having 
first informed the NAC, the PSC will propose to the Council that operation be terminated. The 
Eu will terminate the use of nato assets and capabilities. 
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Saint Malo and Nice: The Machinery of Negotiating 71
these are the political security committee (psc)23, the EuMc and the EuMs.24 
In addition to new institutions the negotiations codified the pledge at the Helsinki 
council to develop an Eu military force of up to 60,000 troops able to be deployed 
within 60 days and for up to a year conducting a large number of tasks ranging from 
peace-keeping to peace-making (Rutten 2001, 176). 
Enhanced co-operation was included into article 27(a-e) of the nice treaty. 
these provisions describe how enhanced co-operation can be used in relation to 
EsDp (treaty of nice 2001). Enhanced co-operation allows groups of states the 
right to carry out a policy without the consensus of all EU governments. A majority 
of governments had to be in favour of an initiative under the treaty of amsterdam 
whilst Article 24 modifications at Nice means that only eight member governments 
have to be in favour of an initiative (treaty of amsterdam 1998; treaty of nice 2001). 
Prior to the enlargement of the EU to 25 governments, a majority of nations will still 
need to be in favour of an initiative for it to become an Eu policy. after enlargement 
less than a simple majority of governments now need to support the initiative, thus 
23 The PSC is the lead institution in decision making on CFSP and ESDP. The PSC also 
acts as a crisis monitoring and crisis management organization. in practice this means that 
the PSC will keep track of the General Affairs Council, provide guidelines to departments 
and committees with interests that spread into the cfsp and EsDp sphere and also deals with 
crisis situations. In crisis situations the PSC is able to take soundings and exercise ‘political 
control and strategic direction of the EU’s military response to the crisis’ meaning that the PSC 
has overall political authority. the psc will also evaluate the opinions and recommendations 
of the Military Committee specifically the strategic military options, chain of command, 
operational concepts and plans that will be submitted to the council. if a crisis were to occur 
the secretary General or high representative would chair the psc. the nice treaty lays out 
that to maintain full control over a military-crisis situation, a procedure is followed: the psc 
would send a recommendation to council based on the opinion of the Military committee. 
The Council might then decide to l unch a military operation within the framework of a joint 
action. The joint action would contain a clause defining the role of the High Representative / 
Secretary-General. Once the operation had begun the Council would be kept informed through 
psc reports presented by the high representative or secretary-General in their capacity as 
chairman of the psc (rutten 2001).
24 EuMc is the highest military institution within the Eu. it is staffed by the chiefs of 
Defence (choDs) and represented daily by their military representatives. (MilrEps). the 
EUMC exercises military direction of all military activities within the EU framework. The 
EuMc provides military advice and recommended courses of action to the psc on military 
matters within the EU when requested. The EUMC also works on military doctrine and 
costings for all military operations within the EU’s remit. ‘Upon the PSCs request it issues 
an initiating Directive to the Director General of the EuMs to draw up and present strategic 
military options. it evaluates the strategic military options developed by EuMs and forwards 
them to the psc together with its evaluation and military advice. on the basis of the military 
option selected by the council it authorizes an initial planning Directive for the operation 
comm nder. Based on the EuMs evaluation, it provides advice and recommendations to the 
psc:- on the concept of operations (conops) developed by the operation commander on 
the draft operation plan (oplan) drawn up by the operation commander. it gives advice to 
the PSC on the termination option for an operation.’ Presidency Report on the ESDP, Annex 
iV. presidency report on the EsDp, part ii. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy72
only a third of Eu governments are required to support a proposal under enhanced co-
operation. this has potential impacts on the EsDp and could allow ad-hoc coalitions 
of governments to advance integration against uK government preferences.  
the french foreign Minister attributed the success of EsDp negotiations to 
‘…the EU’s political will and the will to gather all the military and civilian capabilities 
necessary to ensure the credibility of the defence policy’ (Bulletin Quotidien 7855 
2000). this only partly addresses the question of whether EsDp negotiations 
produced lowest common denominator outputs. iGc negotiations are guided by the 
principle of unanimity and thus to gain agreement across fifteen governments for an 
issue area there must necessarily be a convergence of core interests and agreement 
to exclude aspects of proposed policies that fall outside of some negotiating parties 
acceptable limits – hence negotiated outputs will always be lowest common 
denominator agreements. 
in the case of EsDp negotiations the evidence shows that there are four 
governments who had intense issue specific preferences; namely the UK, French, 
German, and swedish governments. the remaining governments, whilst playing a 
full role in negotiations, did not possess the same range and depth of institutional 
red-lines on EsDp that provided greater latitude for the four governments with 
intense preferences to negotiate and as a result this section has argued that Eu 
intergovernmental negotiations can produce a positive sum-game, and therefore go 
beyond lowest common denominator agreements. the EsDp case study provides 
considerable evidence that governments are highly sophisticated in the way they 
select issues on which they feel core issues of sovereignty, autonomy and key policy 
interests are affected. in addition, by identifying governments with intense issue 
specific preferences, agreements can be struck with those governments, creating a 
positive sum output. 
Summary
the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of iGc negotiations is very strong. 
the fundamental tenets of the theory are validated by the nice negotiations. 
British government negotiators bargained rationally to try and maximize the 
benefits to the UK’s national interest which was defined by the PM and the core 
executive. Negotiations concerning ESDP were not explicitly linked to other issues 
being negotiated at the nice iGc. however, there was evidence of a very close 
co-ordination of uK negotiators across all the issue areas – corEpEr and the 
European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office kept a close and evolving note of all the 
negotiations as they progressed. this gave these co-ordinating institutions a broad 
view of the negotiations which allowed them to suggest areas in which concessions 
could be demanded or given as necessary. Many of the interviewees for this thesis 
argued th t this gave the uK government negotiators a slight advantage over their 
fellow negotiators, and that the uK government was exceptionally well co-ordinated. 
In essence, whilst there was overall Cabinet Office co-ordination on the process of 
negotiating this staging did not affect the subject specific preferences demonstrated 
by the British government. 
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Saint Malo and Nice: The Machinery of Negotiating 73
A notable element of the ESDP negotiations was that defence was kept distinct 
from different issues at the IGC (like voting rights in the Council and numbers of 
MEPs) being linked to ESDP negotiations. The crucial issue for negotiators was 
how strongly committed the government was to the EsDp policy within the iterative 
parameters they perceived from domestic ‘win-set’ providers like Parliament, interest 
groups and the armed forces. Moreover, post-agreement ratification in P rliament 
and securing domestic political support from interest groups are too simplistic to 
explain negotiating behaviour in iGcs. the assumptions made by negotiations about 
domestic political support for a measure provides the context in which negotiators 
can propose any changes to the proposals or make concessions to other negotiators. 
By this rationale the government’s large House of Commons majority should have 
afforded it a great deal of negotiating latitude and win-set on EsDp because even 
with a large rebellion from labour Mps the bill ratifying the nice treaty would have 
been won. The evidence from officials and negotiators involved in the development 
and negotiation of ESDP was, however, that the Prime Minister and his core officials 
took particular care to control and manage the development of ESDP from the Saint 
Malo Accords in December 1998. For example, they authored the ‘Toolbox Paper’ 
presented at Sintra in February 2000 and demanded that the ‘Capabilities Catalogue’ 
was given renewed prominence ten days before the nice iGc. 
UK government negotiators argued that the government’s strong preference 
on ESDP produced an identifiable pattern of Europeanizing behaviour. The UK 
government decided to use the considerable political leverage it possessed through 
military and economic strength to frame the EsDp debate, to suit British preferences, 
and drive the policy towards the intergovernmental negotiations at nice. this was 
particularly true in the example of the Sintra ‘Toolbox Paper’ and the bilateral 
meetings between the Policy Directors of the FCO and MoD Emyr Jones-Parry, 
Richard Hatfield and their respective opposite numbers in fellow EU governments 
(interview D; interview E; interview G).  this behaviour demonstrates that domestic 
win-sets are not solely determined by Parliamentary majority, which would have 
given the government considerable negotiating latitude. Domestic win-sets were 
therefore built from a complex picture of perceived agreements from the armed 
forces, the media, a notion of public opinion, and a similarly iterative sense of what 
is in the UK’s national interest. 
an important element from these negotiations is that there was a point before 
the final agreement of the Treaty where the PM and his close advisors had to make 
a decision about whether the outcome would find sufficient domestic support. 
However, they did not just discuss this once, it was part of a continual iterative 
discourse in the negotiating team about whether proposals would achieve domestic 
or intergovernmental win-sets. This chapter has argued that the government’s 
negotiators controlled the development of ESDP to ensure that the policy reflected 
core uK preferences and provided the largest win-set possible on a policy issue 
on which the labour government was wary for historical reasons. uK negotiators 
were able to manage and strongly influence ESDP negotiations through authoring 
key positioning papers and in the number of bilateral negotiations they held with 
fellow EU government officials. Indeed, this chapter argues that most of the ESDP 
negotiations occurred outside of formal EU frameworks, including the Saint Malo 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy74
accords in December 1998. the large number of bilateral negotiations between uK 
negotiations and other Eu government negotiators developed EsDp to a largely 
completed stage by the European council at nice. 
LI makes the hypothesis that external factors and the fear of not reaching 
an agreement are the principle motivations within the international bargaining 
(Moravcsik 1998, 64). This chapter found that the fear of not reaching an agreement 
was one of the dynamics in the negotiations but not the primary motivation; and one 
that was only triggered once the saint Malo accords had been signed. furthermore, 
this chapter has advanced the argument that enhanced co-operation between the 
french and uK governments in December 1998 at saint Malo, and subsequent 
bilateral negotiations outside the formal IGC framework, brought the bargaining 
beyond a point where a fear of failure dominated, to a discussion about how the 
policy would operate and whether it would have full capabilities.  
This chapter has presented strong evidence that governments act as ‘gatekeepers’ 
between domestic politics and pressure groups and the other Eu negotiators. 
Evidence of this came from the weak link between negotiators and domestic 
parliamentarians and other interest groups and also by the effective exclusion of the 
European parliament and European commission from the negotiations. furthermore, 
governments who had intense issue specific preferences and capabilities were the 
influential actors in the negotiations. In ESDP bargaining these included the UK, 
french and German governments and the effectiveness of international co-operation 
and these negotiations resulted from preference convergence. Less influential 
governments were able to add policies to EsDp through offering their conditional 
support for the policies. these governments including the swedish and Danish 
government had less intense preferences and therefore could offer agreement more 
easily than uK, french and German governments. 
in the example of nice iGc negotiations outcomes were not the product of 
preference convergence across the 15 Eu governments but convergence amongst 
governments with intense preferences and acquiescence from governments with 
less intense preferences. in EsDp negotiations the Eu was a co-ordinating forum 
for national policies reducing transaction costs between governments rather 
than extending an Eu political system. this research has shown that formal 
Europeanization frequently occurs outside of formal IGC frameworks through the 
interactions of officials, initiatives taken at a national level, right through for former 
secretaries of state promoting a Europeanized policy in their supranational roles. 
the formal Europeanization of policies occurs at treaty amending conferences, and 
in the example of defence policy is still dominated by governments, producing an 
inherent instability in this policy sphere, and making intergovernmental analyses 
perennially relevant. 
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chapter 5 
Why Governments transfer sovereignty: 
formal Europeanization
The final element of formal Europeanization, which occurs through intergovernmental 
conferences, is the transfer or pooling of sovereignty by governments to the 
supranational level. the motivational aspects for these transfers are particularly 
important to those seeking to make sense of Europeanization as a political 
phenomenon. Discursively, these transfers lend themselves to analyses that only 
rational governments seek to transfer sovereignty when it is in their interests to 
do so when it provides a better option than continued unitary action and when it 
adds value to their independent policy.  this chapter critically explores why the 
British government took the decision to formally Europeanize its defence policy 
and thus transfer elements of its defence and security competencies to the Eu under 
EsDp. in doing so it analyses the choices available to governments in these EsDp 
negotiations and the distribution of benefits amongst governments transferring 
sovereignty.  furthermore, it explores whether the Eu constitutes a co-ordinating 
forum for governmental preferences and analyses the balances of power inherent in 
the Eu, especially between the uK, french and German governments. 
as discussed in chapter 3, formal Europeanization is only possible when the 
collective policy holds greater benefits for the negotiating parties than continuing 
to pursue a unilateral policy. In the case of a Europeanized defence policy, a key 
motivation has been to improve the EU’s defence capabilities through co-ordination 
and a streamlining of capabilities and command structures, as well as to see a union 
better able to project itself on the world stage. Furthermore, transferring sovereignty 
to the EU has helped the UK government to negate the ‘anarchy’ problem of fellow 
EU governments’ preferences taking EU security structures in a direction that would 
not meet uK defence preferences, as highlighted in chapters two and three. the 
co-ordination of defence and security policy through the Eu, in a policy that met 
core UK government redlines, effectively locked other EU governments into UK 
preferences. the transfer of governmental sovereignty to the Eu adds credibility 
to the saint Malo initiative and similarly reduces the future transaction costs of 
developing pan-European collaborative defence ventures. transferring defence 
sovereignty is therefore an efficient way for British government preferences to be 
expressed and realized. Moreover, within the iGc structure the decision to transfer 
sovereignty is a deliberate one. the transfer of defence sovereignty to the Eu was 
not the product of institutional spillover – competencies acquired over time – but 
was a process managed by the British government who had rationally concluded that 
a collaborative EsDp was in their interests. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy76
Explaining Sovereignty Transfer 
formal Europeanization and, by inference, the Eu serve as instruments to overcome 
the constitutional bars to binding one legislature to an external legislature (Moravcsik 
1998, 3-4). Moreover, these institutional arrangements enable controls to be placed 
to regulate a transfer of sovereignty and monitor governments’ defections from 
agreements once the transfer of sovereignty has occurred. this analysis has been 
explored in great depth by simon hix and alberta sbragia who argue that the Eu 
is a political system in its own right exerting a governmental role over and above 
that of national governments, a position that is radically different from liberal 
intergovernmentalist explanations of the integration project, which suggests that 
governments are pre-eminent in the Eu and the international system more widely 
(hix 1999, 1-17; sbragia 1992, 258 and 292).  
competing explanations of sovereignty transfer highlight the different types of 
benefit governments can derive in terms of securing credible commitments from other 
governments for collective policy solutions (allen 1996, 290; Gordon 1997, 74-100; 
rummel and Wessels 1983, 34). these accounts also suggest that intergovernmental 
bargains are the first step in an ever deepening cooperative arrangement between 
European states on that particular issue area, and across the full range of European 
policy areas (Majone 2000, 2). Even on these terms Europeanization can occur 
within and outside of formal iGc structures. the iGc route merely provides the 
most obvious route through which the formal Europeanization of policies occurs; 
whilst domestic policies, and patterns of official and bureaucratic behaviour can be 
tracked to suggest the extent to which policies are Europeanized. 
There are other factors, identified in the extant literature, that inform the analysis 
of why governments decide to delegate sovereignty to the Eu. the argument that 
vulnerabilities on a specific issue drive the degrees to which governments are 
prepared to delegate sovereignty – nd thus protect their position – is a key concept 
employed within this chapter. the smaller governments of the Eu are dependent 
– sometimes directly – on the financial strength and political credibility of the larger 
EU governments like the UK, France and Germany. These smaller governments 
seek to cement influence, and thus secure their domestic preferences, over these 
larger countries through collaborative policies managed within Eu institutions 
(Moravcsik 1998, 475; Walker, 2004; Economist 2004; Grabbe and Guerot 2004). 
the disadvantages smaller governments feel in terms of economics, institutional 
votes and military p wer and therefore a lack of influence and inability to effectively 
formulate political coalitions within the Eu, leads them to be more prepared to 
transfer elements of their sovereignty to Eu institutions. 
In Ben Tonra’s study of government conduct within the CFSP frameworks he 
argues that smaller states benefit considerably from working with larger states: 
‘Minor states usually lack significant intelligence or espionage capabilities and, 
as a general rule, have smaller diplomatic staffs from which to gather and analyse 
data’ (Tonra 1997, 183). Similarly, Moravcsik draws a comparison between the 
effectiveness of domestic foreign policy capacity and governmental preferences on 
foreign policy co-operation (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1998, 64). As a consequence 
LI argues that ‘..geopolitical concerns would dominate [....] positions [...] in those 
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Why Governments Transfer Sovereignty: Formal Europeanization 77
areas without clear and certain economic implications, such as [...] foreign policy 
cooperation’ (Moravcsik 1998, 402). The evidence presented in Chapter 2 suggests 
that the British government’s decision to become a policy entrepreneur on ESDP 
was partly a consequence of geopolitical and strategic circumstances that aimed to 
maximize British influence at the ‘heart of Europe’.
The liberal intergovernmentalist approach suggests that a government’s capacity 
to act unilaterally is conditional on its position within the existing balances of 
power in the EU (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1998, 64). Institutionally and militarily 
capable governments have a larger capacity for an effective unilateral foreign policy 
than those governments without these capabilities and moreover, a government’s 
power position within the EU is a product of two factors, first, the number of highly 
influential governments in the EU, termed polarity and secondly, the governments’ 
share of key material resources (Krasner 1993, 21-42). these factors weigh heavily 
on the strategic direction of a government’s foreign policy. Stephen Krasner argues 
that, 
the behaviour of individual states, regardless of their domestic political characteristics, 
is constrained by their own capabilities and the distribution of power in the system as 
a whole (...). the external environment will inevitably pressure states to move toward 
congruity between commitments and capabilities (Krasner 1993, 21).
the British and other Eu governments seem to have internalized this view. British 
negotiators were able to exert influence on the development and negotiations of 
EsDp because, relative to other Eu governments, the uK has extensive military 
capabilities and a senior position within NATO and the UN, the key institutions 
in the European security sector (nicola Butler, 2004). the extent to which the uK 
government is an authoritative voice on security affairs in the Eu provides it with 
a freedom and flexibility in negotiating positions that other European governments 
do not share. The added negotiating flexibility of the British government was also 
the result of the additional personnel deployed to co-ordinate the UK’s approach 
towards ESDP negotiations across the Cabinet Office, MoD and FCO (Interview 
E; interview M).1 British officials also tried to co-ordinate the bargaining positions 
of the other respective governments during the negotiations, through holding many 
bilateral liaison meetings (interview E; interview M). the deployment of additional 
diplomatic resources to policy co-ordination allowed the British government to 
strongly influence the path and progress of the ESDP negotiations (Interview F; 
interview h).2    
1 Interview E highlighted the additional diplomatic resources, particularly Officials 
time, that went into EsDp negotiations. interview M argued that this was standard practice 
where issues might become part of the bargaining at a European council. 
2 It might be expected that UK officials involved in the Nice European Council would 
argue that they had considerable influence on the direction of ESDP negotiations. However, 
there is strong textual evidence from examining the saint Malo accords and presidency 
conclusions from nice that the initial proposal was largely unchanged throughout the entire 
negotiating period which strongly validates this position. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy78
A government’s position within the European balance of power is determined by 
its share of certain decisive capabilities. these capabilities are seen as transferable, 
and can be used in unrelated policy areas, and furthermore that the utility of a 
particular capability contributes to the government’s influence within the EU (Waltz 
1986, 333). Economic strength (size of economy and GDp) are important state-based 
capabilities in the Eu. countries with strong economies can be expected to possess a 
high level of technology that may be used, transferably, for military purposes as well 
as private industry. in the case of EsDp, the salient capabilities were military assets, 
financial capabilities, institutional affiliation and roles within these institutions and 
influence over the foreign and security policy of other member governments. In 
ESDP bargaining the British government’s military strength – and ability to project 
force, provided it with a great deal of influence over the ESDP.3 in short, therefore, 
in military and security spheres the uK government had considerable scope within 
existing preferences to innovate, because of its position within Eu and European 
security structures (interview f; interview G; interview h).4 
Britain’s membership of, and position within, relevant security-related institutions 
like the UN, NATO and G8 adds to Britain’s position within the international system. 
Exclusion from these international institutions diminishes the opportunity to influence 
international responses to events and forms an element of the discourse regarding 
the maintenance of the UK’s nuclear deterrent; that is ensuring that the British 
government is not marginalized in the international system. the British government 
is particularly privileged in holding a veto power in the un security council, a large 
number of European parliament seats and Eu council votes, although this is being 
steadily diluted through ever expanding enlargement of the Eu. in addition to the 
UK’s institutional strengths it enjoys an enhanced and privileged access to American 
officials in the Whitehouse, State Department, Pentagon and the CIA. Privileged 
access to US policy makers and policy shapers is said to allow the UK to be the 
conduit between the us and the Eu, and helps place the uK as the pre-eminent 
authority within the development of the EsDp, although Michael noonan argues that 
the US State Department and Pentagon’s support for this initiative was conditional 
on EsDp not using nato funds for replicating nato in the Eu (Williams 2004; 
noonan 2004; interview a; interview M). 
Interviewees from the key foreign and defence policy departments in the British 
government argued strongly that the close day-to-day relationship between British 
and American officials in the State Department and Pentagon gave the British 
government a key advantage over fellow European governments in dealing with 
defence and security issues, including in technology transfers. William Hopkinson 
3 All the UK based interviewees in this research argued that Britain’s military strength 
was a compelling reason why it was able to lead on EsDp. notably though charles Grant 
argued that Blair’s strongly pro-European views assisted in making this case in Europe and 
Lord Wallace and William Hopkinson added that the UK’s prominent roles in NATO and the 
un further assisted this position. 
4 the principle EsDp negotiating team argue that they had considerable room to 
manoeuvre in comparison to some of their fellow negotiators because of the UK’s prominent 
position as a leading defence actor in Europe but were confined by self-imposed red-line 
constraints. 
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Why Governments Transfer Sovereignty: Formal Europeanization 79
argued further that the american view was always considered very favourably by 
British officials whilst a Foreign Office official noted that his interaction with US 
officials revolved around explaining UK positions and reassuring American officials 
about intended actions. John Allen Williams, Chair of the Academic Advisory Council 
of the national strategy forum and senior academic commentator, argued that the 
‘privileged relationship’ is very real and serves to advance an Anglo-Saxon security 
perspective on the globe (Rifkind 2004; Hopkinson 2003; Interview E; Williams 
2004). The enduring quality of Britain and America’s ‘special relationship’ will be 
explored in chapter 6 and particularly for the effects it has had on Europeanization 
across all areas of deepening Europeanization. 
Realist scholars have referred to the influence of ‘national morale’, ‘quality of 
diplomacy’ as well as ‘prestige’ in international relations (Gilpin 1981, 13 and 30). 
Joseph Nye refers to these factors as the ‘second face of power’ (Nye 1990, 29). 
According to Nye a government’s indirect influence is based on the ‘…attraction 
of (their) ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes 
the preferences that others express’ (Nye 1990, 31). Indirect influence is more 
difficult to measure than direct influence, but the available evidence suggests that 
the British government’s unique experience and capabilities in defence and security 
policy, as well as economic power, its strong links with key American government 
departments and prestigious military history meant that Britain was able to shape the 
pre saint Malo debate and then the formulation of EsDp (nye 1990, 32; interview c; 
Robertson 2004). Influence over the speed and direction of formal Europeanization, 
particularly in the defence and security spheres, therefore seems to be dependent on 
standard conceptions of balances of power within the international system. further 
comparativist research is required to assess whether states with high capabilities 
have greater sway over the direction of formal Europeanization in other fields; the 
evidence available on defence, foreign and security policies certainly suggest that 
this is the case. 
Through liberal intergovernmentalist lenses the EU is an institutional framework 
for the pursuit of governmental policy preferences (Moravcsik 1998, 8). Locating 
defence and security policy preferences within the EU brings about ‘costs’, namely 
constraints on government’s autonomy. By inference, the EU will continue to retain 
and expand its competencies only where it provides more ‘benefits’ than ‘costs’ to 
national governments (Moravcsik 1998, 482; Ginsberg 1989, 2; cf Jorgensen 1997, 
167-180; Jorgensen 1999, 78-96; Smith 1998, 304-333; Glarbo 1999, 634-651). 
The nature of these benefits range across the financial, social, political and practical 
outcomes and are contested by integration scholars, notably ‘functionalist regime 
theory’ critiques (Waltz 1979, 96). Within this latter view international institutions 
help governments to overcome problems in formulating collective actions 
(hasenclever, Mayer and rittenberger 1997, 616). the Eu reduces transaction costs 
and, by being an efficient conduit of information between governments, uncertainty 
(Axelrod and Keohane 1996, 250). Thus, where as international treaties, like the 
Kyoto environmental treaty have to be negotiated at an international forum outside of 
the remit and scope of a regularized institutional framework, and therefore entail high 
costs, the EU provides a stable institutional framework through which agreements 
can be reached, managed and enforced (regelsberger et al 1997, 183; Bulmer and 
Copyright material
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
 
Europeanization of British Defence Policy80
Edwards 1992, 150). the Eu also acts in a managerial role adding operational 
detail and interpretation to policies within the issue area to negate the need to create 
separate agreements on smaller operational issues within the headline agreement. 
however, neorealist critiques would suggest that there is a missing balance of power 
structure that underpins the Eu (Mearsheimar 1994, 5-49). this perspective accepts 
a limited independent role for the Eu and consequently argue that the union can be 
an instrument of government policy (Mearsheimar 1994, 5-49). 
By marked contrast functionalist regime theory, holds that the EU may be used 
as an instrument of government to exert power and influence (Krasn r 1982, 506; 
Krasner 1991, 336-366). the question of what the Eu is and how it serves to advance 
or hinder the work and role of national governments is crucial to an analysis or formal 
Europeanization. The EU as a co-ordinating institution is markedly different from 
an international organization that acts as a dominant partner in a federal political 
system. Within the formal Europeanization of defence policy, the EU firmly falls 
into the category of a co-ordinating organization, directly along the lines that liberal 
intergovernmentalism outlines (Moravcsik 1998, 485-6). 
All European member governments seek to create coalitions of supportive 
governments to shape the policy agenda and negotiations of Eu policy. however, 
as chapters 3 and 4 argued the evidence suggests that governments with strong 
issue specific preferences and capabilities are particularly active in ensuring their 
preferences prevail and in doing so seek to achieve a convergence of preferences 
with other governments at the negotiations. this provides part of the explanation as 
to why British government officials were so active in conducting a large number of 
bilateral meetings with the other EU government officials, to try and secure the most 
advantageous set of agreements for the British government.  
The influence and ability of governments to create persuasive coalitions in 
European council negotiations is dependent on the issue area, the strength of the 
respective governments’ policy preferences, and the influence of external actors 
(like the US) or domestic circumstances on the negotiations. Members of these 
influential coalitions gain what Joseph Grieco calls ‘voice-opportunities’ (Grieco 
1996, 261-306). Voice-opportunities are ‘institutional characteristics whereby the 
views of partners (including partners) are not just expressed but have a material 
impact on the operation of a collaborative arrangement’ (Greico 1996). Becoming a 
constructive member of a negotiating coalition affords a government the opportunity 
to shape elements of the policy to suit their own preferences, whilst also allowing 
the major governments in the coalition, in this case the UK and French governments, 
to advance a policy agenda in a way that suits their core preferences. the rationale 
for this is that the junior coalition partners gain a greater measure of influence over 
the precise detail of the policies remaining within the coalition than they would 
if they were outside of the coalition altogether. this was a point notably grasped 
by the Swedish government who sought to use their role as a ‘critical friend’ to 
ESDP to add further ‘soft security’ roles to the negotiated outcome (Jonson 2003; 
interview E).
finally, liberal scholars have noted that a commitment to the Eu can offer an 
opportunity for governments to enhance their autonomy from domestic pressure 
(Moravcsik 1994, 1; Wolf 1999, 333-363). This can be a particularly useful tool 
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Why Governments Transfer Sovereignty: Formal Europeanization 81
for governments. it provides a media and discourse driven separation from 
responsibility for certain policy issues, although because of the core sovereignty 
concerns about defence policy it is unlikely a government would use the EU in 
this way. Governments have strived to retain control of their defence policy, and by 
inference their competency over territorial defence, thus this sort of displacement 
activity would serve to undermine the standing of the government. 
By transferring issues from the domestic level to European intergovernmental 
negotiations, governments are able to increase their leverage over do estic actors 
(such as Parliament and interest groups) in various ways (Moravcsik 1994, 7). 
Through the ‘gate-keeper’ role governments gain a privileged access to information 
from other negotiating governments and thus can shape the domestic debate through 
managing the dissemination of this information (Flagaard and Moravcsik 1993, 282-
285). The government’s monopoly over the flow of informati n is coupled with the 
role of the UK parliament in the ratification of the negotiated output, limited as it is 
to a retrospective ratification, rather than take an active role in negotiations. British 
parliamentarians are able to vote for or against the entire treaty package without 
being afforded the opportunity to amend any of the negotiated outputs. parliamentary 
scrutiny of iGc output and negotiations comes from the ability of parliamentarians, 
as a whole, to either vote to ratify or turn down the government legislation that 
enshrines the treaty in British law and through the standing committees on the 
intergovernmental conference.5 
the standing committee is empowered to study the issues of the iGc in close 
detail and is able to suggest and lobby the relevant government ministers and 
Prime Minister about how they think negotiations should proceed. This scrutiny 
reduces, however, to a simple vote to accept or reject the negotiated package, this 
being particularly true in the case of the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in July 
1993 where the issue became a matter of confidence in John Major’s Conservative 
government (Stephens 1997, 332). The Labour government, enjoying a majority of 
179 in the house of commons, between 1997 and 2001, allowed a great deal more 
room for the government to manoeuvre to achieve Parliamentary ratification of the 
output from the nice European council (palmer 2002; clegg 2002).6 however, the 
prime Minister and his core executive introduced self-imposed tight restrictions on 
their negotiating leverage to ensure that the government’s core defence and security 
preferences were not breached.   
Alan Milward argues that governments seek to transfer sovereignty to the EU 
to effectively lock other EU governments into their preferences, thus having the 
effect of increasing the influence of the proposing government (Milward 2001, 16-
17; MacCormick 1999, 123-126). Milward describes this as the ‘European rescue of 
the nation-state’ – that governments manoeuvre on the European stage to ensure that 
their policy preferences are reflected through the collective policies of the EU-15, 
5 This is primarily the work of the European Scrutiny Committee which also then forms 
an iGc standing committee before treaty approving European councils. 
6 Indeed Nick Palmer, and Nicholas Clegg, commented that it would have been 
exceptional for Parliament to have blocked the treaty legislation given the realities of British 
parliamentary politics at the time. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy82
and since his book was published the EU-25 and now EU-27. Certainly for the British 
government the case for stronger EU capabilities, as a key motivator in the ESDP 
negotiations and process, was strong (liddle 2003; Wallace 2003).7 for the British 
political executive ESDP was seen as a means by which governments can ‘add-
value’ to their security and defence policies by providing an enhanced international 
intervention capability when nato as a whole does not wish to be engaged (George 
2003; interview c).
the ability of the Eu to effectively co-ordinate defence and security issues is, 
however, contested. foreign policy issues that potentially lend themselves to the 
military solutions are a great source of disagreement, negotiation and particular 
sensitivities in the Eu, particularly around the issue of national sovereignty. there 
are further sensitivities about which European security organization should be given 
institutional responsibility for any deployment. these debates centre on accusations 
that the French government is seeking to undermine the trans tlantic alliance or that 
NATO control of a particular operation offers the United States too great an influence 
over any policy. There are also difficult questions about the political legitimacy and 
funding of European defence. funding is a particularly troublesome area within 
the EU’s role in defence and security sphere (Garden 2003a, 2; WEU Assembly 
2003). the netherlands is the only Eu Member currently to have a dedicated budget 
for EsDp activities, and even this budget is restricted so that it covers only Dutch 
activities within the ESDP framework (Newton-Dunn 2002; Grant 2002). 
some of the political sensitivities around Eu military issues are advanced by 
christopher hill, Martin holland and this author who argue, through respectively 
analysing the EU’s response to the Balkans crisis and political upheaval in South 
africa, that the Eu and its external relations apparatus is punching below its weight in 
international affairs (hill 1993; 305-328; holland 1995; Dover 2005). in the context 
of the EU’s involvement in international affairs through the EPC mechanisms, and 
latterly the  cfsp, which attempts to co-ordinate Eu foreign and security policies, 
have only registered marginal success in gaining closer Eu voting patterns in the 
un and in coordinating lowest common denominator responses to elements of the 
Yugoslavian civil war (Bruckner 1990, 187). Indeed, the EU’s ability to operate in the 
foreign and security policy sector have been hindered by the need to gain agreements 
based on unanimity, and t e absence of political will to advance solutions that are not 
based around economic diplomacy and technical support. the Eu has been effective 
in establishing general policy principles, but the policy instruments to reinforce 
these first principles agreements have been slow to follow. Similar stumbling blocks 
include the preference for Eu security and European military interventions to be 
conducted under either the nato or un banner, and that an Eu defence presence 
has been viewed as a direct threat to the nato alliance and one that should therefore 
not be pursued. This was a position held by the Major Government and one publicly 
expounded by the Blair government in the first year of its term in office, which led 
to UK officials shaping the debate to ensure that ESDP could not be viewed as being 
7 liddle argued that the prime Minister was very robust in asserting this as his primary 
aim. Lord Wallace similarly believed that the experience of the Balkans and the need to act 
positively in Europe’s near abroad were significant motivations. 
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Why Governments Transfer Sovereignty: Formal Europeanization 83
a threat to nato. the position of the Benelux countries and Germany, italy and 
spain was that EsDp should not remove the nato security guarantee over Europe. 
the progress of the negotiations made it plain that the EsDp was complementary to 
nato rather than a threat (ruane 2000).  
though the basis of the nato alliance has been the overwhelming presence 
of the united states, eleven of the Eu-15 of 1997-2001 are members of nato 
(robertson 2003; Department of Defense 2000, chapter two).8 as a result eleven 
Eu governments have considerable experience of collaborative defence initiatives in 
which national sovereignty is both pooled and preserved. the Eu has not organized 
its security and defence in isolation and indeed several leading Eu security 
commentators, such as anthony forster and William Wallace, have argued that the 
Eu Members of nato have used the american security guarantee to effectively 
under-finance European security, and therefore ‘free-ride’ (Wallace 2002). The 
defence budgets of many Members of the Eu are well below that of america and 
indeed Britain and france (Military Balance 2004, 335).9 the Eu members have the 
collective experience of collaborative defence ventures, joint operations and training 
experience and the experience of this joint working should serve to reduce the initial 
costs of running the EsDp, indeed the deepening integration on a narrow range of 
activities after 2001 provides some evidence for this. all of this should add strength 
to the argument that EsDp serves to provide additional value to national defence 
budgets and capabilities. in turn, this leads to a follow-on conclusion that EsDp 
negotiations were a means to co-ordinate national policies and further reduce the 
transaction costs of reaching agreements and institutionalizing British and french 
government preferences.  
the strength of the liberal and rationalist literatures can be found in trying to 
locate the British government’s aims in defence policy and European affairs more 
generally (Moravcsik 1998, 476).10 The British government’s motivations for 
Europeanization as set out in the opening chapters were to improve the autonomous 
defence and security capabilities of the Eu, so that the Eu could intervene militarily 
in situations where it felt appropriate to do so and where nato, as a whole, did 
not wish to be involved. this initiative would also serve to secure the medium term 
future of nato through European governments sharing the burden of European 
security with the us, and only activating a military response through the Eu when 
nato chooses not to act. 
8 EU member governments who are also members of NATO are Belgium, Denmark, 
france, Germany, Greece, italy, luxembourg, netherlands, portugal, spain and the united 
Kingdom.
9 all 2001 in us $. us – 299,917m, france – 32,438m, Germany – 26,279m, italy 
– 21,528m, netherlands – 6,083m, luxembourg – 156m, portugal – 2,277m, spain – 7,007m, 
uK – 33,967m. Eu members of nato contribute 164,564m. 
10 Moravcsik notes that in his words ‘exceptional circumstances’ geopolitical 
circumstances have played a role in governments aims for collaborative policies. this is 
certainly the case for ESDP where part of the motivation for the policy was in the side-benefits 
for improving European military capabilities.
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy84
Institutional Choice – Delegation and Pooling
When the British government made the decision to transfer elements of its defence 
and security sovereignty to the Eu it did so in the context of the type of institution 
and range of functions within the host institution. this was important as the main 
potential cost of transferring sovereignty is that the host institution gains further post-
agreement policy competencies through institutional creep rather than government 
agreements. Further, that if the institutions created did not have sufficient experience 
and capabilities to effectively manage EsDp the agreement would almost certainly 
be less advantageous than a unilateral policy solution and therefore formal 
Europeanization would not occur (andreani, Bertram and Grant 2001; forster 2001, 
15-33). 
rational theories of institutional choice places an emphasis on functionality. 
For example rationalists; ‘..explain institutional choices in terms of the functions 
a given institution is expected to perform and the effects on policy outcomes it is 
expected to produce, subject to the uncertainty in any institutional design’ (Pollack 
1997, 102). institutional choice theories, however, emphasize their applicability 
to the development of the Eu and the range of institutions created in its name 
(Pollack 1997). Compared to other international institutions, like NATO and the UN, 
Europeanization has produced a large number of different types of institution – from 
co-ordinating institutions in external relations to supranational governing institutions, 
like the European Court of Justice. EU institutions can limit member governments’ 
autonomy in two ways: through either pooling or delegating authoritative decision-
making. 
sovereignty is pooled when governments agree to decide future matters by voting 
procedures other than unanimity. [...] Sovereignty is delegated when supranational actors 
are permitted to take certain autonomous decisions, without intervening interstate vote or 
unilateral veto (Moravcsik 1998, 67).
pooling sovereignty provides a solution to the problem of incomplete iGc contracts; 
namely those which require additional intergovernmental agreements to bring them 
to fruition (Winkler 1999, 39-40). Qualified majority voting (QMV) provides a 
simpler route to gaining intergovernmental agreement because fewer governments 
are required to endorse a proposal. Under QMV fewer votes are taken in the 
Council because intransigent governments can be quickly isolated and the threat of 
a vote often leads to compromise. QMV also ensures that the national permanent 
representations have to seek negotiated settlements rather than exercise the right 
to veto, thus encouraging a collegiate rather than confrontational approach to 
negotiations (Moravcsik 1998, 73; Interview F; Interview H).
Mark Pollack lists four functions that delegated sovereignty might achieve 
(Pollack 1997, 103). Delegation increases the credibility of commitments, which 
is crucial in policy areas where core national sovereignty is seen to be at issue, 
like with the single currency and ESDP (Sandholtz 1993, 1-39). Furthermore, there 
are governmental incentives to delegate the right to initiate proposals to European 
institutions. one reason being that, from a negotiating standpoint, initiating a policy 
weakens a government’s ability to manoeuvre and bargain at the intergovernmental 
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Why Governments Transfer Sovereignty: Formal Europeanization 85
level because it has already outlined to its fellow negotiators the collective policy 
that best reflects its core preferences. Research in Chapter 4 suggested that the UK 
government had significantly benefited from its position as the initiating government. 
in gaining a negotiated bilateral agreement with the french government at saint 
Malo British officials created a highly influential coalition to advance this initiative 
into the European council at nice. the evidence suggested that, in doing so the 
British government effectively protected its core defence preferences during the 
EsDp negotiations.
in sum, the pooling rather than delegation of sovereignty in the EsDp negotiations 
was the only realistic option for the British government. this is because the 
government did not wish to transfer significant amounts of its defence and security 
autonomy to the Eu. furthermore, the shape and roles of proposed institutions is 
a very large consideration for negotiators during European council negotiations 
and those governments formulate their negotiating positions partly as a response to 
institutional proposals. 
Balances of Power Within the EU
Governments face potential ‘costs’ from transferring security and defence sovereignty 
to the Eu, not least in disrupting existing balances of power. the fact that the Eu 
accepts transferred security and defence sovereignty inevitably results in some 
disruption, however minor, to relationships between governments and international 
organizations like NATO and the UN (Pol de Witte 2004). This is partly because 
of the emergence of another competent organization in this field and also because 
of potential conflicts of interest in membership and capabilities but also a question 
mark over how the new institution ight impact on international affairs, whether 
it will hold a contrary strategic vision to existing institutions. pol de Witte argues 
that these potential shocks are limited by the transparency between EU and NATO 
governments and the central institutions. 
Between 1997 and 2001 several factors shaped Eu governments position within 
the Eu balance of power. the end of the cold War left the united states as the only 
credible superpower. Moreover, German unification signified an increase in German 
government capabilities and drastically changed the distribution of capabilities 
within the Eu. More importantly, perhaps,  the collapse of the soviet union ended 
European bipolarity leaving in its wake a unipolar post-cold war international 
system (Waltz 1993, 44-79; Mearsheimar 1990; Layne 2001; Wilkinson 1999). The 
latitude for EU governments in this system to innovate on policy issues, like ESDP, 
has consequently increased because the confines of cold war strategic thinking have 
lifted. however, the importance placed on retaining, the existing balances of power 
and not creating ‘shocks’ remained a priority of the FCO, according to two high 
ranking officials (Interview E; Interview G). 
to avoid the potential pitfalls of altering balances of power within the Eu, the 
British government, through its officials at the FCO, MoD and Cabinet Office, 
dedicated the time between pörtschach, 25 october 1998, and saint Malo, 4 December 
1998 to managing the development of the saint Malo initiatives. the balances of 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy86
power, on this issue in particular, lay between the uK and french governments, uK 
and Eu governments and between the British government and us administration. 
similarly, between the saint Malo summit and the European council at nice uK 
officials conducted a large number of meetings with officials from other European 
governments and the us state Department (interview E; interview h). this was to 
ensure that ESDP did not disrupt good working relations between UK government 
and its European and american allies (interview D; interview E; intervie  f). the 
care and attention devoted to maintaining pan-European and trans-atlantic harmony 
through finding a formal outlet for a Europeanized defence policy was not matched 
by a similar level of care in the case of the 2003 war on iraq, as will be seen in the 
next chapter. 
So called ‘shocks’ to the international system can overcome problems with 
disruptions to the balance of power, like the end of the Cold War, and are also a 
key supply side factor in the creation of new EU institutions (JDCC 2003, Para 
12).11 the collapse of the Warsaw pact and the problems associated with the Kosovo 
crisis (1999) are two of the many contributing factors bet een the cold War and the 
eventual decision in 2000 of the Eu to codify a common defence and security policy 
(Wallace 2002). ‘Shocks’ provide a supply side solution to the problem of delegating 
sovereignty to the EU in three ways: first, ‘shocks’ help to shift existing balances 
of power and institutions, like NATO, that exist to retain the pre-‘shock’ status 
quo; second, ‘shocks’ discredit old ideologies and working practices that leads to a 
political climate where new ideas and working practices are acceptable (Interview C; 
interview D; lord Brittan 2002).12 Third, that these ‘shocks’ create a general sense 
of shared opportunity for institutional reform (lord Brittan 2002). for British policy 
makers, particularly those in Downing Street, the Cabinet Office, and the Policy 
Director’s staff in the FCO, key concerns centred around how the development of 
a uK European defence policy would affect the relationship between the uK and 
Eu, the uK and france/Germany and most pertinently the relationship between the 
uK and united states, and therefore the focus was on adding value without creating 
‘shocks’ (Interview D; Intervie  E; Interview I; Wallace 2002). 
The German government’s influential role within the EU and the possible ‘shocks’ 
that could have been created by German disagreement, and with it the effect on 
Europeanization across the board, made consultations between national foreign and 
Defence offices very important (Interview E; Interview F).13 During the 1970s and 
11 The UK Ministry of Defence’s definition of ‘shocks’, in the strategic context, are 
high impact, low probability events that have an immediate primary impact but then produce 
consequential impacts. these high impact events are also capable of triggering an escalation 
of circumstances to produce a sustained shift of international circumstances. the example the 
MoD use is the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
12 interview D and Brittan argued that upheavals in the international system often created 
permissive environments in which officials and politicians could advance policies that would 
have been impossible to advance previously. Interview C thought that ‘shocks’ like the Cold 
War produced new scenarios that the military had to react to rather than this being a pure 
opportunity for entrepreneurship. 
13 this was the very strong opinion of these interviewees who spent a great of their time 
managing the expectations and responses of fellow Eu governments including the German 
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Why Governments Transfer Sovereignty: Formal Europeanization 87
80s the German government’s influence within the EU increased due to its continued 
economic success and involvement in the un and Eastern Europe, although it failed 
to exercise similar levels of foreign policy entrepreneurship (rummel and Wessels 
1983, 39). In particular, Germany’s position on the frontline of any East-West conflict 
meant that unilateral German government foreign policies might lead to shifts in the 
EU balance of power and would ‘…lead to negative reactions, thereby reducing the 
Federal Republic’s influence and room for manoeuvre’ (Rummel and Wessels 1983, 
40). 
the end of the cold War provided a permissive environment in which prohibitions 
on the German government to formulate unilateral foreign policy were lifted and 
they could take a more active role in international relations – even though successive 
German governments have shown a reluctance to do this. this is changing however, 
with German troops engaging in peacekeeping operations since the turn of the 
century in the Balkans. 
Post-unification Germany has placed a greater emphasis on its ability to develop 
unilateral policies (Bulmer, Jeffery and Paterson, 1997). The political-cultural and 
historical barriers on the German government to formulate effective unilateral 
foreign and defence policies means that there is added motivation for them to take 
a full role in CFSP and ESDP, as a key means to engage in external relations. For 
example, Anne-Marie Le Gloannec notes that post-unification German preferences 
changed ‘from a champion of federalism into an advocate of intergovernmentalism, 
from a Musterknabe of Europe into a convert to British policies’ (Le Gloannec 1999, 
21). This is partly demonstrated by the German government’s engagement with, and 
enthusiasm for, ESDP as a continuation of the policy of seeking European security 
efficiencies through collaborative defence ventures (Interview C; Hopkinson 2002). 
Evidence from British government negotiators suggests that German government 
officials did not have preferences that were as intense as British and French 
government preferences (interview D; interview G; interview M).  the German 
government was however engaged in shaping the ESDP to reflect its transatlantic 
security preferences, in the 1990s the Germans were arguably closer to the us 
administration than the British, and in having recognized the need for the Eu to be 
able to act in its near-abroad (interview E; interview f; interview h).14 
the post-World War ii preference in Downing street, the fco and MoD is 
that the so called ‘special-relationship’ between the UK and the US supersedes 
all other foreign policy considerations (Short and Rifkind 2003, 24; Massie 2003, 
21; Massingberd 2002, 1). contemporary explanations of the pre-eminence of the 
‘Special Relationship’ have centred on the notion of the ‘Anglo-sphere’, an inherent 
trust of English speaking countries with Anglicized traditions (Sullivan 2003; Bennett 
2002, Bennett 2003). however, the balance of power issue concerning EsDp is in 
whether the perception of french government preferences for Eu security to be 
government to avoid causing these very disruptions. 
14 Evidence from the UK’s ESDP negotiating team was that the German government 
negotiators had fully accepted the need to improve Eu capabilities whilst retaining us 
involvement. Which was not to say that they accepted the need for Germany to improve its 
military capabilities.  
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy88
managed separately from NATO is merely rhetoric or is the official French MoD 
or Ministry of foreign affairs position. in short, the balance of interview evidence 
is that the french government held a preference for security structures outside of 
NATO but do not wish to make these preferences a reality before the EU committed 
to realistic defence spending plans and has the political motivation for an effective 
defence structure. francois heisbourg argues that the french Mfa saw EsDp as a 
distinct process separate from NATO whilst UK officials argued that the two were 
inevitably linked (Heisbourg 2004). 
a media-based interpretation of the saint Malo accords was that it would 
undermine NATO – America’s preferred institutional structure for managing 
European security and to establish a separate locus of power away from the us 
(Layne 2001; Schake 2001). However, interview evidence strongly suggests that the 
British government’s red-lines make it clear that NATO was the continued security 
institution of choice and that British negotiators were prep red not to come to a 
disadvantageous agreement on EsDp rather than undermine this fundamental aspect 
of their preferences. 
the British government was careful to avoid causing a shift in the balance of 
power between the us and the Eu on this sensitive issue. as part of this approach 
the strategy adopted by the key officials within the UK MoD and FCO was to keep 
US officials fully informed of the working parties and moves towards greater levels 
of activity concerning the EsDp (interview D; interview E; interview f; interview 
G). According to key officials this was a standard strategy for ensuring that the US 
state Department remained supportive of uK policy and also ensured that Britain 
remained a beneficiary of ‘solid’ diplomatic relations with the US (Interview C; 
Interview D).   With a privileged link to the US, British negotiators were therefore 
able to openly discuss their intentions, red-lines and analysis of progress in the EsDp 
negotiations with confidence that this discourse would remain private (Interview E; 
interview M).15 
Through extensive daily consultation, UK officials attempted to allay White 
house, state Department and pentagon fears about an Eu split from nato, french 
motivations and the UK government’s ability to manage change in EU security within 
the transatlantic preference (interview D; interview E; interview M). the closeness 
of the uK-us trans-atlantic relationship has had both positive and negative effects 
on the formal Europeanization of defence policy. on the positive side the closeness 
between the two governments helped facilitate a set of policy proposals that did 
not threaten trans-Atlantic security structures. Indeed officials were able to confirm 
in the minds of the security advisors in the pentagon and Whitehouse, samuel 
Berger and Anthony Lake that an ESDP of Britain’s making would promote the 
idea that European governments should take greater steps to underwrite European 
security (interview G; interview E).  on the negative side it reinforced a perception 
amongst the UK’s European partners that the UK saw its allegiances lying with the 
us administration and not the Eu. this would have dire consequences for formal 
15 this was a particularly important reciprocal element to the relationship with the us. 
UK officials felt confident that there analysis would not be passed to the other EU governments 
by America, thus preserving an important control of the flow of information.  
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Why Governments Transfer Sovereignty: Formal Europeanization 89
and informal European political cohesion in the run-up and aftermath of the iraq 
campaign as highlighted in chapter 6. 
The relationship between France, Germany and the UK was a key consideration 
in the debate about balances of power for policy makers within the FCO, Downing 
Street and MoD. The negotiation and development of the ESDP did not significantly 
alter the balance of power between the British and french foreign and defence 
ministries. This is because of a long recent history of joint operations and policy 
development throughout the Bosnian civil war and the peacekeeping operations that 
followed (interview c; Wallace 2002). 
Despite a strong recent history of collaborative efforts in military interventions 
key British defence and military personnel were reluctant to state a preference 
for dealing with the French military and government above working with the US 
military, pentagon and state Department even though these operations had become 
a matter of routine and success. As Chapters 2 and 3 suggested the key hurdle British 
foreign policy officials faced was in persuading officials from the French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that UK entrepreneurship on ESDP was a genuine effort in this field 
as opposed to short-term rhetoric. the balance of power between the uK and france 
was not adversely affected by the moves towards the EsDp, but a new spirit of co-
operation between the french and British foreign and defence ministries continued 
throughout the negotiations spurred on by the saint Malo meeting (interview D; 
interview E).  the relatively limited nature of the Europeanization of foreign and 
defence policy co-operation imposes few costs on the British government and thus is 
attractive as it has allowed the UK to develop, support and influence policy in areas 
of the world relatively free from British influence (Bulmer and Edwards 1992, 150; 
richardson 1993, 150; taylor 1991, 145).
Making Agreements Credible
the transfer of national sovereignty to the Eu may serve to prevent governments 
from defecting from agreements and to provide a political tool that obviates the 
need for governments to blame each other from such defections (putnam 1992, 445). 
The ‘costs’ of negotiators blaming each other for defections are considerable and 
can be measured in terms of a reduction in the flow of information and exchange 
of bargaining information during negotiations making it harder to reach future 
agreements (putna  1992, 445). part of the initial diplomatic exchange in early 
and mid-1998 be ween the uK and french Ministries of Defence was to gauge the 
commitment of each government to the EsDp proposals. this was crucial to the 
construction of trust between the two sets of officials to develop these proposals and 
bring them into a European fora (interview E; interview G). once the saint Malo 
accords had been signed, it was politically untenable for either government to defect 
or accuse the other of defecting as this would make further co-operation on ESDP 
more problematic (interview D; interview E; interview f; interview M).16 
16 the interviewees that provided this information all came to this view from having 
considering experience of these issues at a European level. interview M noted, however, that 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy90
the problems such breaches of trust cause in international relations are shown by 
the evidence presented in Chapter 6 about the breakdown in trust in 2003 between 
the UK and French governments regarding the Iraq conflict and the 2005 EU 
budget negotiations concerning the common agricultural policy. the disagreement 
between the two governments on both these issues had a direct result on the 
continued piecemeal development of EsDp, in this instance via french president 
Chirac initiating informal ESDP summits without inviting UK officials and similarly 
issuing instructions to French government officials not to engage in discussions with 
UK government officials about ESDP (Grant 2002; Black 2004).17 
the transfer of sovereignty to the Eu through pooling or delegation, provides 
solutions to the problems of incomplete contracting, but it impacts differently on the 
actions and influence of member governments. Delegation of sovereignty does not 
enhance one government’s control over other governments because the sovereignty 
is transferred to a supranational coordinating institution. the independence of a 
supranational actor to which sovereignty has been transferred is variable, but the 
potential cost for governments trying to control these institutions is large (Moravcsik 
1993a, 15). 
When sovereignty is pooled, however, it ‘is not transferred to a supranational 
body because the crucial decision-making role is taken by an interstate body’ 
(Keohane and hoffmann 1991, 8). thus, when sovereignty is pooled, governments 
can exert pressure on their negotiating partners and as a result can potentially extract 
further policy concessions (putnam 1992, 452). in some circumstances, therefore, 
the pooling of sovereignty can actually increase a member government’s influence 
and presents a key attraction of formal Europeanization to the British government. 
They see Britain’s pre-eminent place in the European security system secured by 
Europeanization. this means that the EsDp provisions and pooled sovereignty 
serves to make the UK a disproportionately stronger actor in the international 
security system, if ESDP works as it was originally designed to do in 1998. 
Governments with effective unilateral policies benefit mostly from an un-
Europeanized policy regime and have little to gain from international co-operation. 
this poses an interesting set of questions to those advocating a deeper Europeanization 
of British defence policy. prima facie, Britain has maintained an effective unilateral 
defence and security policy, within many intergovernmental structures, and has no 
pressing need to delegate this sovereignty to the EU (Interview C; Hopkinson 2002). 
Yet, as Chapter 2 suggested, the main benefits to the UK from delegating sovereignty 
on defence and security were to improve Eu defence capabilities, to strengthen the 
transatlantic Alliance, and to eventually produce budgetary efficiencies through 
collaborative research and development, procurement and training budgets. the 
benefits of this delegation are supplementary to the idea that negotiators bargain 
towards specific and calculable benefits. 
such events are very carefully managed so that their significance is down played to the public 
and parliamentarians. 
17 this command from president chirac went unreported but was brought up 
independently by both interviewees.  
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Why Governments Transfer Sovereignty: Formal Europeanization 91
However, it can be strongly argued that the side benefits of British government 
entrepreneurship on defence policy met short-term political objectives. These were, 
for example, demonstrating the British government’s pro-European credentials and 
securing continued american involvement in Eu security, that aimed to over ome 
the potential costs associated with provided ‘shocks’ to the international system. 
in contrast, smaller Eu governments and less effective military actors sought to 
co-operate on EsDp where they saw that they could have a practical effect on and 
benefit from the policy (Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1998, 61). A case in point is 
the negotiating position of the nordic countries who universally emphasized the 
need to improve Eu crisis management capabilities. they argued that nato is 
primarily focussed on territorial defence and thus Eu crisis management ought to be 
conducted outside of NATO frameworks (Graegar, Larsen and Ojanen 2002, 219-
220). the development of EsDp allowed smaller Eu governments, in co-operating 
with the development of the policy to add further elements that did not undermine 
its fundamental tenets.  
Conclusion
The final element of formal Europeanization, the transfer or pooling of sovereignty, 
proceeds along liberal intergovernmentalist lines. Within the defence context 
formal Europeanization has occurred through the British government transferring 
small amounts of defence and security sovereignty to the Eu in the belief that 
this would produce greater benefits than pursuing a unilateral policy. From the 
British government’s perspective the ESDP outcome was an efficient and rational 
development, securing its pro-European and atlanticist preferences. 
The analysis made by officials advising the Prime Minister and his core executive 
was that the projected costs of cooperating on defence were much less than the 
benefits that could be accrued. The potential costs centred around potential future 
losses of autonomy, risks to existing balances of power within the EU and the 
risk of institutional spillover within the ESDP taking the policy remit beyond the 
nice European council output; something that has subsequently been negated by 
the fallout from the Iraq war. The risk of these costs occurring were however low, 
according to British government officials, not least because of the extent to which 
they had effectively managed the negotiations and because of the agreed text in the 
European council conclusions that ensured that further extension of EsDp would 
need a unanimous agreement by the Eu governments. 
the potential costs of pursuing EsDp were also remote because the agreed 
text clearly marked the policy as intergovernmental in nature and in operation. 
For example, governments are not compelled to take part in military operations 
initiated under the ESDP banner and similarly the ‘Headline Goals’ established at the 
Helsinki Council in December 1999 are entirely voluntary. The intergovernmental 
and voluntary nature of EsDp therefore allowed the British government to pursue 
a formal Europeanized defence policy that similarly met short and medium term 
political and strategic aims. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy92
the negotiated EsDp also entailed a transfer of small elements of defence and 
security sovereignty in areas which issues of common agreement already existed 
but remained un-codified. For example, the ESDP reflects a policy that deals with 
crisis management and peacekeeping functions that were already areas in which the 
UK and France had particular experience of in the Balkans. Moreover in research, 
development and procurement policy, which are predominantly economic issues, 
the existing Eu trade and industry agreements provide the Eu with considerable 
experience and history of effective collaboration. these issues are brought out more 
fully in chapter 7 which deals with the Europeanization of the arms trade.  
the liberal intergovernmentalist explanation of Europeanization can be located 
within a significant body of literature that analyses EU external relations from a 
rationalist perspective (Ginsberg 2003, 1-2: smith 2003, 3-5). Within these approaches 
the exact level of co-operation between governments remains unspecified, although it 
is effective in identifying the costs and benefits of this intergovernmental cooperation 
(Moravcsik 1998, 479-80). Moreover from this perspective it is clear why QMV in 
external relations has been controversial. security, defence and the deployment of 
military assets are elements of the security policy sector where autonomy is a key 
indicator of a government’s sovereignty, which is why governments have cautiously 
negotiated the transfer of elements of their security and defence sovereignty. 
Whilst the EU’s external relations policy regime remains non-binding, unanimous 
and intergovernmental, German, french and British government support for the 
development of this area can be explained by the few costs they incur for doing so 
and in terms of the impact the cooperation has on national autonomy. 
the evidence suggests that governments transfer elements of their sovereignty 
to the EU to achieve credibility for government commitments (Moravcsik 1998, 
4-8). Establishing multilateral credibility for governmental preferences binds 
the signatory governments into a framework whereby they cannot change their 
preferences (Moravcsik 1998, 4-8 and 64). For negotiating governments, therefore, 
a key element of the cost-benefit analysis they conduct is the extent to which a 
collaborative policy is in the government’s perception of short, medium or long term 
national interests and similarly the likelihood of their being circumstances where the 
government’s view of ESDP might fundamentally change. In the specific example 
of EsDp the framing of the policy enshrines the autonomy of governments to decide 
whether to engage or commit assets to EsDp. the EsDp outcome therefore removed 
a core element of the ‘costs’ of agreement, making a negotiated agreement far more 
explicable.
One of the key problems associated with the British government transferring 
defence and security sovereignty is characterized as the problem of ‘anarchy’. This 
draws on a realist perspective that governments are keen to avoid exposing themselves 
to the associated risks of transferring ‘sovereignty vulnerability’ to external actors. 
in this instance this vulnerability is partly overcome by the presence of the Eu to 
regulate the behaviour of governments and its ability to make further delegation 
less costly. Moreover, there are four key supply side factors that militate against the 
problem of ‘anarchy’ and make governments more willing to transfer sovereignty: 
first, the government’s prior experience of dealing with the EU builds trust among 
governments to continue this practice. second, the Eu has supportive constituencies, 
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Why Governments Transfer Sovereignty: Formal Europeanization 93
the Commission, European Parliament and judicial service that pressure governments 
to strengthen and expand the institutions and their competencies. third, the presence 
of existing EU institutions reduces uncertainty and thus makes governments more 
willing to transfer sovereignty. fourth, existing institutions reduce transaction costs 
making it easier for governments to agree the nature of new institutions. As a pre-
existing institution in which a great deal of positive experience has been accrued 
and in which the creation of new agreements, institutions and processes entails low 
transaction costs, the EU was a low-risk institution in which the British government 
decided to transfer elements of its defence and security sovereignty. 
the transfer of sovereignty in the formal Europeanization of policy occurs is 
a deliberate and active process of government delegation. Andrew Moravcsik, for 
instance, rejects the notion that sovereignty transfer can also be a passive process, 
caused by government inaction that allows the EU institutions to grow unchecked 
or by the Eu acting in a purposive manner to enhance its own powers; the classic 
example being the European Court of Justice (Shaw 1995, 11; Ward and Marshall 
1995, 19). this view is questionable, even in this example which is dominated 
by intergovernmental negotiating, as there is evidence of Europeanizing factors 
occurring outside of formal iGc structures. the amount of autonomous power the 
EU has over any particular policy area is reflected by its ability to influence national 
decisions or practices or to make decisions that do not reflect the preferences and 
policies of leading governments. EsDp is an intergovernmental area in which member 
governments can volunteer capabilities and support to actions without committing 
themselves to permanent operational arrangements. in this respect, the institutions of 
the Eu retain little control over policies that might affect the autonomy of member 
governments (Ginsberg 2003, 1-2). this conclusion, as will be shown by chapter 
seven, is limited to formal Europeanization and not to Europeanization in general 
where, in the specific instance of the arms trade Europeanization can occur without 
the consent of government. 
the transfer of defence sovereignty through the EsDp challenges a liberal 
intergovernmentalist view that agreements between governments are particularly 
difficult to achieve and further that voluntary defections from agreement, by 
governments, are particularly likely because of the permanent nature of international 
treaties (Moravcsik 1998, 4-8). The case of ESDP challenges these core assumptions; 
the uK government did believe that their foreign and security goals could be further 
advanced through EsDp and indeed that the policy would allow the uK to engage 
in humanitarian and peace support operations with the assistance of Eu partners and 
with pre-identified capabilities and an institutional mechanism for raising additional 
military assets. 
this case study challenges the view that agreements between governments are 
difficult to achieve. The key hurdle to agreement on ESDP occurred at the Saint 
Malo summit between the uK and french governments. this obstacle was the 
perception that the two governments held diametrically opposing views on European 
security and the UK government’s red-line preference that European security should 
be underwritten by nato whilst the french Ministry of foreign affairs were more 
ambivalent about a continued role for nato. once the two governments published 
the saint Malo accords, which provided a clear blueprint for the development 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy94
of EsDp, it was clearly demonstrated that these two diametric views had been 
accommodated in these agreements. following saint Malo, agreement amongst the 
other member governments of the EU was not as difficult to achieve, as a liberal 
intergovernmentalist approach would assert (Moravcsik 1998, 485).18  the evidence 
shows that there is a cost-benefit analysis advanced in the process of negoti tions 
and the transfer of sovereignty – this chapter has argued that the potential costs of 
this transfer were low and this will be further demonstrated by the next chapter 
which examines the EsDp following the nice iGc agreement in a wider context. 
18 For example, Moravcsik argues that withdrawing defence and security coverage has 
been historically used in European council negotiations as a threat by British and french 
negotiators to secure concessions from other negotiators.  
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chapter 6
the iraq War – the problem of national 
interests for Europeanization
The earlier chapters of this book have focussed on the formal Europeanization of 
British defence policy through the discrete diplomatic cycle of the anglo-french 
saint-Malo meeting and nice iGc negotiations. this chapter explores the effect of 
the war on iraq on the Europeanization of security, defence and foreign policy and 
across the EU’s non-security policy areas. This war caused a great deal of diplomatic 
friction between European governments on a subject that a fully formed EU foreign 
and security policy would have to deal with. the lessons learnt from the iraq war 
are, therefore, important to the future Europeanization of defence and security 
policy. the respective positions of the British, french and German governments and 
the European commission prior to and during the war are explored and critically 
assessed for where they converged and diverged, and how these positions fit within 
a ‘European’ concept of security policy.  
This chapter is split into two distinct sections; the first section deals with the 
diplomacy that preceded the war on iraq between the British, french, German, and 
american governments as well as the diplomacy that occurred in the Eu and un. the 
second section places this diplomacy within the context of the internal Eu diplomacy, 
particularly through the example of the British Government’s Presidency of the EU 
in the last six months of 2005. this presidency was selected because it foregrounds 
the British government’s approach to the EU, negotiations and Europeanization from 
the institutional position of chair of the Eu. 
the iraq case study brings out several important lessons for formal and informal 
Europeanization that will be explored and expanded throughout the chapter. these 
lessons centre on the how the Eu, as a security actor and polity, is founded. More 
specifically that European security and defence policy co-operation and the common 
positions between governments can be undermined by the behaviour of influential 
European governments seeking to advance narrow self interests. The example of Iraq 
highlights the subordinate position of the Eu and its institutions in the formulation 
and operation of a European security, defence and foreign policy – and that the 
intergovernmental underpinnings of this policy area makes predicting the pace of 
Europeanization problematic. however, this chapter will also argue that the iraq 
war conversely facilitated the deepening Europeanization of soft-security functions, 
whilst providing a context in which economic and political integration has slowed. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy96
War with Iraq 
an enormous quantity of media and analysis on international relations since 2001 
has obsessed on the impact of the attack on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 
2001 (Gunarantna 2002; Chomsky 2002; Kellner 2003; Daadler and Lindsay 2003; 
shepherd 2006, 71). in conducting the research for this chapter it would have been 
easy to fall into the same pattern of constructing the ‘9/11’ attacks as a, or even 
‘the’, pivotal moment in international affairs (Crawford 2006; Sands 2005; Hutton 
2003, 30). The US-led coalition’s military action against Iraq cannot be analysed 
without a small reference to 9/11, because of the links made by both the American 
President and British government between the loose global network of terrorists 
known as Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s government in Baghdad, and therefore 
provided a justification for war (Coughlin 2001, 31; Latham 2002, 22; Sullivan 
2002). an interesting aspect of the negotiations leading up to the iraq war was the 
sense of futility in the diplomatic efforts – that the war was inevitable from the 
summer of 2002 and a widespread belief that the Bush Administration was seeking 
legitimacy for a pre-meditated attack on Iraq. The war also polarized the leading EU 
governments on an issue of wider relevance than just the Union. The extent to which 
being a member of the EU confines or modifies government behaviour gives some 
indication of the extent to which a distinctive Eu polity has been created.  
the american-led coalition of the us, uK, australian and polish armed forces 
engaged in offensive military actions against iraq from 19 March to 1 May 2003. 
As previously suggested, the road to war had seemed inevitable since the attacks on 
the World trade centre in september 2001. the strategic environment changed and 
with it came an unwillingness on the part of the Bush administration to countenance 
rogue states and future threats to us interests at home or abroad. the mood music 
for Iraq had looked ominous from the end of 2001 and got demonstrably worse 
when President Bush delivered his now infamous ‘axis of evil’ State of the Union 
address (January 2002) that named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as countries with or 
capable of developing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) with a desire to harm 
the united states (Borger 2002, theodoulos 2002). ironically, north Korea and iran 
have shown a willingness to actively develop nuclear weapons but have not faced 
US military action whereas Saddam Hussein’s Iraq has yet to yield any evidence of 
WMD materials.  
In January 2002 the Bush Administration adopted a National Security Strategy 
that incorporated a notion of pre-emptive strikes against countries they perceived to 
be a threat to their national security and this has subsequently become known as ‘the 
Bush Doctrine’ (The Whitehouse 2002; Watson 2002). This doctrine also allowed 
the United States to pre-emptively attack perceived enemies without necessarily 
having a mandate from the United Nations, and on 28 January 2003 President Bush 
confirmed this by announcing that he was prepared to attack Iraq without such a 
mandate (harnden 2003, 1; Borger 2003, 1). this doctrine has some intellectual 
heritage in the EU. The British government’s strategic ambitions announced in 1997 
included a commitment to changing the international system by force, if necessary, 
to promote democracy and liberalism in the world. 
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The Iraq War – The Problem of National Interests for Europeanization 97
The British View of Iraq 
The British government’s position on Iraq, as with all British interventions in the 
Middle East, is tainted by an imperial legacy. having been instrumental in the 
creation of Iraq in the 1920s and as an important figure in arming both Ir n and 
iraq during their 1980-1988 war the British government had a myriad of political 
and economic reasons to be involved in the iraq campaign (scott 1996). having 
sought to supply saddam hussein with high-end military technology in the 1980s 
the British government now sought to argue that the iraqi leadership were a danger 
to international security and that military intervention was required immediately to 
neutralize the threat. importantly for the European debate, the British government 
focussed on the danger of the iraqi government possessing WMD and stated that its 
aim was to remove these weapons (Blair 31 January 2003; Blair 3 February 2003; La 
Guardia and helm 2002; Grice 2003). iraqi WMD was said to be peculiarly dangerous 
to international security because of the perceived links between the ruling Ba’ath 
party and international terrorist groups, to whom saddam hussein might transfer 
such technology. the prescience of the debate on WMD between Eu governments 
has been demonstrated by the coalition armed for es failing to find any WMD 
materials, and the links between Saddam Hussein and terrorist organizations failing 
to materialize (ptiffner 2004, 25-46; phythian 2004). the British prime Minister, in 
particular, sought to elide the possession of WMD by countries like Iraq, which were 
loosely classified as ‘rogue’, with the developing threat from international terrorists 
(Milne 2003, 24; roy 2003, 2; times Editor 2003, 21). Both the french and the 
German governments publicly questioned, with strong justification in hindsight, 
how much of a threat iraq was to the international order and whether there was 
any evidence of links between Al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government (Boyes 2003; 
harnden and Guardia 2003, 1; henley 2003, 2). the effect of this dovetailing of 
threats was that the British government could argue that ‘rogue’ states and terrorists 
equally threatened British economic and political interests in the Middle East and 
at home. This was a classic British foreign policy choice, to seek stability in the 
international system through a small scale military intervention, a good example of 
this being suez in 1956. this point runs contrary to the emerging Eu foreign and 
security policy which is consensual and norms based (Dover 2006). 
The officially stated purpose of the war against Iraq was to uphold UN Security 
council resolution 1441 – 8 november 2002 (united nations security council 
2002). the focus of the international debates about the war centred on what actions this 
resolution permitted and, therefore, the legality of the war. resolution 1441 brought 
a new round of arms inspections on Iraq and threatened ‘serious consequences’ if the 
inspections were impeded and disarmament was not forthcoming and documented. 
The phrase ‘serious consequences’ is considered in international politics as variously 
as permitting armed conflict or limited to diplomatic or economic sanctions. It was 
around these different interpretations and the legality of the war that European 
governments vehemently disagreed – this chapter explores this disagreement and 
the effect it has had on the Europeanization of defence and security policy as well as 
non-security policy areas. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy98
‘Old Europe’ vs ‘New Europe’
The diplomatic divide in Europe over the war in Iraq began to take shape at the 
end of 2002 and continued into the first two months of 2003. Despite being in 
possession of broadly the same intelligence as the British, american and australian 
governments, the russian, french and German governments opposed the potential 
military action in the strongest diplomatic terms. the German government was 
domestically hamstrung by the then chancellor Gerhard schroeder having promised 
not to enter a military coalition with the americans, whilst the french and russian 
governments were accused firstly of having signed lucrative oil contracts with the 
iraqi government and secondly adopting an anti-american position (Beaumont 
and islam 2002; rennie 2002, 14).  unhelpfully, us secretary of Defence Donald 
Rumsfeld described this ad-hoc alliance as ‘Old Europe’ implying that it represented 
outdated and outmoded thinking (Rumsfeld 2003; Parris 2003, 24; Rennie 2003, 
16). Unsurprisingly this did little to persuade these ‘old European’ governments of 
the case for war. 
the french and German governments showed unity of purpose in opposing the 
conflict including a joint public statement after a bilateral heads of state meeting in 
January 2003 (Usborne 2003, 1; Connolly 2003, 15; Black 2003, 5). For Germany 
there remains a large Second World War legacy that acts like a self-denying ordinance 
on deploying armed forces outside of German borders (Lander 2003). Schroeder’s 
election announcement that Germany would not take part in US-led military actions 
merely served to reinforce this. Schroeder’s position also acted as a strong marker for 
German foreign policy preferences – an ad erence to minimum force and optimized 
coalitions with legitimate international backing, again a reaction to legacy of the mid 
twentieth century. The French government’s position was different; the EU should 
have a foreign policy independent of the united states and that acts as a counter-
weight to american hegemonic power. the french position did not exclude the use of 
military force, but to place it very firmly within the auspices of UN Security Council 
consent. By contrast those governments, considered by inference as being in ‘new 
Europe’ by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, declared themselves to be supportive of the 
American Administration’s position in an open letter published on 30 January 2003. 
The British, Czech, Danis , Hungarian, Italian, Polish and Portuguese governments’ 
stated that they believed iraq to be a threat to global peace and that they believed the 
us and Eu shared common values that required protecting (Evans-pritchard 2003, 
14; Walker 2003, 10). A further ten NATO accession states issued a similar open 
letter supporting the american administration.1 
in early february 2003 the us and the British governments pressed for a new 
UN resolution to provide legitimacy for an armed conflict against Iraq. As a counter 
measure the German, and french governments argued that a new resolution was 
precipitous and that the weapons inspectors should be given more time to complete 
the job given to them by Resolution 1441 (Stevenson and Preston 2003). Their 
position was supported by the head of the un inspectors, hans Blix and by former 
1 The governments include Romania, Slovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, 
latvia, lithuania, Macedonia and slovenia.
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The Iraq War – The Problem of National Interests for Europeanization 99
leading inspectors like the American, Scott Ritter (Bone 2003; Bone 2003a). Having 
been given support from leading figures in the weapons inspectorate, the French 
and russian governments threatened to veto a newly tabled resolution from the 
British and american governments in the security council (10 March). a further 
week of intense diplomacy followed and on 17 March the British and American 
administrations withdrew their draft resolution and finalized their plans for war. In 
Britain the decision to go to war had immediate and serious political consequences 
for Tony Blair’s government because of the resignations of former Foreign Secretary 
and then Leader of the House of Commons, Robin Cook and the Secretary of State 
for Development, claire short and the million strong public march through london 
opposing the war (Cook 2003; Freedland 2003).
Despite heavy criticism of its position from the public, the media, and its own 
MPs the British government stuck to its original assessment that the Iraqi government 
was in breach of resolution 1441, which legitimized a military response. it also 
argued that iraq was in breach of resolution 678 which had been passed at the 
end of the first Gulf war in 1991 and that obliged Iraq to surrender all weapons of 
mass destruction (yoo 2003; de torrente 2004; Kagan 2004). thus, by a slightly 
convoluted and tortuous rationale the american and British governments constructed 
legitimacy for the military assault on iraq on 19 March 2003. 
The EU’s Response 
the war on iraq itself and the debate that preceded it was conducted by states. 
The EU’s contribution to the debates and the road to war was marginalized and 
therefore provides an interesting perspective on how the commission views its 
role in a Europeanized defence and security policy. As seen earlier in this book 
the commission opted to remain aloof in the EsDp negotiations on the grounds 
that it saw them as being between states ‘holding’ competency on these issues. 
however, with a commissioner for External relations in place, the commission, 
through its representative and former British cabinet Minister, chris patten chose to 
publicly comment on iraq. furthermore, the commissioner agreed with the British 
and american position, highlighting saddam hussein as a threat to world and iraqi 
domestic peace armed with WMD (Patten 29 January 2003). Patten also positively 
suggested that an armed intervention might become necessary to avoid the un being 
humiliated – an interesting rationale in the context of the British and american 
governments having proposed the contentious resolution in the un requesting the 
option of military force.  
Whilst the debate about the legitimacy of the war raged on there was international 
unity behind the belief that the iraqi government was responsible for the escalation 
of the crisis. this extended to Eu heads of state from both sides of the divide over 
the effic cy of conflict (Patten 29 January 2003; Blair 3 February 2003). Even those 
opposed to the conflict, like Vladimir Putin, suggested that the Iraqi government 
could remove some of the pressure on it by cooperating with the weapons inspectors 
(stewart 2003, 5). the disagreements were, therefore, not about iraq as a problem 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy100
in the international system – but the tools with which the international community 
sought to deal with it. 
The leading ‘old’ Europeans – the French and German governments – were key 
to demonstrating the ‘European’ consensual style of security policy. They viewed 
the British government’s behaviour as destabilising the world and making it less 
secure. What is more, the french and German governments correctly predicted 
that the unilateral action by the american-led coalition would erode international 
unity on tackling terrorism (Helm 2003, 1; Harmden 2003, 11; Bone and Webster 
2003, 14). They could have taken this point a step further to include the difficulty 
the American-led coalition would face in the post-conflict reconstruction phase of 
the war, with governments who normally support reconstruction or peace-keeping 
efforts, withholding assistance because they viewed the initial war as illegitimate and 
illegal. This has proved to be a significant problem for the US, UK, Australian and 
Polish coalition that has failed to make the transition – on the ground -from high-end 
war-fighting to peace-keeping. That the coalition appears to still be entrenched, in 
2006, in a series of counter-insurgency campaigns can be attributed either to their 
continued presence in Iraq and the absence of an international peace-keeping force, 
or to the intractability of an enemy that has found an effective set of operational 
tactics (Haskini 2003; Hoffman 2006, 103-121). The absence of a wider number 
of European military actors assisting in the peace-keeping or peace-enforcement 
activities in iraq has left the coalition members exposed to the political consequences 
from iraq. a good example of one of the consequences is the Madrid train bombings, 
which has been attributed in policy circles to the Spanish government’s support for 
the Iraq war and resulted in Aznar’s pro-war government losing the subsequent 
election.
the German government questioned the wisdom of the war in the context of 
the war against terrorism, again something given credibility by the Madrid and 
London bombings, that were a key feature of 2004 and 2005. The German Foreign 
Minister, Joschka Fischer argued that seeking stability and solutions at source in 
regional conflicts would be a far more effective way of dealing with the problem 
of international terrorism (Beeston, Watson and Webster 2003, 1). fischer paid 
particular attention to the on-going tensions between israel-palestine, which he 
argued was the key to all the troubles in the Middle East and by implication, for 
terrorism exported to the ‘west’ (Fischer 13 March 2003). He argued that a war 
against iraq would have serious consequences for the Middle East and might even 
lead its ‘Balkanization’ – a reference clearly designed to resonate with the memories 
of the 1990s for European governments who had suffered strong criticisms following 
their collective nd individual responses to the yugoslavian civil war (fischer 19 
March 2005; Dover 2005). 
In the European debate on Iraq one of the key schisms that opened up was between 
the British government, on one side, who viewed iraqi possession of WMD as the 
key threat to regional and global security and the French and German governments, 
on the other, who argued that Iraqi WMD was an issue to be tackled alongside other 
more pressing Middle Eastern issues, such as israel-palestine. as a result the french 
and German governments saw the un process and resolution 1441 as a means 
to identify what materials and weapons programmes iraq were developing and to 
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The Iraq War – The Problem of National Interests for Europeanization 101
then respond to those findings. The French government were keen to disarm Iraq if 
it was shown to possess WMD, whilst the British government had concluded that 
Iraq was in breach of UN Resolutions and therefore could be subject to forcible 
regime change (fischer 19 March 2003; fischer 20 March 2003; Webster 2003, 
1; Delves-Broughton 2003, 14). Both the British prime Minister and secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Jack Straw, drew wider implications for the international 
community if action was not taken against Iraq – that taking action would deter other 
‘rogue’ states from trying to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction (Blair 28 
February 2003; Blair 18 March 2003; Straw 9 January 2003; Straw 11 February 
2003).  Even with the benefit of only three years hindsight this seems to have been a 
bad judgement call as Iran and North Korea appear to have accelerated their nuclear 
weapons programmes, because they view acquisition of WMD as a means to ensure 
they are not attacked by an American-led military coalition. 
As the coalition moved towards war against Iraq Joschka Fischer complained 
that the British government kept subtly changing the grounds for war and that in 
doing so was making the diplomatic efforts to prevent ar impossible (Fischer 13 
March 2003). This is a charge that the British govern ent would publicly reject but 
which diplomats speaking on the condition of anonymity privately felt had showed 
them to have done a ‘good job’. Fischer’s assertion highlights some of the problems 
inherent in trying to create a common foreign, security and defence policy. the 
British government’s shifting rationale for attacking Iraq highlights the problems 
inherent in an intergovernmental system that broadly defines European external 
relations policy. in transforming the rationale for war from it being a consequence 
of Saddam Hussein’s complicity in the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001, 
to the need to prevent his attempts to develop or acquire WMD, and finally onto 
the need to remove saddam as a potential proliferator of these technologies, and 
as a threat to regional security, the British government brought to the fore a tension 
within the Eu. this tension exists between the Eu as a closely co-operating club of 
nations, or as a fledgling super-state. One thing that is clear from the Iraq example is 
that the stronger the disagreements between at the intergovernmental level the more 
problematic future formal integration becomes. But paradoxically, these tensions 
also provide more latitude for the European commission to deepen integration on 
pre-agreed areas.  
A major line of disagreement at the intergovernmental level between the British, 
french and German governments was the nature of the intervention. this disparity 
went to the heart of very different conceptions of a Europeanized security, defence and 
foreign policy. Notably, the French and German governments’ approach to Iraq fitted 
more closely into patterns established by other Eu foreign and defence initiatives – 
strong normative foundations but with consensus at its core. the french government 
argued strongly that it was unhelpful for single states to believe that they could 
resolve international disagreements unilaterally, whilst the German government said 
it wanted to encourage consensus politics and the rule of international law, both 
positions carrying a clear critique of British and american diplomatic conduct. the 
British government’s approach was far closer to the American position – an ideological 
underpinning prioritising the liberation of the iraqi people and a promotion of world 
stability, but attached to a divisive policy framework where consensus was optional 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy102
(Blair 7 January 2003; Blair 31 January 2003). The imposition of a particular model 
of political and economic governance by the american and British invading force 
echoed of imperialism, the sort of practice that had been rejected by the German, 
spanish, italian, Belgian, and portuguese governments because of their individual 
historical legacies, mostly in Africa. The British government’s position therefore 
went outside of established Eu foreign policy practice and means that any further 
defence and foreign policy integration and common positions are likely to continue 
proceeding on a lowest common denominator basis. 
unsurprisingly, perhaps, the Eu pursued a series of positions that emphasized 
consensual decision making in the international community and as a result, the 
creation of a truly multilateral international system. the European commission 
was therefore keen to talk up the UN as the most appropriate forum for resolving 
international disputes and also to suggest the strengthening the cfsp and EsDp 
frameworks to make them more effective. European Commissioner Chris Patten 
talked in strong terms about the Iraq conflict producing a return to a 19th century 
‘balances of power’ international system which he argued threatened the institutions 
created after the second World War, including both the un and Eu (patten 20 March 
2003). Speeches like this highlight the extent to which a Europeanized foreign and 
defence policy has been created. Patten and French and German officials clearly 
asserted a European way of doing foreign policy and were willing to argue strongly 
for it. far from this being formal Europeanization, it is the Europeanization of foreign 
and defence policy practice. 
Whilst iraq was not directly an Eu defence or foreign policy issue it has become, 
by association, a European issue. the di unity between Eu governments put the 
cfsp under pressure and raised questions over the Europeanization of other issues 
(patten 20 March 2003). European commissioner chris patten argued that this 
disunity was particularly damaging between those governments who had taken ‘firm 
national policy positions as if they spoke for the European Union as a whole’, which 
applied to the British, french and German governments equally (patten 12 March 
2003). Out of adversity though, EU officials viewed this crisis of European identity 
as an opportunity to build upon areas of common agreement and good practice like 
for example, in the Balkans (Patten 13 March 2003; Patten 20 March 2003).
Further diplomatic declarations by, for example, Javier Solana suggested that the 
iraq war would be a turning point in Eu relations whilst romano prodi described 
this diplomatic impasse as a ‘moment of truth’ for the EU, presumably in terms 
of whether a foreign and defence policy capable of progressing beyond the lowest 
common denominator is possible (solana 24 March 2003; prodi 26 March 2003). 
The Greek Presidency, through Foreign Minister George Papendreo, suggested that 
the only way for the EU to get past lowest common denominator policy making 
would be to develop pan-European approaches to Middle Eastern issues (papendreo 
6 May 2003). solana and papendreo also argued that the Eu should produce a 
European equivalent to the american national security strategy to guide European 
action and to produce a greater sense of cohesion on foreign and defence policy 
formulation, something that was done in December 2003 (papendreo 6 May 2003). 
from this evidence we can suggest that a Europeanized security policy is limited to 
those issues that the ‘big’ European states are not involved with. Moreover, whilst 
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The Iraq War – The Problem of National Interests for Europeanization 103
‘the European approach’ is typified by consensus and humanitarian norms, these 
can be over-ridden by European governments taking unilateral action. The problems 
of intergovernmentalism – as discussed at length in the earlier chapters of this 
book – are as pronounced in the Iraq example and in practice seem to undermine the 
attempts to create a Europeanized polity. 
the french government argued that a Europeanized security and defence policy 
was essential to stability within the international system (de Villepin 11 December 
2002). As a reflection of their political desires the French sought to advance the 
idea of the Eu being one pole in a multi-polar world. By this rationale the military 
strength of the Eu has to be enhanced to provide credibility to its position as an 
alternative locus of world power (Chirac 22 January 2003). Thus, the French 
government’s view is not too dissimilar to the EU’s institutional view. Patten, Prodi, 
solana and papendreo all argued that the Eu should focus on how it could be used 
to assist the UN’s central, but damaged role in world affairs (Patten 12 March 2003; 
papendreo 6 May 2003). as two correctives to the British and american coalition 
on Iraq, the Greek Presidency argued that the EU was an obvious counter-weight to 
US hegemonic power and, furthermore, a union of shared values, ideal for tackling 
global issues like WMD proliferation (Simitis 26 March 2003). 
the political motivations for the Eu counterbalance to the uK and us is interesting 
insofar as it highlights the deeper problems of common policy making in the Union, 
and that some influential EU member governments have a very distinct notion of 
what it means to be a member of the EU and in the Europeanization project. The 
lack of common-cause between European governments on these issues suggests that 
the Europeanization of security and defence policy will remain typified by lowest 
common denominator policy making, unless there is a substantial development on 
the part of Eu member governments to put aside narrow national self interests. 
support for the concept of global multi-polarity also came from the french 
government who believed that the us-uK war against iraq would result in global 
instability through blow-back from Islamic terrorists and the artificial creation 
of a ‘clash of civilisations’ (Chirac February 2003).2 the french government 
also believed, on a point of principle, that removing a head of state was an error, 
establishing a dangerous precedent that could result in the international system 
reverting to a 19th century system of ‘survival of the fittest’ (de Villepin 2 March 
2003). in a more immediate sense the removal of saddam hussein had the predictable 
knock-on effect on other proliferating countries like North Korea and Iran who now 
face potential military interventions to prevent the further development of their 
WMD programmes. to avoid such outcomes, the German government focussed on 
improving un institutions, particularly those involved in weapons inspections, as 
a means to uphold the UN’s position as global policeman and leading institution in 
rolling back proliferation and thus obviating the need for unilateral military action. 
The British government’s repost to the French and German government’s position 
was to focus on the effectiveness of the UN in solving difficult problems. Thus the 
2 For example, Chirac said ‘It would create a large number of little bin Ladens. Muslims 
and Christians have a lot to say to one another, but war isn’t going to facilitate that dialogue. 
I’m against the clash of civilisations, that plays into the hands of extremists’.
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy104
British government’s implicit argument was that US-UK led action therefore provided 
credibility for the un in helping to deal with the threat to international stability (Blair 
31 January 2003). This is a curious understanding of the Iraq campaign and their 
view of the EU and the UN is, as a result, that making a claim about the effectiveness 
of these institutions is more important than finding international consensus. Tony 
Blair’s publicly stated position in 2003 was that the Iraqi crisis should be resolved 
through the UN, but that the UN would have to become more pro-active in seeking a 
resolution. What this amounts to is a clear indication that the us-led coalition would 
adhere to un rules so long as they moved in a direction that was both agreeable to 
the coalition, and one that they were heading in regardless of extraneous diplomacy 
(Blair 3 february 2003; Blair 12 february 2003). this position is deeply problematic 
for the Eu because of the inbuilt assumptions regarding consensus and a norms 
based foundation.  
Despite the obvious schisms all the EU’s leading governments expressed their 
desire to retain strong diplomatic relationships with the united states. the British 
government retained the strongest desire to be close to the us – seeing it as important 
to the cohesion of the ‘free world’. The German government kept stressing that its 
opposition to the war did not constitute a recalibration of its strategic position in the 
world and even the french government sought to stress that the crisis over iraq should 
not be construed as being hostile to the us and that they envisaged continuing strong 
relations. how much of this is diplomatic posturing and the niceties of international 
relations is difficult to tell. As a statement of intent it is clear that all three leading EU 
governments did not wish to destabilize trans-atlantic relations, even though there 
were pronounced policy differences.
A Failure of Common Purpose
the iraq case study is a strong example of why it is, and will continue to be, inherently 
difficult for the EU to formulate a coherent foreign, security and defence policy. The 
majority of European governments were in favour of a common approach to Iraq 
that emphasized the importance of multilateral and consensus approach to the agreed 
problem of an iraq with a serious WMD capability. Disunity between governments 
was caused by the unconditional support given to the US’ course of action in seeking 
to topple saddam hussein without the mandate and authority of the un. the British 
government’s side of this disagreement was informed by their efforts during the 
1990s to police iraqi compliance with un resolutions made before, during and after 
the first gulf war. Conveniently, perhaps, the British government decided there was 
little point continuing the containment policy of the 1990s, particularly in the light 
of repeated iraqi breaches of un resolutions. thus, the British government thought 
that military action against iraq would ensure that these repeated infractions would 
end perm nently and if the action was supported it would unify the world behind an 
americ n conception of global security. 
in pursuing this singular course of action the British government provides 
strength to the argument that narrow self-interest is the largest stumbling block to a 
fully fledged common EU security policy; and without a see-change in the politics of 
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The Iraq War – The Problem of National Interests for Europeanization 105
the EU this will remain a significant challenge to the Union and one likely to cause 
it to remain typified by lowest common denominator outputs. 
The EU’s central institutions – the Council and the Presidency – emphasized the 
role of the un as a forum for conciliation and appropriate for disarming iraq. the 
European Council tried to provide a summary of a unified position in its statement 
on the 17 February 2003 that emphasized Iraq’s responsibility to comply with UN 
resolutions and to argue that armed conflict should be a last resort (Greek Presidency 
17 february 2003). it was quite clear however that the member governments were 
engaged in open disagreement on many of these points. 
the french and German government positions were couched in legal terms 
(french), and that the proposed uK-us military action was unacceptable (German). 
as previously mentioned chancellor schroeder opposed military action during the 
august/september 2002 election campaign, a position that s me believe enhanced 
the chances of his coalition’s eventual victory on 22 September (Chandler 2003; 
lambert 2003). the pledges schroeder made during the election campaign put 
the German government at one end of anti-war sentiment. he argued that the un 
resolutions had their remit restricted to disarmament and this was not to be achieved 
by armed force. Schroeder’s overall position was that war should be a last resort and 
indeed should only be triggered when a strategic ally was being attacked – which he 
accepted for afghanistan and 9/11 – but even then only when the un had issued a 
mandate for such action. this, the chancellor said, was a result of German historical 
legacies – particularly the Second World War – which particularly qualified the 
German people to advocate military reticence. 
The Consequences for the EU’s Institutions 
The example of the Iraq war highlights the difficulties faced by the European 
Commission and Parliament. Commission officials were effectively hamstrung by 
the actions of the major European governments in their diplomacy over the Iraq crisis. 
once the British, french and German governments had adopted strong positions 
any comment by Commission officials would be open to interpretation as either 
supportive of or detracting from that position. the commission could be accused 
of becoming openly politicized. this accusation was levelled at chris patten who 
made a public statement arguing that armed action might be justified to uphold the 
sanctity of the UN, which was a clear replication of the official British government 
position. The Commission’s difficult position on Iraq is partly exacerbated by 
individual commissioners reverting to national positions, but more importantly that 
the Commission lacked an independent legal personality to make security policy 
pronouncements on behalf of the Eu. patten sums this tension up neatly when he 
said: 
the commission is not a member state. We of course contribute to the development of 
the Union’s Common Foreign Policy and we are deploying the instruments within our 
competence to make it more effective. But many of the issues we are discussing go to the 
heart of national sovereignty’ (Patten 29 January 2003).
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy106
In the face of stark levels of disunity over Iraq the EU turned in on itself and focussed 
on bolstering the narrow security roles the Eu already plays. as mentioned in chapters 
Two and Four the success of the ESDP was dependent on the so-called ‘Berlin Plus’ 
arrangements being codified. This was achieved, somewhat surprisingly given the 
circumstances, on 17 March 2003 (robertson 17 March 2003). further extensions 
to existing Eu security activities occurred at a council meeting (18 March 2003) 
with the decision for the Eu to discharge nato operations in Macedonia through 
Operation Concordia which became the first EU badged military operation. This 
was followed up with operation artermis, which was an Eu-badged but french 
led peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo to suppress inter-
ethnic tensions and violence. Both these operations were conducted with agreement 
from the member governments. in these cases agreements were relatively simple 
to achieve because the activities were covered by readily agreeable humanitarian 
norms. By contrast, iraq was so divisive because it was a w r of aggression and of 
choice, containing very few humanitarian characteristics. these divisions did lead, 
arguably, the creation of a European security strategy in December 2003, which 
aimed to find common agreement on security norms and practices across the Union, 
a paradox of deepening integration at a time of disunity. 
The Lasting Legacy – A Fractured Identity and the British Presidency of the 
EU (2005)
the lasting legacy of the divisions over iraq were felt further than on the 
Europeanization of security, defence and foreign policy. as seen above, there were 
strong improvements made to the existing range of Eu security areas in the months 
following the onset of the iraq war. this section explores, through the example of the 
British Presidency of the EU – in the final six months of 2005 – whether the disunity 
caused by the Iraq conflict spread across the full range of EU policy competencies.  
The UK Presidency began on 1 July 2005 in the context of the effective rejection 
of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty by French and Dutch publics, and a Luxembourg 
presidency that had failed to reach an agreement on the Eu budget. across the 
policy board the EU was rightly seen by many commentators to be a ‘club in crisis’ 
(henley 2005; financial times leader 2005, 12). the uK government set out its 
own expectations for its presidency in two White papers: Priorities for the UK 
Presidency of the Council (23 June 2005) and ‘Prospects for the EU in 2005: The 
UK Presidency of he European Union’ (30 June 2005). These papers separated out 
the UK’s aspirations into three sections: economic reform and social justice, security 
and stability, and Europe’s role in the world with a final paragraph pledging to ‘take 
forward the discussions on future financing’. Both papers provided strong signalling 
that the government appreciated that it would have to pick up unfinished business 
from the luxembourg presidency, but with the British rebate as a contested area the 
position of the British government as chair of the Eu, this was inopportune.  
In keeping with the focus of this book this section ought to centre on defence and 
security policy. however, in the context of the 2005 British presidency this chapter 
explores the disunity in the EU created by the Iraq conflict, as a defence and security 
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The Iraq War – The Problem of National Interests for Europeanization 107
issue, that has spread to other sectors of European public policy making and informal 
Europeanization. these non-defence areas can therefore be included in the wider 
analysis of defence related Europeanization. that a large disagreement on one policy 
area should heavily impact on negotiations across the full spectrum of European 
policies directly contradicts the work of liberal intergovernmentalists who suggest 
the each policy area is negotiated on a rational basis and separate from other issue 
areas. the example of the 2005 British presidency would suggest that this is not the 
case and further, that the UK’s support for the US led war on Iraq has put back the 
further formal Europeanization of defence by some years, if not indefinitely. 
the British presidency set out to achieve agreements on the budget reforms 
(2007-13), accession talks with Turkey, progress on stabilizing financial services 
and chemical processing (known as REACH) as well to make significant ground 
on environmental and climate change policy. The mood music prior to the UK’s 
presidency augured well for an engaged and positive British government. prime 
Minister Blair’s speech to the European Parliament (23 June 2005) raised expectations 
that the UK would lead radical debates on the future of European integration (Jones 
and rennie 2005, 11; financial times observer 2005, 14). the speech was received 
warmly by most Eu governments, although the failure to follow through with 
some of the bolder statements during the presidency has been the cause of some 
discontent (stephens 2005, 19). the British presidency, achieved the substantive 
elements of its programme, including the budgetary legacy from the luxembourg 
presidency, but did very little to improve pan-European relations arguably as a 
hangover from the disunity surrounding military action on iraq and its continued 
fallout. this is a paradoxical position as cfsp and EsDp are policies dominated by 
member governments and unanimity. it should follow, therefore, that disagreements 
are lost within an agreed political system that understands ‘opt-ins’ and ‘opt-outs’ 
of member governments. however the evidence suggests that governments clearly 
act outside of the constraints of individual policy areas and take a broad view of 
diplomacy that leads to implicit or explicit linkages, again something that liberal 
intergovernmentalism rejects.   
as with all Eu presidencies, the British government had very limited scope 
to influence the six monthly agenda. It could use its restricted privileges as Chair 
of the Union to push the EU’s business forward. Institutionally, it could facilitate 
this through acting as chair for heads of state and Government, Ministerial and 
other committee and working group meetings, in representing the Council of 
Ministers at the European parliament and the European commission and to act as 
Eu representative to third countries and international organizations. as a result, the 
British government acted as the chief facilitator for an established agenda, brokering 
deals on different issues. that the uK has been central to the disagreements on the 
Eu budget is unfortunate, and holding the position of chair made its antagonistic 
position ven starker. 
The ‘programme of action’ for the British Presidency was part of the Multi-
annual strategic programme for the period 2004–6, designed by the irish, Dutch, 
luxembourg, uK, austrian and finnish presidencies (Multi-annual programme 
2006). the luxembourg and British presidencies submitted their annual operational 
Programme of the Council for 2005 and were also tasked, as are all Presidencies, 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy108
with managing the EU’s responses to large international events. For Britain this was 
particularly onerous due to the terrorist attacks on the London transport system in July 
2005 that highlighted the shifting nature of European security away from territorial 
defence and onto homeland security, as well as managing the European programme 
in the absence of a fully functioning German effort, due to the attempts to formulate 
a functioning coalition government (september 2005). By happy chance the British 
government also held the presidency of the G-8 presidency alongside the presidency 
of the Eu. the two presidencies remained separate and distinct – the G8 presidency 
focused on broad global issues like world poverty and climate change, whilst the EU 
Presidency worked its way through negotiations on institutions and budgets. 
Benchmarking Success 
any number of state, sub- and supra- state actors are able to legitimately pass 
judgement on the success or otherwise of a European Presidency and these 
judgements are invariably highly contested. From a European Union perspective, the 
British Presidency was judged well because it secured an agreement on the budget, 
but poorly because of the political consequences of those negotiations. as previously 
mentioned, similar damage was done to the Briti h government’s reputation as a 
result of the rapid loss of momentum between the Prime Minister’s speech to the 
European Parliament in June 2005 and the mid-point of the Presidency. The failure 
to implement radical policies and instil a sense of direction to the European project 
was seen as constituting a missed opportunity.  The British government’s concept of 
a successful presidency, on the other hand, included success in these areas but also 
the protection of key national interest areas such as retaining as much of the budget 
rebate, secured by prime Minister thatcher in 1984, as possible (Daily telegraph 
Editor 2005, 17).
In procedural terms the British Presidency was judged to be a success. As 
Chair of the large number of committees and working groups the FCO and Cabinet 
Office were once again effective in co-ordinating positions and institutions (see 
chapters 2 and 3). the one exception to this was the informal foreign ministers 
meeting in september which suffered from rare poor organization (Browne 2005, 
41). Complaints about the British government’s diplomatic and negotiating style 
were more widespread however – a good example of this came in october with the 
informal Heads of State summit at Hampton Court, London. The Slovakian Prime 
Minister, for example, complained that he and other heads of state had not been 
given agendas or briefings for the meeting (Editor: The Observer 2005, 32). Most 
of the new Eu member states saw the meeting at hampton court as an opportunity 
for the British government to use up some the time of its presidency and thus avoid 
difficult issues like budgetary reform. However, Prime Minister Blair’s call for an 
energy security policy was greeted with enthusiasm and has become a much larger 
issue since the British presidency through the austrian presidency, and through the 
global exposure given to the issue as a result of the disagreements between russia 
and the Ukraine over the supply of natural gas and concerns about global warming 
(herbstein 2006, 32). 
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The Iraq War – The Problem of National Interests for Europeanization 109
on foreign and security policy the British presidency managed to retain some 
European unity in the face of some considerable challenges, such as iran and us 
‘renditions’. This cohesion is somewhat surprising given the schism over Iraq and 
more generally on the direction of the EsDp. the tension hanging over from iraq 
were not eased by revelations about the American policy of ‘extraordinary renditions’ 
(the removal of suspects from or through continental Europe for interrogation all 
over the globe) and further that the cia had established interrogation bases in 
Europe without the permission of host governments (Watt 2006, 27). the universal 
outrage this caused in the EU prompted a unified response and a collective request 
for clarification on US policy and practice in this area. 
the latest challenges have included the diplomatic standoff with iran over their 
nuclear technology programmes, whilst the strategically and economically sensitive 
relationship with China was rocked by negotiations over voluntary export restraints 
to limit the impact of Chinese textiles and shoe imports – the so called ‘bra-wars’. 
Bringing these tensions under control and delivering cohesion across the union was 
an important challenge for British diplomats and one in which they achieved some 
notable and surprising successes. 
Domestic Security Policy 
the developments at saint Malo and nice were premised on territorial defence 
and humanitarian intervention, whilst the post 9/11 security environment has been 
dominated by ‘homeland security’ issues in the UK and across the rest of the EU. 
As a key security player the British government divided its work on these issues 
into: counter-terrorism, people-trafficking and enlargement. The British government 
viewed opening accession negotiati ns with Turkey as strategically important and 
achieved this in early October. The rationale for this desire rests on Turkish accession 
providing greater levels of regional and global stability in the future, even with the 
strong austrian, french and German government and public resistance to this further 
enlargement. 
Counter-terrorism policy came to the fore because of the attacks on London in 
July 2005 – but had been preceded by the adoption of the Hague Programme in 
June 2005. The Presidency also made significant strides in reaching agreement to 
harmonize, for law enforcement purposes, the retention of telecommunications, 
email and internet data in all member states for up to two years. The German, Greek, 
Italian, Portugues  and Slovakian governments as well as many civil society groups 
all raised concerns about civil liberties implications and costs of the measures 
(Laitner 2005, 8). The Presidency managed to get a qualified majority vote for a 
Directive on the retention of data, but this may be subject to a future legal challenge 
in the European Court of Justice. 
the focus on homeland security since 2001 poses the larger question of whether 
defence and security policy should be refocused on to these domestic concerns. insofar 
as they provide a case study for Europeanization, the measures taken to support 
government counter-terrorism efforts have been successful and have included pan-
European policing agreements, common arrest warrants, limited intelligence sharing 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy110
and increased powers of data acquisition and retention, bringing common working 
practices and importantly a sense of a truly pan-European attempt to counter the 
terrorist threats posed to mainland Europe. 
The opening of accession negotiations with Turkey was seen as a large 
diplomatic success by the British and american administrations. this success is 
even more stark when viewed in the context of a veto threat from the Austrian and 
German governments who wanted to continue the debate about the nature of the 
EU’s relationship with Turkey (Browne 2005, 42). However, British negotiators 
managed to publicly identify the Austrian government as an awkward and vulnerable 
negotiating party, but as a result these tactics left central and eastern Eu members 
feeling isolated because of the number of bilateral negotiations conducted by the 
British government. 
the German general election and helpful declarations by the un War crimes 
tribunal greatly assisted British efforts. the inconclusive German general election 
prevented a Christian Democrat, and therefore anti-Turkish, representation at the 
General affairs council while the un reported that croatia had fully cooperated 
with efforts to detain the suspected war criminal General Gotovina, which allowed 
British negotiators to persuade their austrian counterparts that in exchange for 
Turkish accession talks, talks with Croatia should also begin (Wagstyl 2005, 8; 
Moravcsik 2006, 2). At this most intergovernmental level the British government 
were able to play a very conventional diplomatic role, moving between the various 
member governments finding compromize on these difficult issues; showing the 
benefit of standard international relations explanations for European negotiations 
and diplomacy. 
External Relations and External Security
the British government managed to retain a measure of Eu foreign policy cohesion 
throughout the presidency, whilst not actually deepening formal integration, even 
on sensitive issues like Iran’s development of nuclear technologies. Cohesion on 
Iran was made considerably easier by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s call on 26 
October for Israel to be ‘wiped off the face of the planet’, which was badly received 
by tony Blair as president of the European union, and by other Eu leaders (Webster 
2005, 4; la Guardia, helm and rennie 2005, 8). the Eu3 (Britain, france and 
Germany) persisted with attempts to negotiate with iran over its nuclear energy 
programme, which is widely seen as a cover for a nuclear weapons programme, that 
is unacceptable to most Eu governments and particularly to the us who labelled 
Iran as a member of the ‘axis of evil’ – countries who support terrorism and seek to 
undermine the ‘west’. In January 2006 the EU3 declared that they were no longer 
able to negotiate with Iran without the Iranian government making some concessions 
(sherwell 2006, 24). this has left the international community with limited choices 
about whether and how to escalate the crisis in a way that puts pressure on the 
Iranian government. The EU-3’s approach has been resolutely through collective 
responses, rather than unitary action.  
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The Iraq War – The Problem of National Interests for Europeanization 111
Eu cohesion on the iranian issue, and therefore the semblance of a Europeanized 
foreign policy has been made possible by the overwhelming presence of a unifying 
norm against the proliferation of nuclear materials. this position is particularly 
held, in Europe, by the french and British governments who are already nuclear 
powers and outside Europe by the american administration who view the theocratic 
regime in tehran as a threat to american national security interests. the presence 
of this non-proliferation norm raises the bar on the lowest common denominator 
agreements possible in intergovernmental negotiations – hence the quality and rigour 
of the European position. 
on less sensitive defence and security issues the Eu further developed its 
international presence during the six month presidency. in september 2005, the 
European Union launched the first ESDP operation outside Europe and Africa, the 
monitoring mission in aceh (indonesia), with support from the norwegian, swiss, and 
a number of asEan governments. the success of these missions is more symbolic 
than an impressive show of military capabilities. furthermore, on 15 november the 
Council adopted a joint action that officially launched the EU Police Mission in 
the Palestinian territories (EUPOL–COPPS) as of 1 January 2006, further evidence 
of the Eu engaging in humanitarian operations although the israel-palestinian-
lebanese clashes in 2006 have disrupted these efforts. the missions have, however, 
served to reinforce the view that the Eu has found a niche foreign policy identity that 
serves to support post-conflict reconstruction and other soft-security roles. 
the other Middle Eastern issues dominating European politics were more 
problematic. the British government had wanted the Eu to become more involved 
in iraq, but this has still not occurred because of fractures in domestic support for the 
war and post-conflict reconstruction efforts in countries like Spain, Italy and France. 
From the British government’s perspective, the more countries it can involve in the 
reconstruction effort, the greater its legitimacy will be and prospectively the less 
danger it will face as an occupyin  force. negotiations to increase political and trade 
cooperation with Iraq have yet to start and nor has a Commission Delegation Office 
opened in iraq. nonetheless, the Eu political Directors did initiate a dialogue with 
Baghdad on 24 October 2005 and a decision was taken to extend EUJUST LEX (the 
rule of law Mission for Baghdad), which is positive step for European involvement 
in iraq. 
Economic Reform and the 2007-2013 Budget 
the Europeanization of defence and security policy has impacted on the wider 
Europeanization programme. as a civilian and economic superpower the principal 
focus of any EU Presidency should be the stabilization and promotion of the EU’s 
trading status. the British presidency, as with the foreign policy emphasis of prime 
Minister Blair domestically, was more engaged in security policy than economics. 
this was partly due to the prevailing security situation in Britain, partly because 
of the government’s wider security interests in the Middle East, and also because 
the prime Minister had developed his premiership to bolster his reputation as an 
international statesman, whilst leaving his chancellor to drive a domestic policy 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy112
agenda. However, it was a joint priority of the Barroso Commission and the UK 
presidency to reinvigorate the lisbon agenda. they placed particular emphasis on 
streamlining business regulation which included reform of chemical regulation 
(REACH) – finally agreed in December 2006, and development of the Financial 
services action plan and the services Directive. the commission caused a number 
of headlines when it published a communication (25 october) calling for a three year 
programme of reform and consolidation of 222 pieces of basic legislation and 1,400 
Acts (Parker 2005, 8). The Commission’s proposals included scrapping 68 pieces of 
new legislation which met with criticism from the french government in particular. 
the persistent legitimacy questions faced by the commission following the santer 
commission have placed a renewed emphasis on the council and achieving unity 
amongst Member governments. indeed, the current situation has put a renewed 
emphasis on governments as the lead players in the Eu, which means there is greater 
scope for disagreements in one policy area to spill over into unrelated areas. 
the uK presidency was also at the forefront of moves to further integrate 
the EU’s financial services market. The Commission’s Green Paper on Financial 
services policy 2005–10, provided details of the proposed reforms, which were then 
duly adopted without controversy, even though the uK and french governments 
had previously disagreed on these issues. The European Parliament’s Internal 
Market Committee ended its internal disagreements and voted for the Services 
Directive on 22 November which allows it to come forward for a first reading in the 
European parliament in 2006. the services Directive is broadly in line with British 
government thinking, highlighting an under-published truth that, just as with ESDP, 
despite its ‘awkward partner’ stance the British government manages to shepherd 
through initiatives that are in its interests, regardless of the dominant political and 
media discourse that the Eu imposes disadvantageous measures on the uK (forster 
2002). 
The final few months of the British Presidency was blighted by arguments over 
the budget and future financing of the EU. By tying this debate to a discussion about 
agricultural subsidy and the cap the British government highlighted the damage 
that can be inflicted on formal and informal Europeanization by narrow national 
interests and two major UK-centric issues in particular. First, the UK budget rebate 
and second, the promotion of certain types of economic reform. these issues were 
very clearly foregrounded in the diplomatic wrangling over the 2007-13 budget in 
late 2005. the British government would have preferred to postpone discussion of 
this issue until after its presidency, as it had done with the European constitution, 
but Eu states and the commission did not allow the issue to slip off the British 
Presidency’s agenda. The British strategy had two divisive elements: First, the UK 
Presidency linked reform of the UK rebate to reform of the CAP, which it said was no 
longer compatible with European economics. in doing so the British government laid 
itself open to the charge of opportunism (sunday times Editor 2005, 16; rennie and 
helms 2005, 1).  second, it used the same delaying tactics that had been successful 
on the Turkish accession issue to try and force the debate on CAP. 
the British government presented its detailed budget proposal to its fellow 
Eu members on 5 December. the proposals aimed to reduce the burden on the 
current net contributors to the budget through cutting the regional aid planned for 
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The Iraq War – The Problem of National Interests for Europeanization 113
the Central and East European member states ‘by no more than 10 per cent’. British 
officials tried to justify this reduction on the basis that the East European member 
states have failed to spend a large amount of aid within the two-year time limit. 
The reduction would be linked to an extension of the time limit in which the East 
European states would be allowed to spend their aid, as well as a 2009 review of 
spending, to include the CAP. A key point of the British proposals was that they 
tried to disentangle the reform of CAP reform from the UK’s budget rebate – which 
had been done presentationally – through the reduction in the rebate being part of a 
British desire to support the accession states. these proposals were received badly 
amongst Eu governments but a negotiated position did emerge through reducing the 
British budget rebate by one billion pounds a year – although in cash terms it would 
continue to grow (White 2005, 11). 
The large EU governments’ cash contributions will increase because of this 
budget in a large redistribution of wealth to the former soviet bloc countries part 
of the enlarged Eu area. furthermore, the uK managed to get agreement from the 
French government that a review in 2008/9 would examine the workings of the 
cap, although this is a relatively minor concession, given the history of delays 
aimed at avoiding reform of this policy area. It is difficult to judge whether the 
diplomatic schism over iraq was an important contributory factor to the similarly 
divisive developments on cap and the British budget rebate. however, the cap is 
seen by the french government as an area of core national interest and they treat it as 
such in negotiations. The perception of the British government flaunting it’s ‘special 
relationship’ with the United States and constructing itself as being above the EU’s 
day-to-day politics gives the British government’s status as an ‘awkward partner’ a 
different dynamic, including a great deal of resentment. 
There are few objective reasons for the UK to occupy a ‘special’ role within the 
Eu – the legacy of Empire is a dim, distant historical relic, as is victory in World War 
Two. The nuclear deterrent is stru gling to find a role in a new security environment 
framed by asymmetric threats and the power of un has been dented by inertia and 
inaction on important events like Rwanda (1994) and Darfur (2005/6) both of which 
seemed to unify world opinion but have produced little action. as a club of unitary 
states the Eu has historically struggled to channel the needs of huge state egos into 
useful action – the diplomacy at the end of 2005 over the Budget rebate and cap 
demonstrates this point clearly. 
Summary
this chapter has explored the effects of the iraq war – the diplomacy leading up to 
it and the fallout from it – on what might be termed the informal Europeanization of 
security policy and wider Eu policy areas. this research suggests that Europeanization 
is a relatively fragile political phenomenon. Whilst strong and significant advances 
have been made to produce unified positions and common understandings across 
the union on security policy the behaviour of individual member states in following 
narrow national interests has been shown to derail the EU’s unity of purpose. The 
UK’s unilateral decision to join the US-led coalition and play a leading role in the 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy114
military action stood at great odds with the EU’s consensual and law-based security 
and foreign policy preferences. in turn, the commission was unable to forge a strong 
position on the iraq crisis for fear of being seen to favour one particular side of the 
debate, and moreover, did not feel empowered to do so. the example given of chris 
Patten making a public statement that appeared to reinforce the British government’s 
position did nothing to help this sense of paralysis in the commission. 
crucially, the diplomacy concerning the iraq crisis is part of a wider European 
contest to frame the nature of EU defence, security and foreign policy. The first side 
of this contest typified by the French and German government positions on Iraq 
which sees the EU as part of an international system of collective security apparatus’ 
that explicitly reject the notion of unilateral military action – which was favoured 
by the British and american administrations in relation to the problem of iraq. the 
collectivist position also emphasizes the rule of international law, the responsibility 
of major states to uphold this law and to protect smaller states from the affects of 
globalization whilst pointing towards the unity of the Eu as an institution of shared 
experiences and political outlooks. 
the British counter-position is that the Eu is a political system rather than 
collecting house for common culture, values and experiences. the British 
government’s instrumentalist position is the EU will remain operation and useful for 
all the time in which the separate institutions and governments remain committed 
to trying to find common solutions to policy issues, where those issues suit pan-
European policies. indeed, the British version of this model can be summed up 
as intergovernmental insider-advocacy – that is one which is happy to retain the 
unanimous elements of the Eu, but with an aspiration to convince other governments 
of the wisdom of the British position. That such contests are taking place over 
the future direction of European security should not be a surprise – but that the 
protagonists have such different ideas is perhaps surprising and indeed worrying 
for the future of the Europeanization of security, defence and foreign policy. this 
points towards a conclusion, that is supported by the evidence in this chapter, that the 
Eu will continue to deepen integration on issues underpinned by readily acceptable 
international norms, such as humanitarian intervention, but that cohesion on issues 
that fall outside of this bracket will be problematic because of behaviour of national 
governments pursuing narrow national interests.  
this chapter also explored the effect of the iraq crisis on the Europeanization 
of issues outside of the security sphere. it did this through the prism of the British 
government’s Presidency of the EU in the last six months of 2005. Within these 
examples the Europeanization can be seen as a disparate political phenomenon. 
Despite the widespread disagreements over the iraq crisis the normal business of 
the Eu continued unabashed. the British presidency achieved a budget agreement, 
accession talks with Turkey and movement on REACH and the Services Directive. 
However, in achieving the successes on Turkey and the budget the British government 
incurred huge political costs and goodwill in the union, because of its diplomatic 
strategies and approaches. 
the budget deal was a necessary evil for the uK, costing the government 7.2bn 
GBp over 7 years and some bad press coverage in the uK. on issues such as the 
rebate and cap the negative effect of the iraq crisis on Eu diplomacy was over-
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The Iraq War – The Problem of National Interests for Europeanization 115
shadowed by more pressing narrow national preferences; in the case of the budget 
from the British government and in the case of cap by the french government. 
however, all the negotiations occurred within the diplomatic context of the British 
government being poorly regarded by its fellow European governments because of 
its publicly negative attitude towards the Eu and because of its self-constructed 
and self-important role as a bridge across the atlantic to the Bush administration in 
america. 
one of the positive elements of the British presidency was that the structural 
constraints of the chairman role placed the British government under a political 
obligation to engage positively in negotiations and to try and advance a Europeanizing 
agenda. free from the constraints of the presidency in 2006 the British government 
will of course be free to return to an ‘awkward’ partner strategy particularly as this 
plays well with the ‘Euro-sceptic’ British media and a instinctively Euro-sceptic 
public (forster 2002). ultimately, the British presidency chieved much of what 
it wanted to do substantively, whilst failing to achieve the level of reform stated 
by Prime Minister Blair in his June 2005 speech to the European Parliament. The 
British government returned, once again, to its position of ‘awkward partner’ in 
Europe, leaving the impression that it is happy for the Eu not to reform. the British 
government’s style of diplomacy was roundly criticized during the Presidency; 
the habit of tabling last minute amendments and proposals was seen as a form of 
brinkmanship; aimed at hijacking the diplomatic process, whilst in normal diplomatic 
terms this is seen as part of the essential statecraft involved with these processes. 
the day-to-day Europeanization of defence and security policy under the British 
presidency continued at a good pace. the Eu was still able to run and lead peace 
support and advanced policing roles in Bosnia, the congo and greater levels of 
support to Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories, although the EU’s involvement 
in the Palestinian areas has been very recently thrown into doubt with Hamas’ 
victory in the general election (la Guardia and rennie 2006, 2). this has been 
exacerbated by the conflict between Israel, the Palestinian authority and Lebanon 
over the kidnapping of three Israeli soldiers that saw Israel take military action 
against palestine and lebanon to try and recover their men (Guardian – agencies 
2006; Macintyre 2006). the long term future of the Eu as a foreign, security and 
military actor looks to be in providing niche support to the failing and failed states 
and post-conflict reconstruction areas; whilst individual EU states use their high-
end military capabilities in taking part in international coalitions of the willing. The 
corrosive effects of pan-European disagreements on the war on Iraq are likely to 
reignite if the US / UK coalition proposes taking military action against Iran which is 
seen as having a more demonstrably ‘western’ population than Iraq – 2006 and 2007 
could therefore see the beginning of the end for the common foreign and security 
policy making in the EU, if the debate over Iran drives the US/ UK coalition down 
a military route. the Europeanization of security policy proceeds smoothly whilst 
there is a unifying international norm underpinning the policy, but outside of this 
narro  situation the logic of an anarchical international system – where the Eu and 
Europeanization projects are still at the whim of individual nation states asserting 
their national strength on narrow self interests – prevails, providing a validation of 
the liberal intergovernmentalist framework of analysis. However, the next chapter 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy116
throws these conclusions into sharp relief by highlighting the influence and control 
exerted by supra- and trans-national actors over Europeanization. 
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chapter 7 
the Europeanization of the arms trade
this chapter explores the Europeanization of the legal arms trade at the national and 
supranational level. it focuses on the how the British arms trade operates and then 
situates it at the European level. in doing so the chapter argues that the arms trade is 
both the ‘fast and slow track’ of Europeanization. Whilst the European Commission 
and arms manufacturers are at the forefront of an increasingly Europeanized arms 
trade, national governments are concerned with protecting national economic 
interests that are now anything but national because of the internationalization of 
defence industries through mergers, acquisitions and joint projects. Furthermore, this 
research suggests that the Commission and manufacturers are using the ‘homeland 
security’ agenda to force a Europeanization agenda, distorting the preferences of 
national governments away from the stated security goals of the EsDp by steering the 
securitization of national policy to meet economic objectives through state-private 
networks of officials and manufacturers. The juxtaposition of the deeply insular 
national trade against an emerging and vibrant pan-European trade will be explored 
through a typical procurement and sales cycle. this structure will help bring to the 
fore the elements of the cycle particularly affected by national and supranational 
pressures, and the particular officials and institutions involved. The chapter will 
show that the intergovernmental foundations of defence are being eroded by a trade 
driven cross-pillar approach; a supranationalist attack on core national sovereignty. 
The Arms Trade as Power Politics  
The legal arms trade in Britain is viewed by government officials as being a core 
function of the state and an indispensable part of the British economy (Dover 
2007). Moreover, the legal arms trade has foreign policy implications – the British 
government’s view is that they can garner favour from third parties and exert insider 
advocacy over other countries foreign or domestic policy (DEso 2006). the two 
leading examples of this belief concern arms exports to saudi arabia since the 
1980s and India and Pakistan in 2002-3 in which officials described the British 
government’s decision to maintain export levels to potentially warring countries as 
insider advocacy (MoD Interview March 2005). Sales to Saudi Arabia were justified 
on the grounds of being able to influence a strategically important government in the 
Middle East (Stavrianakis 2007). It should come as little surprise, therefore, that the 
British government lends this trade its full institutional support. 
on the European stage the EDA provides the EU with an ability to influence 
the development of technology and, by inference, the procurement and sale of 
these materials. By extension the arms trade should now be considered as a tool of 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy118
diplomacy at the disposal of the Eu as well. however, with this new diplomatic tool 
comes the tension inherent in national arms programmes. The EU’s established role 
as a humanitarian foreign policy actor provides part of this tension within its arms 
trade activities. the Eu has been at the forefront of efforts to control the proliferation 
of weapons and military technologies. its efforts in policing the ottawa treaty 
concerning landmines have met with scholarly acclaim (long 2002; Dover 2006). 
The EU has enjoyed similar sentiments on its work to ensure a Code of Conduct 
for the arms trade is codified – a set of provisions aimed at making the trade more 
transparent and less open to claims of corruption (Bauer 2003; Davis, hirst and 
Mariani 2001; council of the Eu 2005). 
in practical terms the Eu has thus far tried to demonstrate its arms related 
diplomatic strength through the medium of non-proliferation policies and actions. in 
the ongoing case of iran, the Eu – through the Eu-3 – has adopted increasingly tough 
positions (through 2005/6) to try to stop and then roll back the Iranian government’s 
programme to develop nuclear energy, with the commonly held assumption that 
this programme will naturally result in a weaponized nuclear programme (Bowen 
and Kidd 2004; Bahgat 2006). in the case of china the exact opposite approach 
has been taken. Member states, concerned with improving trade relations with 
China, have lobbied extensively for the EU’s arms embargo on China to be lifted. 
this has been an ongoing issue since 2004 and has received a great deal of media 
attention (Minder 2004;  Agence France Presse 2005; Buckley 2005). The human 
rights abuses perpetrated by the chinese government on political dissidents, their 
problematic position on taiwan (from an merican perspective) and the chinese 
economy’s emergence as a potential hegemonic power, have all made the issue of 
trading military equipment with China more politically difficult.
However, within a framework of trying to achieve preferential trading terms 
with china, the sale of arms has become a bargaining chip that many within the 
European political elite are willin  to trade. from a national perspective, the uK 
and BaE systems have publicly declared that they will not sell military equipment 
to China regardless of the EU’s position because they wish to remain closer to the 
US government’s position on the issue. This demonstrates the influence of arms 
manufacturers on the direc ion of national policy and the commensurate affect this 
has on the European stage – with the ban on exports to china remaining.   
the European commission sees the arms trade as a useful way of improving 
the EU’s position on the world’s economic stage. The Commission believes both 
that defence manufacturing will contribute to meeting the lisbon agenda targets 
and that military technology will spin out to improve civilian technology industries. 
the Eu has therefore moved from a position of being a non-military, foreign policy 
actor, at the forefront of arms control and non-proliferation initiatives, to a state-like 
actor with policy tensions between a desire to promote a thriving arms trade and the 
competing desire to control the proliferation of these technologies. What is clear, 
however, is that the trade dimension (including the lisbon agenda) has facilitated 
the growth of a Europeanized and internationalized arms trade; one in which the Eu 
has replicated state-like institutions like the UK’s DESO into the EDA – evidence 
of the uK government uploading its policy and institutional preferences into the 
supranational level.  
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The Europeanization of the Arms Trade 119
Whilst the EDA and the EU’s defence and foreign policy identity remains an 
intergovernmental policy area there is considerable merit in the argument that the 
Europeanization of the arms trade has taken on its own dynamic and internal pace. 
The influence of lobbying on the EDA and member governments in tandem is driving 
the European defence procurement agenda to a position where it is considering 
network enabled capabilities to remain on a par with the United States (Hayes 2006, 
27). The EDA’s and Commission’s desire to increase arms sales might also be part 
of a post-Cold War version of an arms race, the dash for market share, as firms from 
america, russia and Europe vie for contracts around the world. the competition for 
market share is partly a raw economic equation of boosting balances of trade, but it 
also serves a foreign policy purpose of buying, or more precisely selling, influence 
into those client countries – particularly as the contracts often contain maintenance 
clauses that extend the commercial relationship into the medium term.  
as an interesting footnote to these economic and tr de developments, it is 
significant to note that the EU’s Code of Conduct on arms sales has not had a significant 
effect in reducing the number of exports made by Eu countries. uncharitably this 
might indicate that the code may have been a rather public attempt by the Eu to 
retain its humanitarian actor tag, rather than a serious attempt to reduce proliferation 
(larsen 2002; Bretherton and Vogler 2006).
The EDA’s desire for technological parity with the US is partly driven by 
economics, but also driven by the consideration of power politics, both nationally and 
supranationally. for the British government, in particular, the political dimension is 
covered by the desire to act as a useful military ally of the US. The EDA’s programme 
of action for 2005-6 demonstrates this point neatly: the priorities are stated as 
strategic lift (normally used for deploying military assets into high intensity military 
theatres), air-to-air refuelling and c4istar (command, control, communication, 
computing, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance); a 
concept that has gained a higher profile since 2003 and the Iraq war (Potts 2002; 
Fulton 2003; EDA 2006). The EDA’s flagship programmes for 2005/6 centre around 
projects that the United States military has been at the forefront of developing. For 
example, unmanned aerial Vehicles (uaVs) are technologies that the american and 
israeli military forces have used in preparing reconnaissance for tactical bombing 
or infantry movements – a recent example being the 2006 israeli action against the 
Lebanon (O’Sullivan 2004; Massy-Beresford 2006). The EDA’s stated desire is 
that European built versions of this technology should remain ‘interoperable’ with 
American built te hnology, reinforcing the thesis that the European Commission’s 
vision of defence technology is one that supports us-led military actions – a direct 
echo of the British government’s position. 
Given the post-conflict reconstruction work that European member states are 
involved with currently, and presumably will remain involved with, a new generation 
of armoured fighting Vehicles (afVs) and inter-operable c3 technologies 
(command, control and communications) are required. these technologies are 
being designed and dealt with by both the EDa and manufacturers, a move designed 
to improve the ability of the European militaries to participate in wars of choice. 
the us has voiced dissatisfaction, however, with the development of a European 
owned and controlled satellite system (known as Galileo), which the US views as an 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy120
unnecessary addition to European capabilities, seeing as america offers good access 
to their surveillance and spy satellites (Parker and Thornhill 2005; Agence Europe 
2004).  The development of the ‘Galileo’ project is seen from the EU’s perspective 
as an attempt to gain a foothold in the global satellite market, opening up European 
civilian and military applications. Whilst space cannot officially be militarized these 
satellite systems do offer militaries the ability to assess enemy capabilities and view 
enemy ground movements; a significant capability and a statement of intent on the 
EU’s part.   
nationally, the transfer of military and dual-use materials are facilitated and 
strongly supported by the Defence Export services organisation (DEso) and Defence 
Attachés (DAs) who use privileged access to officials in government procurement 
agencies to unlock foreign trade opportunities. Furthermore, DESO and the arms 
manufacturers use their respective position within and access to the uK Ministry 
of Defence (MoD) to shape the ministry’s domestic procurement practices for the 
benefit of the manufacturers. The vast majority of the British government’s and EU’s 
efforts on the arms trade are focussed on the presumption to sell arms, rather than to 
control or monitor their end use. there is only slight evidence to suggest that there 
has been a curtailment of trading, despite the weight of evidence from nGos of 
inappropriate end-use or re-sale of uK or Eu built and sold arms. importantly both 
the promotion and monitoring of arms sales occurs mostly at the nation-state level 
with only little of it occurring at the supranational level.  
‘Too Close for Comfort’: Government, Manufacturers and the Pre-licensing 
of Exports1
the arms trade is an emotive issue, ar using strong views amongst campaigners who 
argue the moral and economic cases against the arms trade while industry insiders 
advocate the political, strategic and counter-economic case for continued export 
activities. the trade has attracted criticism on wider fronts, such as on corruption and 
the impact of the arms trade in fostering violence in the recipient countries (Barkawi 
and laffey 2001). 
The industry commentator Joe Roeber, whose book on corruption in the arms 
trade was too contentious to go into print following threats of litigation from arms 
manufacturers to his publisher, suggests that the trade is the ‘most corrupt legal 
sector of the economy’ (Roeber 2005).  Roeber also contends that in the late 1990s 
the cia estimated hat the arms trade accounted for 40-45% of the total corruption in 
world trade despite only amounting to less than half of one percent of the total trade. 
however, British arms exports have continued to prove to be highly lucrative for the 
UK Treasury as well as, as previously mentioned, an area in which officials believe 
asserting considerable influence over recipient countries; whilst industry figures 
emphasize the economic advantages of the arms trade to the uK. 
In 2004 UK arms exports reached a five-year trading high, according to figures 
released by DEso, exports totalling us$8.2 billion, up $400 million from 2003. in 
1 This subtitle echoes Stavrianakis’ PhD (Stavrianakis 2007). 
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The Europeanization of the Arms Trade 121
terms of market share this translates to a 20% share of the world market in 2004, 
putting the uK second behind the united states (DEso 2006; isenberg 2005). for the 
British government, therefore, the arms trade is a national, rather than European issue, 
although there is interview evidence that the British government made significant 
efforts to ensure that a British official was appointed as the first head of the European 
Defence agency (EDa) (Dover 2007, 30).  the arms manufacturers see the trade as 
internationalized – the increasing overlap of shareholdings, projects and procurement 
strategies mean that ‘flag-carrying’ companies are no longer entirely tied to individual 
nations, but this disjuncture has not resulted in friction between the manufacturers 
and the British government. Arguably the manufacturers have benefited from good 
relations with both the British government and European commission; the decision 
of the Commission to fund some research and development ork introduces an 
interesting dynamic into the arms trade – the supranational funding of materials to 
be sold through state-private networks to the British procurement agencies. This 
means that, by a complicated process, the British government is influenced by both 
national and European producer group pressure.    
The British government’s approach to the arms trade can by typified by a strong 
pro-trade preference that forms an essential part of the British government’s wider 
external relations policy. this agenda manifests itself most strongly through DEso 
whose raison d’etre is to support the transfer of military and dual-use equipment 
(norton-taylor et al 1996, 15). one intervie ee characterized this preference as 
being a free-market philosophy under which the default is to sell as much material as 
possible but within a framework that exerts control over exports within given criteria 
(interview 23is). as previously suggested, the case of saudi arabia provides strong 
evidence for this claim through the long established and important links to British 
arms manufacturers. Evidence of the strength of this trade link is shown by the 
answer to the freedom of information act query placed by the Guardian newspaper 
that revealed 161 of the 600 employees at DESO were assigned to the ‘Saudi Armed 
Forces Project’, which specifically facilitates arms sales to Saudi Arabia (Leigh and 
Evans 2005). The government’s effort in promoting and supporting the arms trade, 
and particularly in exporting equipment to saudi arabia, coupled with an overlap 
between public and industry officials highlights the extent to which public and 
private interests have elided. 
Uploading British Preferences to the Supranational Level  
one way in which the uK has uploaded its defence preferences to the supranational 
level is through the establishment and remit of the EDA. The EDA’s role is to 
advance collaboration between companies and countries on the development of 
defence equipment. Nick Witney, the current British Chief Executive of the EDA 
(and former UK MoD and FCO official) and also Head of the group tasked to 
design its institutional elements, has been keen to extend the role of the EDA and 
critics argue, generate further manufacturing contracts for British industry (tigner 
2004; Interview 14IS). Arms manufacturers had a large role in the working groups 
that designed the EDA: high ranking European Commission officials sat with 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy122
representatives of BaE systems and EaDs as well as the president of the European 
Defence industries Group to advise on how the new institution should operate, 
providing a key voice opportunity to manufacturers and providing greater evidence 
of a fundamental elision of public and private interests. As a result of these working 
groups the EDa has been greeted by anti-arms trade campaigners as a strong signal 
that the EU has taken on a military identity. More notably perhaps are the comments 
of two interviewees that the installation of Witney as the head of the EDa was a 
key UK government position in the intergovernmental negotiations that secured the 
establishment of the agency (Interview 13IS; Interview 14IS). Having a ‘Brit’ as the 
head of the agency would ensure that British interests were secured. 
British officials anticipate that Witney will help steer the EDA towards a British 
conception of what the Agency should seek to achieve. In trying to balance a quasi 
think-tank role of identifying and plugging gaps in European military capabilities, 
whilst also being an institutional guarantor of Eu defence manufacturing interests 
pushes the Eu into a potentially contradictory position. Evidence of this tension 
was seen within days of the agency being established ith the largest Eu arms 
manufacturers taking out a full page advert in some British newspapers to emphasize 
their vision for the EDA (The Times; The Telegraph 15 June 2004). 
the danger for the EDa is that it will lose its strategic overview of how to plug 
the capabilities gaps that exist within the European military portfolio – based on the 
sort of operations the EU and its member governments’ wish to conduct – as a result 
of becoming a conduit for the lobbying attentions of the major arms manufacturers. 
Moreover, its strong links with a European Commission which is determined to 
promote a high-technology, research-led industrial base, an enhanced internal 
market and an increasingly neo-liberal industrial policy pushes the EDA down 
certain avenues of activity. at the time of writing none of these avenues appear to 
disadvantage British manufacturers, or go against the British view of the European 
arms trade.  
The EDA – Institutional Structure, Legal Basis, Membership and Budget
the European Defence agency was originally agreed within the convention on 
the future of Europe, a pre-cursor to the European constitution in october 2003 
(European convention secretariat 2003). the EDa should have been established as 
part of the constitution in 2008 – however, subsequent referendums in france and 
the Netherlands in 2005 have effectively killed it off (Scolioni 2005; Lichfield 2005). 
Member states have begun, however, to resurrect the elements of the constitution 
that they thought were meritorious, and included in this tranche of measures are the 
EDa provisions. the role of the agency was debated extensively between Member 
Governments and by the Defence Working Group – which was composed of national 
government representatives, those with Ministerial experience at the national and 
supranational level, and manufacturers – which again reflects the extent to which 
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The Europeanization of the Arms Trade 123
a state-private network exists, to determine government policy and procurement 
practices, in the European arms trade.2 
During the Thessaloniki Council negotiations the French government pushed 
for the agency to reflect their political desire for a fully-fledged common defence 
policy by having the EDa as a pan-European procurement and development gency 
– incorporating equivalent roles to the UK government’s DESO and Qinetiq into a 
supranational agency.  the British government, having argued all the way through 
the saint Malo process that capabilities should be at the heart of the Europeanization 
project, simultaneously tried to protect and advance British arms manufacturer 
interests. The British position, reflecting British pragmatism and this dual approach, 
pushed for an EDa that would coordinate mutually convenient and advantageous 
projects as they occurred, without being too prescriptive (Interview MoD Official 
2005). the German and italian governments, argued however, for a light-touch 
agency to ensure common procurement trends across Europe, reflecting their 
concerns about the EDA undermining NATO and providing inflationary pressures on 
national defence budgets. The outcome, as expressed in the Conclusions of the June 
2003 European Council meeting at Thessaloniki provided a pathway for the EDA to 
be formally established with a mix of British and french preferences – as with saint 
Malo – as the underlying operational understandin s: 
The EDA is an intergovernmental agency in the field of defence capabilities development, 
research, acquisition and armaments. This agency, which shall be subject to the Council’s 
authority and open to participation by all Member states, will aim at developing defence 
capabilities in the field of crisis management, promoting and enhancing European 
armaments cooperation, strengthening the European defence industrial and technological 
base and creating a competitive European defence equipment market, as well as promoting, 
in liaison with the Community’s research activities where appropriate, research aimed at 
leadership in strategic technologies for future defence and security capabilities, thereby 
strengthening Europe’s industrial potential in this domain (EU Council Greece 2003). 
A Joint Action brought the EDA into existence on 12 July 2004 as an agency 
in which member states can voluntarily opt in or out of its remit thus allowing the 
‘neutral’ countries to hav  internal debates about whether they wished to become 
members of a supranational defence organization (EU Council Joint Action 2004). 
the British and french governments engaged in a lengthy debate about whether the 
EDA should be governed by unanimity or by majority vote – the decision that emerged 
was that states retain a right of veto over the involvement of non-Eu countries in 
2 Javier Solana (High Representative for the CFSP), Gen. Rainer Schuwirth (Head of 
Eu Military staff), corrado antonini (president of the European Defence industries Group), 
Jean-Louis Gergorin (EADS), Laurent Giovacchini (DGA, French Ministry of Defence), 
peter lundberg (assistant DG, Defence Equipment agency, sweden), Mr anthony parry 
(BaE systems), Gen. carlo cabigiosu (former Kfor commander General), alain le roy 
(speci l Envoy of the European union in the fyroM), Gen. Gustav hagglund (chairman 
of the Eu Military committee), lord robertson (secretary-General of nato and former 
uK secretary of state for Defence), alain richard (former french Minister of Defence), and 
christopher patten (commissioner for External affairs) (Eu council doc. conV 461/02, 
2002.
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy124
the EDA. In turn, the French government won the debate over the EDA’s autonomy, 
allowing the EDA to request and fund new projects whilst the British government 
secured a provision that means the EDA’s budget is decided by unanimity. The 
intergovernmental nature of the EDA is underlined by the Agency’s steering board, 
which is composed of 24 Eu defence ministers, meeting biannually at Ministerial 
level (or by proxy through their designated officials), who effectively control the 
EDa. in theory, therefore, the EDa should be a tool of national governments, but 
a central argument of this chapter is that the EDa has managed to go beyond the 
narrow confines of state control and develop its own distinct and Europeanized 
agenda. 
The Agency has a staff of around 80 officials who ultimately report to the 
High Representative, Javier Solana. The EDA has official links to the 24 member 
governments who are associated with the agency. the agency is staffed by those 
seconded from national bureaucracies and also by direct recruitment into the agency 
(EDA Open Recruitment 2006). Nick Witney was appointed as the ‘Head of the 
Establishment Team’, which broadly equates to Chief Executive. Under him is the 
German, Hilmar Linnenkamp.
Whilst the effect of a pro-sale operating principle is marked on the behaviours 
of the EDA it is similarly pronounced on the UK’s Embassy officials and for DAs 
attached to those embassies (phythian 2001). Defence attachés are not expected to 
get involved in any covert intelligence activities but are expected in the course of 
their duties, to collect openly available military information (steele 2004, 282). they 
spend a great deal of time liaising with the host armed forces and arms companies 
and are therefore an invaluable source of military information to those wishing to 
access their knowledge (Clarke 2000, 730).  
Similarly, the success of an Ambassador’s period of tenure is partly judged 
upon whether he or she has assisted in securing a significant quantity of export 
trade, including arms sales, for uK companies (interview 24is). for the purposes 
of supporting the efforts of manufacturers, a British company, is one which brings 
in or maintains employment in the uK (interview 03is; interview 23is). former 
British ambassador to the us, christopher Meyer, illustrates the reciprocity of 
such relationships having been invited to join the Board of UK arms manufacturer 
GKn, whilst simultaneously holding the chairmanship of the press complaints 
commission (Barnett 2005; Meyer 2005). 
For British diplomats seeking to secure rapid entry to the higher echelons of 
the diplomatic community a successful spell in a trade division of a uK embassy 
is essential, demonstrating the importance of trade to the overall British foreign 
policy effort (interview 24is; interview 28is). this can be viewed as an extension 
of the age-old function of government to promote trade as a symbolic and material 
encapsulation of its international status. the institutionalization of trade targets 
and the expectation on embassy staff to assist arms manufacturers in selling their 
products demonstrates a virtuous or vicious circle (depending on one’s perspective) 
whereby state-sponsorship of private interests skews national foreign policy. The 
repeated reviews of the structure and costs of the diplomatic service have also led to 
an increasing emphasis on export assistance to uK companies, and have effectively 
made these state institutions, better agents of manufacturer’s interests. 
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The Europeanization of the Arms Trade 125
A key function of UK embassies abroad is to support and facilitate arms sales. 
Embassies act as an essential marketing tool for the arms companies and assist 
in resolving contractual glitches. DAs are the arms companies’ principal point of 
contact in the country they hope to sell to; the Da reports directly to the ambassador 
in weekly (and daily – depending on the progress of the sale) review meetings 
(interview 24is). Between 25-40% of a Das time is spent on facilitating arms sales 
– including being directly tasked by DESO (something which is unique to the UK 
system) – this suggests arms sales are a significant part of the DA’s role. Direct 
tasking from DESO is unique to the UK, however the use of Attachés in this role is 
quite commonly found in competitor European, russian and american governments 
(Dover 2007). the proximity of the manufacturer, MoD, DEso, and Das is partially 
illuminated through the MoD Defence attaché committee that decides on which 
countries should receive uK Das. this committee has DEso representation and one 
of the explicit criteria for a Da being sent to a country is the possibility of creating or 
further opening up a market for UK arms exports (Interview 24IS; Interview 36IS). 
DESO’s intervention on this committee suggests the extent to which this small part 
of the MoD guides state power – in this instance guiding state power onto very 
localized issues concerning defence contracts. 
The European Commission’s involvement in defence industries has manifested 
itself in promoting research and development in defence industrial sectors – although 
mostly through dual use technology (de Vestel 1995; Eu commission 1997; Eu 
Commission 1996). There have been several lines of resistance to the Commission’s 
involvement in funding defence research – the first has been Treaty provisions 
expressly forbidding it (particularly article 223 treaty of rome and article 296 
treaty of amsterdam) and partly because of the political-cultural point that the Eu 
is a civilian rather than military superpower (treaty of European union 1992; treaty 
of amsterdam 1998; Morth 2000). 
however, through a series of communiqués the commission provided a gradual 
justification for its involvement in funding defence research. Through these self-
empowering ordinances the commission can now help fund aerospace, general 
defence and security research, and because a clause in one of the communiqués 
removed the distinction between military and civilian funding the commission 
has a potentially large role in defence industrial policy (European commission 
2003; European commission 2003a).  the Group of personalities (a group of 
commissioners, research institute representatives, MEps and arms manufacturers 
who meet in near secrecy) 2004 report argued that, in addition to the EDa managed 
projects and dual-use research projects, a further one billion euros should be invested 
in security research, demonstrating the Commission’s commitment to investments in 
security equipment (European commission 2003a). furthermore, the commission 
has provided support to ailing defence firms and supported employees made 
redundant by arms manufacturers who have closed, a role normally played – on a 
case by case basis – by national governments (Bishop and Griapos 1995). 
the European commission has proved itself to be a cheerleader for manufacturers 
through the establishment of pro-trade advisory committees at the supranational 
level. these committees are weighted heavily with arms industry insiders and 
commissioners, which is only notable because they do not appear to have devoted 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy126
such efforts to other industries. the committees have each focussed on an aspect of 
the defence trade – MEP Elmar Brok has chaired the ‘Group of Personalities’ whose 
remit has been to focus on research and development in the security sector, especially 
to expand work on homeland security technologies. As the Group of Personalities 
report states: 
technology itself cannot guarantee security, but security without the support of 
technology is impossible. it provides us with information about threats, helps us to 
build effective protection against them and, if necessary, enables us to neutralize them. 
In other words: technology is a key ‘force enabler’ for a more secure Europe. At the 
same time, the security dimension of technology itself is changing, because technology 
is very often multi-purpose. civil and defence applications increasingly draw from the 
same technological base and there is a growing cross-fertilisation between the two areas 
(Group of personalities 2004).
Such words could have been written by the marketing division of an arms manufacturer, 
which poses a series of questions about how much critical distance officials can have 
when the representatives of manufacturers are on the co mittees and, moreover, the 
extent to which a state-private network exists between the European Commission 
– effectively the government of the Eu – and private business interests. this is a 
relationship that exactly mirrors the situation at government and regional level in the 
UK. Quite why public officials work so hard to ensure that private industry continues 
to profit from defence sales is difficult to comprehend – but that this network exists, as 
Seymour Melman, and Marc Pilisuk and Thomas Hayden suggest, is clear (Melman 
1970, 19; Pilisuk and Hayden 1965, 69). The Commission’s behaviour on defence 
trade fits within Giandomenico Majone’s description of it being both a regulator 
and policy entrepreneur, and perhaps even within Laura Cram’s description of the 
Commission as an opportunist (Majone 1996; Cram 1997). 
The Commission’s 2003 communiqué on military equipment, and particularly 
its economic advantages, demonstrates eliding the interests of the commission 
and the arms companies (European commission 2003). the commission claims to 
be able to show pre-eminence, as in other areas of community law, over member 
governments on the issue of arms control – which, according to it, should now be 
considered in the light of the EU defence industrial bases’ competitiveness. This 
places at the supranational level the operating assumptions within the UK’s arms 
licensing and control processes; that economic considerations have priority over 
moral and non-proliferation concerns. This also reflects the success of the British 
and french governments in uploading their preferences into the supranational level. 
Both governments operate their arms trades on this basis and have steered the Eu 
down the same path, perhaps unsurprising given that Britain, france, Germany and 
spain account for 80% of the defence spending in the Eu (European commission 
2005).  
the arms trade has been a permissive area for Europeanization because it has 
become framed as a predominantly trade, rather than security issue (Morth 2000). 
One of the interesting trends within the arms trade is that the EU’s defence industrial 
base is increasingly international. It is misleading to talk of BAE Systems, for 
example, as a British firm – 40% of its shareholders live in the United States and 
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The Europeanization of the Arms Trade 127
it has business ties across the whole Eu area. so, whilst national governments 
have adopted protectionist policies regarding their arms manufacturers both the 
commission and the manufacturers themselves have both Europeanized and 
internationalized. The Commission’s support for the manufacturers is in part a 
recognition of the manufacturers’ lobbying efforts, and in part a realization of the 
Commission’s desire to engage in defence policy and to shape defence and security 
policy through influencing on industrial policy  (Treaty of Amsterdam 1998). 
arms manufacturers spend a great deal of time and money lobbying national 
governments (both politicians and officials) and now, at the European level, the 
Commission and the Parliament. Across all the EU’s policy competencies some 
15,000 professional lobbyists operate within Brussels to steer EU decision-making 
(European commission 2006). for the arms industry the umbrella grouping 
‘Aerospace and Defence industries Association of Europe’ (known as the ASD), 
was formed in 2004 from the European Defence industries Group, the European 
association of aerospace industries and Eurospace, and the association of European 
space industry (asD Website 2006). replicating the revolving door between the 
arms trade and government departments, the first three Chairmen of the ASD were 
Mike Turner, BAE System’s CEO, Pier Francesco Guarguaglini, Chairman and CEO 
of finmeccanica and thomas Enders, cEo of EaDs, thus representing the most 
significant arms manufacturers in Europe and showing the institutional strength 
behind the lobbying effort. The ASD represents a ‘who’s who’ of the multi-billion 
Euro European arms trade and within the European commission, which sees itself 
as an ambassador of European trade and the European parliament, with constituency 
employment concerns, the asD represents a very serious player on the Eu lobbying 
stage.  
the so-called post-cold War peace dividend, represented by cuts in national 
defence programmes, saw European arms manufacturers being squeezed in a 
global defence market increasingly dominated by American firms. Much of the EU 
manufacturers’ lobbying on the Commission has focused on policy responses that 
react to the dominance of American manufacturers, a desire to improve EU market 
share and to increase the nu ber of orders in their order books, something that was 
not assisted by the negotia ion of the ESDP. The Commission’s trade-driven response 
was to suggest that there needed to be further consolidation of EU defence firms either 
through acquisition and merger and/or through greater levels of harmony within the 
defence procurement practices, resulting in pan-European research, development 
and economies of scale. To meet this end some €570million was dedicated to ‘space 
and security’ in the EU’s 2005 budget (European Commission 2005a). On the face 
of it the Commission’s approach to the arms trade looks like a repeat of its conduct 
with other industries – driven by a conviction that consolidation and mergers will 
produce greater efficiencies in the defence industrial base (Sandler and Hartley 1995; 
cf Dunne and perlo-freeman 2003). 
One weakness in the EU’s approach – a product of the desire to legitimize its 
influence over the arms trade – has been the uncritical approach and belief that 
improvements to the European defence industrial base will result in advances in high 
end civilian technologies. This phenomenon, known as the ‘trickle-down effect’, is 
a claim made by defence manufacturers to ground their technologies in the civilian 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy128
sphere, but is one countered by the campaigning organizations and nGos (Gusterson 
2004, 27-33).  The European Commission, as the work of James March attests, has 
internalized both sets of the manufacturers’ lobbying output. In the first instance 
the need to spend more on ‘traditional’ defence equipment, skewing procurement 
away from fulfilling the Petersberg tasks and into high end (and therefore expensive) 
technologies, but latterly in adopting the ‘homeland security’ agenda that allows 
manufacturers to develop high-end niche products (March 1994, 221-272). the 
internalization of these messages has been deepened by the formation of groups 
such as the European advisory Group on aerospace, which was established by 
the commission in 2001 and whose membership includes representatives from the 
European Union’s supranational institutions and arms manufacturers (European 
commission 2006a).3 
the composition of the aerospace advisory committee is w rthy of note because 
of the ‘Star 21’ report recommending large increases in funding to aerospace 
companies, tax concessions, and favourable business conditions alongside the 
foundation of the ‘Galileo’ satellite system (European Commission 2002). More 
recently, in april 2005, the European security research advisory Board (Esrap) 
has been established by the Commission. Fourteen of the Board’s 50 seats have 
been taken by industry representatives, a further 14 by academics and researchers, 
eighteen have gone to representatives of national security and defence ministries, 
whilst 4 seats have been occupied by EU officials (Hayes 2006, 25). 
The lack of transparency of the Board is worrying given that it has been established 
and staffed in secret, holds meetings away from public or parliamentary scrutiny, 
without public outputs, and whose remit is to advise the Commission on ‘strategic 
missions’ and priority areas for security research, including FP7. The Board also 
advises on implementation issues such as the exchange of classified information and 
intellectual property rights and on the use of publicly owned research/evaluation 
infrastructures. Whilst the absence of transparency should be of concern to those 
who hold democracy dear, this network is also acting to dominate the formulation 
of preferences, at the European level, to an entirely trade driven agenda that then 
serves to download these preferences to the national level and reinforce the effects 
of this network. For the purposes of analyzing Europeanization the main point is 
that domestic producer groups almost exclusively provide the interests that are 
adopted at the national and supranational level. at the core of European defence the 
governments issued their strategic preferences through the EsDp, which have now 
3 Membership included philippe Busquin (European commissioner for research), 
Pascal Lamy (European Commissioner for Trade), Erkki Liikanen (European Commissioner 
for Enterprise and the information society), loyola de palacio (Vice-president of the European 
Commission, responsible for Relations with the European Parliament, Transport & Energy) 
and chris patten, Member of the European commission, responsible for External relations, 
carlos Westendorp y cabeza MEp (chairman industry, foreign trade, research and Energy 
committee) and Karl von Wogau MEp. Whilst from the arms manufacturers members included 
Jean-Paul Béchat, Chairman and CEO SNECMA, Manfred Bischoff, Co-chairman EADS, Sir 
Richard Evans, Chairman BAE Systems, Jean-Luc Lagardère, Co-chairman EADS, Alberto 
lina, president and cEo finmeccanica, Denis ranque, chairman and cEo thalEs and sir 
ralph robins, the chairman of rolls-royce. 
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The Europeanization of the Arms Trade 129
been steered by the effects of terrorist attacks on EU soil but also by the influential 
agenda of these industry interests.  
The 2001, 2004 and 2005 attacks on New York, Madrid and London respectively 
are encouraging the acceleration of the Europeanization of the arms trade. homeland 
security is a cross-pillar issue, situated in the Justice and Home Affairs pillar but 
increasingly pushed towards the security and economic spheres with the commission 
showing an enthusiasm for promoting its role, and the utility of technology 
solutions to the threat posed by terrorists. these supranational policy entrepreneurs 
have succeeded, in this limited area, in taking defence research, development 
and procurement beyond the intergovernmental level. therefore, whilst it is still 
technically possible to fall back on liberal intergovernmentalist theory that ‘states 
are still in control’, the Commission, the EDA and the manufacturers have made this 
suggestion all but redundant in the case of homeland security, and the technologies 
springing out of this agenda. this research suggests that the supranational level has 
gained a large influence over domestic research, development and procurement 
policy making intergovernmental negotiations less relevant in this sphere. 
Product Design and Development 
The first stage in any arms transfer is the design and development of marketable 
defence products, but it might also be the sale of old stock. Finding suitable products 
for domestic and international markets open to UK arms manufacturers is a key 
challenge in maintaining healthy order books. Accordingly, the British government’s 
privileged knowledge of the requirements of external militaries is invaluable 
information to arms companies and is available from government sources, including 
Das. While there is little evidence that suggests that uK government agencies, 
including the intelligence services, routinely play a commercial marketing role for 
arms companies, evidence exists of assistance being given to manufacturers when the 
government is uncertain of its investment in a project. At that point there is evidence 
that the intelligence services, in particular, are tasked to conduct intelligence-led 
assessments of a project’s commercial viability. A notable example of this happening 
is in the case of the Merlin hM K1 helicopter produced by GKn Westland in the 
late 1980s (Dover 2007).4 The majority of evidence points towards the process 
being geared towards arms companies creating equipment and systems and then 
making a great effort through lobbying and back channels to influence government 
policy into requiring these products (tigner 2001). Because of competition between 
national industries – which is problematic for the reasons stated before – there seems 
to be very little information sharing between European governments on where 
opportunities lie, although with the increasing internationalization of the arms trade, 
companies are no longer tied to a single country affiliation. 
A significant material advantage given to the UK’s arms manufacturers comes 
in the form of research and development space on uK Ministry of Defence land. at 
4 commercial viability does not always equate to technical excellence however, and 
this project has received some inglorious reviews (Page 2006, Chapter 5).
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy130
sites near Bristol and in Wiltshire, for example, BaE systems and their subsidiary 
companies, Thales, MBDA, and Raytheon have significant research and development 
units. the commercial basis on which these sites exist is not publicly available, but 
it is a note for future research that the extent to which the Ministry of Defence 
subsidises the arms trade through indirect subsidies like these is an important area 
for investigation. What the positioning of these research and development units do is 
to provide a day-to-day revolving door between uK military personnel, Ministry of 
Defence officials and the arms manufacturers. This relationship makes a great deal 
of sense given the sensitivity of the technologies being developed, and the control 
over the development of technology that the government wishes to exert. 
However, this proximity does reduce the space between government officials and 
the arms manufacturers – the number of secondments from the Ministry of Defence 
and the armed forces to arms manufacturers and vice versa is an indication of a 
relationship that arguably constitutes a state-private network in its own right and is 
the key influence over national and supranational government policy on this issue. 
an interesting paradox within British domestic policy formulation is that the 
manufacturers and European commission are engaged in a rapid Europeanization 
of the arms trade whilst governments, and particularly the British government, are 
intent on an isolationist policy, so the assistance given to the manufacturers by the 
Eu is actually aiding and abetting a policy outcome that the government does not 
favour.
the development of new technologies has traditionally occurred at the state level 
on the basis of national procurement requirements. The terrorist attacks on New 
York, Madrid and London since 2001, for example, have opened up new commercial 
possibilities for arms companies in the $100bn ‘homeland security’ market (Hayes 
2006, 3; taverner 2003). there is very little evidence that governments have 
been placing requirements on arms manufacturers to create products suitable for 
homeland security, aside from biometric identity cards in the uK. rather, the 
manufacturers have been operating in a highly permissive environment in which 
technical innovations are openly welcomed by the government and in turn influencing 
government homeland security policy, demonstrating the important influence 
of informal networks in guiding these developments (Interview 14IS; Interview 
25IS). The political salience of ‘homeland security’ has allowed companies to push 
cutting edge technologies enthusiastically to national governments and through 
European commission committees, which has opened up the possibility for a fully 
Europeanized arms trade. 
Given the EDA’s research and development functions, and the potential it has to 
accelerate the Europeanization of the arms trade, the Agency’s budget only covers 
the costs it incurs – so, for example, staff and building costs which runs to €1.9mil 
(on 2004 figures) (EDA 2006a). The Agency’s influential research and development 
costs are funded by individuals or groups of member governments establishing 
and running projects through the EDA framework which appears to be a truly 
intergovernmental endeavour. The EDA acts as a facilitator for multinational projects 
and as a research organization able to identify gaps in the capabilities-catalogue and 
in national and supranational procurement projects. It also acts as a conduit for the 
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The Europeanization of the Arms Trade 131
complementary interests of arms manufacturers, their lobbyists and the European 
Commission, which has thus far steered the Agency’s policy outputs. 
the EDa is creating a culture change within the European arms trade. the 
Europeanization and internationalization of the arms trade has been underway for 
some time through acquisitions, mergers and joint working arrangements. What the 
EDa and the input of the commission has provided is an institutional push – at the 
supranational level – for common procurement and increased defence equipment 
budgets; in its own words ‘a coherent approach to EU procurement’. Officially, 
the EDA’s tasks are set out in the core documents associated with the 2004 Joint 
Action. As a result the Agency has been asked to co-ordinate: “defence capabilities 
development; armaments co-operation; the European defence, technological and 
industrial base and defence equipment market; research and technology” (European 
Defence agency 2006b). and: 
..to work for a more comprehensive and systematic approach to defining and meeting the 
capability needs of ESDP (supporting, for example, the “Headline Goal 2010” initiative 
– which is clustered around the idea of forming up ‘battlegroups’); to promote equipment 
collaborations, both to contribute to defence capabilities and as catalysts for further 
restructuring of the European defence industry; to promote European defence-relevant 
R&T, as vital both to a healthy defence technological and industrial base and to defining 
and satisfying future capability requirements. this will involve pursuing collaborative 
use of national defence R&T funds, in the context of a European policy which identifies 
priorities; to work, in close cooperation with the Commission, on steps towards an 
internationally competitive market for defence equipment in Europe (European Defence 
agency 2006b). 
the EDa is, therefore, an institution dedicated to reshaping European defence 
procurement and with it carries the political and economic aspirations of both the 
manufacturers and the commission – and tangentially the economic aspirations of 
the British government. 
Old Wars versus New Wars – Plotting a Strategic Direction 
The Saint Malo process and the ESDP have not turned out to be particularly profitable 
for arms manufacturers in Europe. The ‘capabilities catalogue’, far from providing a 
flood of new orders, has refocused European governments on being able to deploy a 
minimum force level, based on prior capabilities. the manufacturers, their lobbyists 
and the commission had hoped that the Eu would attempt to close the capability 
gap between the Eu members and the united states (yost 2000; Kagan 2003). 
Unfortunately for the manufacturers the Petersburg Tasks, which frame the ESDP, 
demands that the money available is spent on filling low-technology capability gaps 
rather than developing high end technology to keep up with the technological advances 
made year on year by the american defence industrial base. the manufacturers, for 
obvious reasons, would like the EU to positively address this EU-US capabilities 
gap, and therefore seek to influence government policy in this regard. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy132
the Global War on terror (GWot) and the homeland security agenda offers 
the commission and manufacturers an opportunity to push through the advances 
in technology and increases to the budget that they clearly desire. the European 
Commission’s enthusiasm for an active role in the EU’s arms trade has existed 
since the mid-1980s. successive commission presidents have provided economic 
justifications for their interest in the arms trade – arguments that resonate with the 
spurious economic arguments deployed in the national context (oxford research 
Group 2004). The Prodi Commission (1999-2004) typifies this approach having 
spent a great deal of time highlighting and working on promoting European defence 
industries as part of a broad portfolio of economic concerns (Morth 2000). Moreover, 
the codification of the ESDP in 2000 – despite the Commissioners’ reluctance 
to become involved in the saint Malo process – encouraged the commission to 
become involved in defence industries as part of its wider interest in foreign and 
security policy. the commission has belatedly realized that economic advantage 
and technological progress will not come from the EsDp. in a demonstration of 
the intergovernmental nature of defence and the arms trade, as a sub-set of defence 
policy, member governments have rejected the Commission’s attempts to engage 
with traditional defence procurement areas. 
however, in the post-9/11 world the commission has been able to support and 
push for so-called ‘dual-use’ technologies with security applications. Ben Hayes lists 
these as including: ‘Myriad local and global surveillance systems; the introduction 
of biometric identifiers; electronic tagging and satellite monitoring; “less-lethal 
weapons”; paramilitary equipment for public order and crisis management; and the 
militarization of border controls’ (Hayes 2006, 3).
The arms manufacturers and the Commission have managed to take advantage 
of the homeland security agenda because of a series of fortuitous circumstances. 
first, national governments have responded to the threat posed by so-called islamic 
terrorists in a securitized manner – the national emphasis has been on security-
technology solutions to this threat (mostly surveillance and monitoring equipment). 
second, government agencies involved in local and national security have been 
buying more equipment for their officers. In Britain there has been a large growth in 
the market supplying police with ‘security technologies’ as well as seeing an increase 
in the number of private security companies (Krahmann 2005; Kinsey 2005). lastly, 
arms manufacturers and computer firms have found ways to collaborate on security 
projects – mostly in the fields of surveillance and counter-surveillance. In short, the 
political and economic agendas of the arms manufacturers, national governments 
and the European commission have merged to create additional opportunities in this 
field. The interests that are aggregated by national and supranational governments are 
exclusively those of business interests, to the exclusion even of the armed forces. 
The Licensing of Arms Sales
Before British military or dual-use equipment can be transferred to third countries 
(aside from government gifts) a Dti licence has to be obtained by the manufacturer. 
Eight criteria are used, and have to be considered by the Dti in deciding whether 
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The Europeanization of the Arms Trade 133
to grant a full licence to export military or dual use equipment. the information 
for the assessment is provided by manufacturers and triangulated against open 
and secret information provided by government departments. these politically but 
not legally binding criteria are: Respect for the UK’s international commitments 
and obligations (un and Eu sanctions); respect of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms in the country of final destination; not exacerbating tensions in the country 
of final destination; preservation of regional peace, security and stability; the national 
security of the UK, of territories whose external relations are the UK’s responsibility, 
and of allies, Eu Member states and other friendly countries; the behaviour of the 
buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards in particular to 
its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for international law; 
the existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country 
or re-exported under undesirable conditions; the compatibility of the arms exports 
with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country (fco Document 
2000). 
The ‘Smart Front End Committee’ which considers all license applications, and 
sifts the contentious ones for further consideration, is composed of representatives 
from the MoD, FCO, DFID and DTI are taken on the basis of unanimity. Where 
consensus cannot be reached, discussions go to successively higher levels of 
officials (outside of a formal committee structure) until it reaches the political sphere 
with Junior Ministers, Secretaries of State and eventually the Prime Minister who, 
like officials, are politically but not legally bound to make their judgments with 
reference to the eight criteria. ultimately, therefore, it is the decision of national 
politicians whether exports licenses are granted; the influence of lobbying money, 
party donations and the large number of ex-ministers with arms manufacturers 
directorships can only be speculated upon.5 Whilst there is a European ‘Code of 
Conduct’ for arms sales, its recommendations are for national implementation rather 
than to police a ‘European arms trade’ at the supranational level. Control of licenses 
for military equipment are vested (in the British context) in the Department for trade 
and industry – because licensing is primarily a trade, rather than military or foreign 
policy issue area.  
arms sales and Defence equipment manufacturers almost invariably approach 
the government before commencing research or manufacturing work on a particular 
product to ensure that the start-up costs for either of these activities are not wasted 
through a straightforward license refusal. there are two formal processes whereby 
manufacturers make pre-license enquiries. One is known as the ‘Ratings’ process 
and the other as f680 process, and the assessments of a range of government 
departments, including the Defence intelligence staff (Dis) play a role in the replies 
companies receive (interview 18is; interview 36is; scott 1996, c2.8-11, c2.29-31 
and K7.2) 
the f680 process is run by the Ministry of Defence, more precisely, the 
Directorate of Export services policy (DEsp) within DEso (scott 1996, c2.29-
5 For example, John Major is the European Director of the Carlyle Group, Malcolm 
Rifkind is the Chairman of Armor Group, and Michael Portillo was until May 2006 a Non-
Executive Director of BaE systems. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy134
31). The process obliges ‘List X’ companies like BAE Systems, GKN and MBDA 
– who handle material with a classification of ‘confidential’ or above – to apply 
for a license before they promote their products. Materials requiring listing are 
provided in the ‘Manual of Protective Security’, which is issued by the Cabinet 
Office and often contains sensitive information about commercial agents in the 
country, political figures and general assessments about the stability or political 
situation within a particular region (interview 04is; interview 23is). there is 
reciprocity of information between the government and the arms manufacturers with 
commercially sensitive information being passed to UK government officials under 
a duty of confidentiality, but outside of a formal intelligence sharing arrangement 
(interview 23is; scott 1996, E10.30-3). that this arrangement exists supports 
a central argument of this chapter that the British arms trade constitutes a state-
private network of key government and industry officials. There is very little need 
for arms manufacturers to hold the types of information that they receive from the 
British government – the proximity between the government and the manufacturers 
suggests a tension between the Europeanization in the industry and the isolationism 
of the British government. however, the strength of the British arms trade and the 
closeness of the relationship between government and industry might be cause to 
think that the government is subtly uploading British preferences onto the European 
stage or that the manufacturers have managed to get their interests adopted at the 
national and supranational levels. 
Non-List X companies (who can handle ‘unclassified’ or ‘restricted’ material) are 
not obliged to seek F680 clearance for promotions, but may need to have an F680 
clearance to pursue full licenses from the Dti (DEso 2005). the process helps 
prevent unauthorized disclosure of protective market (classified) assets; it gives 
companies an indication of what markets may provide viable export opportunities 
for their products, whilst also potentially speeding up the assessment of any eventual 
export license application made through the Dti (DEso 2005). the process can, 
however, be used to license an arms transfer that occurs outside the uK, and 
therefore represents a straightforward way of gaining authority for brokering arms. 
the f680 process involves the submission of a written application to the MoD using 
the F680 form. On receipt of the form, officials within DESP circulate the contents to 
‘MoD Advisors’ – which includes a wide range of views from country and technical 
experts. (interview 36is; interview 26is. interview 18is). 
since 1999 f680 forms have also been circulated to the fco and DfiD for their 
assessments. the f o circulate these forms to their counter proliferation, country 
Officers and Human Rights Departments as well as MI6 (Interview 36IS). These 
assessments are based mostly on pre-existing information, but with some new 
intelligence information often forming part of the assessment, showing a reactive 
approach to creating assessments at the pre-licensing stage and places an emphasis 
on the quality of inter-agency information sharing and ad-hoc networks of officials. 
the departments involved in the f-680 licensing process have lists of destinations 
they believe are problematic. The countries on their lists reflect the differing 
priorities and worries within the departments; and often replicate the stereotypes of 
particular departments (interview 36is; interview 10is). for example, the treasury 
has concerns about whether a client government will pay, the DfiD is concerned 
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The Europeanization of the Arms Trade 135
about the impact of a sale on development issues and future regional or national 
stability, the MoD on the implications for uK interests at home and abroad and 
the fco on the implications for the stability of regions (interview 36is; interview 
13is). the informality at this stage highlights the pro-trade preferences of the British 
government, that the process is resolutely state-based, and a willingness to deny 
pre-licenses only when overwhelming evidence is presented. at the full licensing 
stage the collection of information is far more pro-active with a greater emphasis on 
freshly collected sources. 
The DTI run an independent process to F680 known as ‘Ratings’. This process 
decides whether a license is required to export particular goods through the Export 
Control Organisation. Enquiries are made through the Export Control Organisation’s 
technical assessment unit which comprises a team of engineers and scientists all of 
whom have worked for arms manufacturers to advise exporters on technical issues; a 
structural position that belies the proximity of the government to arms manufacturers 
(Dti 2005; interview 23is). this is a change from the situation outlined by sir richard 
Scott, in his report on arms to Iraq, which highlighted the lack of expertise within 
the technical units at the Dti (scott 1996, c2.8-11). the post-scott arrangement 
is a powerful commercial tool and provides a partial explanation of why uK arms 
manufacturers are such successful exporters of materials around the world.  
Contract Negotiation, and Sales
once the manufacturers have received f-680 clearance they are free to engage 
in marketing activities to sell their products. Arms manufacturers are able to call 
upon the full machinery of the British state to support these efforts – depending 
on conditions that will be outlined – and this section demonstrates the extent to 
which the government views the arms trade as an extension of the national interest 
– contrary to a Europeanized policy. 
DESO’s role is to provide support for defence sales which includes research and 
providing negotiating assistance for manufacturers (interview 24is; interview 36is, 
Scott 1996, C2.22-3). DESO provides this support through its officials in London 
and in Embassies globally as well as through the Defence attaché system (scott 
1996, C2.26). The EU has no comparative capability like DESO. It focuses, through 
the EDa, on capability assessment and research and development. 
in september 2006 DEso was accused of helping manufacturers immorally 
profiteer from the Iraq war and the rapprochement with Libya – a document obtained 
under the freedom of information act shows the efforts being made by DEso to 
ensure that British manufacturers secure entry into Iraqi and Libyan markets and 
demonstrates the single mindedness of DEso in achieving its goals (Barnett 2006). 
DAs are very well placed to provide ‘privileged’ information to arms manufacturers, 
in an ad hoc manner, as they are routinely invited to briefings by their host 
governments; as well as in the course of their duties networking with senior officials 
in their host nation’s military. DESO regularly task DAs with providing various 
kinds of logistical, political or knowledge based assistance to manufacturers – which 
is in marked contrast to other governments. The DA’s assistance feeds into every 
Copyright material
ww
w.
as
hg
at
e.
co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
  w
ww
.a
sh
ga
te
.co
m
 
Europeanization of British Defence Policy136
stage of the marketing, and sales process – making the DA the British government’s 
person on the ground in these sales. again, the Eu has no comparative capability to 
this – because the Eu has not entered into a direct selling arrangement with the arms 
trade, like national governments have done and because defence attachés are part of 
national militaries. 
Unlike competitor nations, British arms manufacturers are able to contact 
DAs directly, establishing a discreet link between the provider and consumer of 
privileged information.  DESO will provide, through its ‘Partners Network’, contact 
details of the relevant Da and Embassy staff that can assist throughout the life of the 
negotiation (DESO 2005a). The British government makes no charge for the DA’s 
assistance in trying to secure contracts – this is in contrast to the charges made by 
Embassies for their assistance to other industries). the relationship between DEso, 
attachés and manufacturers highlights the state-based foundations of the arms trade. 
The transformation of the trade to reflect commercial Europe nization (mergers and 
acquisitions) and political Europeanization (the Commission’s efforts in R&D and 
strategic direction) is occurring outside of the state-based frameworks but with the 
British government keen to steer the Europeanization process.   
British government assistance to manufacturers extends out to having the Defence 
Attaché and occasionally embassy officials present at the sales presentation to 
foreign government procurers (Dover 2007; scott 1996, c2.26). anecdotally, this is 
often a persuasive factor in any sales pitch – there is a badge of credibility carried by 
British officers because of the perceived quality of UK forces on active service and 
demonstrates the conflation of interests between the British government and arms 
manufacturers. Moreover, it provides a direct link through which British government 
support for a manufacturer can be made explicit to a foreign procurement official 
(interview 24is; interview 18is). the Embassy and the attaché are also able to use 
their links with the foreign government to smooth over any problems that emerge 
during the negotiations and in extreme circumstances ambassadors will be willing 
to write to the foreign Defence Ministers to press the case for procuring British 
arms (interview 24is; intervie  19is). these roles step outside what the Embassy 
is officially tasked to do for an arms manufacturer but falls within the government’s 
‘can-do’ attitude towards arms transfers. 
A high-profile measure of assistance from the British government is the official 
visit to potential customers from a high-ranking official from DESO or a Junior 
Defence Minister. in publicly important cases such as the negotiations with the saudi 
government, the se retary of state for Defence and even the prime Minister will be 
involved in official visits, emphasising the political support given to the arms trade. 
DESO’s close d y-to-day relationship with the large UK-based arms manufacturers 
such as BaE systems, means they are able to provide high-level support and advice 
to both the anufacturers and the Embassy staff that accompany official visitors. 
circumstantial evidence of this close relationship can be seen with the current head 
of DEso, alan Garwood, having previously been the head of sales at BaE systems 
and his predecessor, Charles Masefield, worked for Vickers before running DESO to 
then go on to become vice-chair of BaE systems after leaving DEso in 1998. this 
interchange of government and commercial posts brings commercial experience 
to Whitehall and skews the government’s policies and preferences towards certain 
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The Europeanization of the Arms Trade 137
outcomes. this is not so much the aggregation of domestic producer group pressure, 
than the import of institutional memory.  
the scott report demonstrated the lengths to which the British government is 
prepared to go in support of a strategically sensitive and important transfer of arms 
(scott 1996, K7.1-3). the examples, as previously mentioned, of high-level political 
support being afforded to BAE Systems’ successful attempts to sell the Saudi Arabian 
government Eurofighter aircraft in a deal worth about £40bn, and the parallel attempts 
to sell military aircraft and small arms to India and Pakistan respectively during their 
nuclear stand-off in 2002, provides evidence of the full machinery of government 
supporting these transfers (Norton-Taylor and MacAskill 2002). Because the Saudi 
arabian example is ongoing the evidence is largely circumstantial, however through 
official and secondary source reports it is clear that BAE Systems’ marketing effort 
to the saudi arabian government has been supported at the very highest level by the 
prime Minister and the secretary of state for Defence, both of whom have made 
personal trips to saudi in pursuit of this contract (Guardian 2005). previous British 
Prime Ministers including Ted Heath, James Callaghan, Margaret Thatcher and 
John Major, as well as members of the British royal family have all intervened in 
large saudi arms deals, the latter option is unavailable to french competitors due to 
their Republican constitution. This can be seen clearly in the example of the ‘Al-
Yamamah’ deal in which the Saudis bought a fleet of Tornado aircraft (Financial 
Times 1988; Interview 03IS). Michael Turner, BAE Systems’ Chief Executive, 
stated his recent aims clearly: ‘The objective is to get the Typhoon into Saudi Arabia. 
We’ve had 43 billion pounds from Al Yamamah over the last 20 years and there 
could be another 40 billion pounds’ (Flight International 2005). This deal has been 
complicated partly by reports that the saudi arabian government had agreed to buy 
90 rafale aircraft from french-based Dassault aviation in april 2005, but also that 
the Saudis had demanded that the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) investigation into 
BaE systems be dropped as part of the deal – a deal with a private British company, 
not the British government. The SFO investigation has looked at the legality of $2bn 
of commissions allegedly made to five agents in Saudi Arabia, and is a bone of 
contention between the two governments (isenberg 2005). 
The Saudi case study has all the prima facie elements to make it a good example 
of where centralized state support applies to the arms trade. it is a good example of 
where the British government has a clear interest in supporting a financially lucrative 
and strategically important transfer of arms and dual use technologies. What is more, 
the Saudi market represents a key area in which the British government has historically 
worked to suppress the competition presented by French defence companies partly 
because of the economic loss this would present, but also because of the number of 
human intelligence sources that can be placed in saudi arabia as a result (interview 
03IS). Within the British government’s understanding of the arms industry it would 
be perverse and surprising therefore if the full machinery of the state, were not to be 
utilized in support of transfers that give the uK a balance of payments surplus and 
political leverage over events in the Middle East. the saudi case study represents a 
strong example of national protectionism in the context of an arms industry that is 
clearly internationalising; a paradox within this issue area. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy138
End-Use Monitoring
the end-user monitoring of arms and dual-use materials is also done on a state-level 
basis; with the exception of studies like the ‘Small Arms Survey’, which is compiled 
in switzerland with the help of international non-governmental organizations (small 
arms survey 2006). one of the curiosities within the British arms trade is that 
the uK parliament is entirely excluded from licensing until after the transfer of 
materials is complete. there is no prior role for the house of commons Quadripartite 
committee, which scrutinizes strategic exports licenses and is constituted of the 
select committees of the MoD, fco, Dti and DfiD and came into existence in 
1999. 
The main function of the committee is to provide judgments about the licensing 
process in the previous parliamentary year and to do so largely on policy grounds 
rather than in respect of the detail of particular transfers (interview 24is; interview 
36IS). The Government has argued ‘that prior scrutiny of export licence applications 
raises unacceptable constitutional, legal and practical difficulties’ (Quadripartite 
committee 2005). Moving scrutiny from post-hoc to prior would remove the 
delegated responsibility that the Dti holds within the arms transfer process, and 
also put pressure on the relevant government departments to respond transparently 
to questions that are posed to them about process, something the government has 
been unwilling to do even after the publication of the scott report. 
the Quadripartite committee argued in the 2001-2004 parliament that there 
should be a limited trial of prior parliamentary scrutiny, for example on government 
gifts of military equipment, which do not require a license. this would remove 
some of the latitude the government has to make arms transfers to governments that 
government-insider NGOs, like Saferworld, suggest have established track records 
in transferring arms to problematic destinations or are problematic recipients in 
their own right (saferworld 2005). Moreover, there is little in the way of end-use 
monitoring of arms transfers by the government. the rationale for this is that once 
the manufacturer has cleared the f680 and full license process the potential for 
misuse or misappropriation of the materials transferred has been reduced beyond a 
point where it is ‘economically feasible’ for the government to investigate (Interview 
24is; interview 26is). campaigners have argued that the British government 
should have taken action in high profile cases where end-use restrictions have been 
broken by recipient governments. These include the prohibition on the Indonesian 
government using Hawk jets in offensive operations over East Timor, the use of 
British made tanks in the occupied Palestinian areas, and armoured cars for internal 
repression in Uzbekistan (Norton Taylor 2005; Joffe-Walt 2006; Nevins 2002, 643). 
In these circumstances DAs are tasked, by the Government, to monitor the end use 
of these technologies, which is structurally problematic in the context of one of 
key functions being to facilitate arms sales. NGOs concerned with the arms trade 
have campaigned strongly for a formal system of end use monitoring, but this looks 
unlikely to be achieved in the short-term. The EU has been a strong supporter of 
humanitarian foreign policies including the restrictions on landmines and other 
‘problem’ munitions, but as it becomes an advocate of expanding the EU’s defence 
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The Europeanization of the Arms Trade 139
industrial base it also becomes subject to the tensions between a pro-sale and ethical 
concerns.   
The final state-based government institution engaged in end-user monitoring is 
HM Customs and Excise. Customs Officials serve the function of monitoring and 
examining air, sea and land passengers and their baggage, freight and mail to ensure 
there is no smuggling of goods or goods in excess of established regulations (scott 
1996, c3.1-10; Butler 2004, 37). they process customs documentation and therefore 
have a role to play in the export of weapons and dual-use material. Customs officials 
played a significant role in the events leading to the Scott Inquiry, succeeding 
ultimately in interrupting an attempt to breach official government policy towards 
Iraq (Scott 1996, C3.1-71). Outside of this very high profile example of where 
two government departments worked against each other, Customs Officers play an 
important role in preventing the transfer of arms through the illegitimate trade, which 
is their main focus (Department of trade and industry 2005a; Butler 2004, 37-8). 
in the post-september 11 world there is a great deal more institutional co-operation 
between national ‘policing’ institutions – such as Customs and Excise, intelligence, 
and counter-proliferation units. 
however, there remains a disparity between government support for the arms 
sales and efforts to monitor their end use. this can be explained through the disparity 
between the political motivation to sell military equipment and the less compelling 
desire to discover reasons for halting transfers and also for the state-based foundations 
on which the arms trade seems to rest; the competition between states drives the 
political motivation to export ‘at all costs’, while the EU seeks to increase the levels 
of trade through competition and cooperation between Eu states and in competition 
with the other big arms exporting blocs – america, russia and china. 
Conclusion
the Europeanization of the arms trade is a multi-paced and multi-levelled political 
and economic phenomenon. European arms manufacturers have been subject to 
mergers and acquisitions that have effectively Europeanized the defence industrial 
base. Europeanization has become – to a lesser degree – internationalization 
with the enhanced presence of European firms in the American arms market and 
increased American ownership of European firms. The European Commission has 
manoeuvred to increase its influence over the European defence industrial base; 
including funding research and development projects. The British government 
appears to be on the slow-track of arms trade Europeanization as its day-to-day 
conduct is highly protectionist. however, even here the analysis is not clear cut 
– the British government lobbied very heavily to have Nick Witney installed as the 
head of the EDa; a situation not dissimilar to the uploading tactics seen in the 
Saint M lo Accords (see Chapters 2 and 4). The British government’s tactics seem 
to be to try to create the greatest possible value for ‘UK Plc’ from the inevitable 
Europeanization of defence industrial base commercially, whilst trying to shape the 
preferences and policies of the Commission. All these behaviours fit neatly within 
the liberal intergovernmentalist traditions of government action but with the large 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy140
footnote that in this instance the EU’s institutions and arms manufacturers are the 
most persuasive actors in the process. 
From a national perspective, a key theme that emerged during this research was 
that UK government officials have elided the government’s identity and interests 
with those of the commercial manufacturers. there was a notable use of collective 
terms by government officials such as ‘we go and sell’, ‘we negotiate’, and ‘our 
kit’ whilst maintaining a notable caution in providing information on the processes 
that lay behind transfers. however, the proximity and overlap of government and 
private officials, interests and movement of money suggests the governmental and 
private spheres have merged, raising large questions about the extent to which a 
state-private network operates within the British government.
The conflation of interests raises two points for further research, firstly about the 
efficacy of public money being spent in the promotion and facilitation of arms sales 
and secondly, whether the protection of sensitive markets for private businesses is 
a realization of an age old function of state – the further development of economic 
diplomacy. The privileged position of the defence industry in the decision-making 
processes of the government is a contested area. Explanations range from the extent 
to which defence manufacturers provide funding for political parties, to the level of 
integration and inter-changeability between employees of manufacturers and civil 
servants, right up to international political-economy critiques such as those made 
by Seymour Melman, for example, which argues that government officials are top-
level managers of defence capitalism (Melman 1970, 13). there are also foreign 
policy-led explanations for the pre-eminence of defence industries, namely that 
high-end defence technologies produce additional political credibility for the British 
government on the international stage, through enhanced capabilities and trade links. 
What remains out of these many competing explanations, some of which require 
further empirical testing, is that defence manufacturers hold a special position within 
the British government’s policy formulation processes and now hold an equally 
advantageous position within the European Commission and European Parliament’s 
decision making apparatus. 
the Europeanization of the arms trade at the supranational level has adopted 
the same inherent tensions that are present in national defence industry policies. 
The EU was, until the codification of the ESDP provisions within the Nice Treaty, 
a civilian superpower hich had eschewed a military identity. the EsDp rapidly 
developed into a policy defined by the projection of humanitarian norms in peace-
keeping and peace-support roles while ‘high-end’ security remained vested at the 
national level. however, the Europeanization of the arms trade has marched on 
apace – the Commission, in particular, has brought together the EU’s economic 
superpower role with its involvement in defence industrial policy. More particularly, 
the Commission’s thinking on defence industrial policy has been coloured by its 
view that the high-technology of the defence industries will spin-out to support 
advances in the civilian technology sectors. 
The EU’s work as an active supporter of non-proliferation looks set to continue. 
the union has been at the forefront of initiatives to control the proliferation of small 
and light weapons and high-end military technologies (Manners 2002; Dover 2005). 
however, the Eu has fallen into the same pattern of behaviour as the big Eu defence 
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The Europeanization of the Arms Trade 141
exporting countries (Britain, france and Germany) who have used defence exports 
as a means by which to secure foreign policy leverage over client states. an example 
of this is the recent french and German government efforts to lift the arms embargo 
on the chinese government – a move that deeply resonates with a trade agenda. 
the Europeanization of the arms trade will continue apace so long as it is tied 
to European industrial policy and homeland security agendas. the involvement 
of the European commission in defence research and the transnationalization of 
defence manufacturers will only serve to deepen and widen Europeanization. the 
corollary to this is the behaviour of European member states who have continued 
to adopt protectionist policies towards their defence manufacturers. in this respect 
the manufacturers and commission appear to be more progressive than member 
governments who have yet to realize that the arms trade has internationalized. 
a point for further research is the extent to which lobbyists at the supranational 
level can generate European policies that are imposed on member governments, 
and furthermore, impose policies on member governments than run contrary 
to the interests of member governments. this represents a potential paradox of 
Europeanization. 
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conclusion
Europeanization is a multileveled and multi-paced political phenomenon. the 
contrast between the negotiation of the EsDp, which was conducted exclusively 
between governments, and the Europeanization of the arms trade, which is talking 
place almost exclusively outside the control of governments, is marked. Similarly, 
the pace of Europeanization has varied greatly. For nearly fifty years, after the Second 
World War, the Europeanization of defence outside of nato structures, proceeded 
at a snail’s pace and with a great deal of reluctance from large parts of the European 
defence community. yet between october and December 1998 an agreement was 
formulated and signed that uprooted previous European thinking on the subject. 
Furthermore, the attacks on Madrid and London in 2004 and 2005 have presented the 
European commission and arms manufacturers with the opportunity to Europeanize 
the arms industry (albeit through a vanguard of homeland security equipment) that 
will, in all likelihood, result in a pan-European defence procurement, and research 
and development base. Europeanization can perhaps be typified as an opportunistic 
phenomenon; requiring the fortunate placement of key political and bureaucratic 
figures and historical contingency to succeed. 
the institutional actors involved in Europeanization are national governments 
and their departments, the central institutions of the European union, and sectional 
interest groups such as manufacturers, universities, think-tanks, the armed forces and 
lobbyists. the case study of defence integration highlights that Europeanization of 
one policy is often dependent on the progress or status of other issues. for example, 
whilst the EsDp was negotiated as a discreet item at the nice iGc, its origins lay in 
the British government’s unwillingness to participate in the single currency project. 
further integration –from 2003 onwards – has been hindered by the European wide 
schism brought about by the British government’s decision to join America’s war of 
choice against iraq. 
Whither the State? Europeanization to Trans-Nationalization 
The structures of state – governments, government departments, their officials and 
the politicians that control them, are vital to the formal Europeanization of policies. 
The ‘large’ EU governments (Britain, France and Germany) have a particularly 
sizeable influence on the direction and speed of Europeanization in general, but 
specifically within defence integration. Put starkly, ESDP could not have happened 
without he convergence of member state preferences. The creeping influence of 
the European commission in defence policy has been undermined by the pre-
eminent role of governments. Whilst the commission had limited involvement in 
the negotiation of the EsDp – a self-denying ordinance based on a belief that the 
convergence of national interests across Europe was only possible if it was seen to 
be outside of the process – the first few years of the ESDP in operation has seen the 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy144
Commission take a renewed interest in external relations and the military facets of 
that policy. the commission has, therefore, allowed itself to become involved in 
Europeanization – deepening security integration and pressing for a more prominent 
role in Eu external relations policy. 
Moreover, in the case of the arms trade, the commission has played a very 
prominent role in advancing the direction and level of arms sales; including directing 
research and development money. Balancing its role as a funder of defence research 
and development and yet a constraint on the proliferation of these technologies, the 
Commission is gaining state-like attributes. It is interesting to note that it has tacitly 
adopted the tensions inherent the state activity on the arms trade – the problem of 
promoting trade versus promoting arms control; a tension that resolves itself at the 
state level at promoting the sale of equipment unless there are compelling reasons 
not to.  
The final institutional set of actors within Europeanization are sectional and 
producer group interests. This research has argued that think-tanks and institutional 
interests – apart from large business interests – have very little influence over 
the Europeanization of defence, aside from to offer vocal support for the policies 
being pursued. The exception of business is made because of the influence of the 
major European arms manufacturers in directing the Europeanization of the arms 
trade, procurement and the continued securitization of homeland security. arms 
manufacturers have made use of state-private net orks at the domestic and European 
levels to ensure the policies at both these levels advance their interests. the British 
government, the European commission and parts of the European parliament have 
all elided their interests with the interest  of the major arms manufacturers. The 
success of the manufacturer’s strategy has been to tie their interests domestically 
to the relative success of the economy, and to Britain’s influence around the world; 
and supranationally to a cross-pillar agenda that makes arms sales a part of routine 
European trade. this study has further argued that the manufacturers are at the 
forefront of expanding their international horizons having successfully entered 
American defence markets (and vice-versa), which means they now effectively 
engage in a global trade that transcends the European. 
What all of these examples highlight is the extent to which sovereignty has been 
transferred, gifted or eroded from the control of national governments; and therefore 
this transfer is a key element of Europeanization. The EU is, at its core, a tool by 
which governments can express and secure their national interests; but as we have 
seen the influence of supra- and trans-national actors and interests can advance 
distinct European agendas over and above the core interests of national governments. 
When governments purposefully seek to transfer elements of their sovereignty to the 
EU they do so on the basis that this locks in governments, preventing defections 
from intergovernmental agreements and thus binding one legislature to another. 
the concept of sovereignty has played an important role in the European 
integration literature and in popular discourse about the UK’s role in the EU. In 
broad terms, sovereignty can be defined as what ties the international to the 
domestic through linking independence from outside interference (autonomy) with 
the government’s authority over its internal jurisdiction (Hinsley 1986, 158). this 
is also known as the ‘Westphalian System’ and as Francis Hinsley argues, ‘…these 
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Conclusion 145
two assertions are complementary. they are the inward and outward expressions, 
the obverse and reverse sides of the same idea.’ James Caporaso argues that the 
importance of Westphalian concepts of sovereignty are to demonstrate that domestic 
and international political systems are distinct and to also show how the domestic and 
international political systems interact with each other (caporaso, 1996, 26-52). this 
system is premised on the role of national boundaries and third party governments 
respecting the internal authority of their partner governments. this approach is limited 
when applied to the Eu because of the multiple levels of governance in the union as 
a product of the transfer of national sovereignty to supranational institutions. 
the creation and operation of the Eu is premised on the delegation and pooling 
of sovereignty. Indeed, many analysts like Tanja Börzel, James Caporaso, and 
liesbet hooghe have argued that an important consequence of European integration 
(and sovereignty transfer) is that the autonomy and authority f Eu governments is 
weakened (Börzel and Risse 2000, 45-59; Caporaso 1996, 29-52; Hooghe and Marks 
2001; risse-Kappen 1996, 53-80; sweet and sandholtz 1997, 297-317). approaches 
to sovereignty within the Eu have focused on the multi-levelled nature of actors and 
authority within the union. the constructivist approach has argued that sovereignty 
and statehood are inter-subjective rather than a description of facts (Jachtenfuchs 
1997, 43). Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks argue that, ‘..one does not have to argue 
that states are on the verge of political extinction to believe that their control of 
those living in their territories has significantly eakened’ (Hooghe and Marks 2001, 
27). Hooghe and Marks also argue that ‘authority’ rather than the competencies a 
government holds, is the crucial determinant of sovereignty (Hooghe and Marks 
2001, 5-6). Moreover, they argue that economic and political control by the Eu 
affects the ability of member governments to act and that governments cannot be said 
to be sovereign if the only competency they retain is the defence of their territory 
(Marks, Hooghe and Blank 1996, 431-378). Other multilevel governance theories, 
like that advanced by Ben Rosamond, describe the EU in broad terms encapsulating 
power relationships at different moments during policy formulation and negotiation. 
Analysis of these interchanges leads to Rosamond’s description of the EU as a 
‘polycentric polity’ – a political system with multiple sites of substantial political 
control (rosamond 1999).  
Alexander Wendt’s approach to the question of sovereignty is informed by 
practical considerations. he advances the argument that if governments deal with 
each other in a way that indicates they believe they are sovereign, they are (Wendt 
1992, 410). Furthermore, Wouter Werner and Jaap de Wilde argue that ‘…the reality 
of sovereignty consists in its use and acceptance’ (Werner and de Wilde 2001, 304). 
there is, therefore, no settled position concerning the Eu and national sovereignty 
but there is a growing and diverse literature on the subject. This research fits within 
the literature on Westphalian sovereignty because it argues that sovereignty transfer 
was a critical element in the British government’s negotiating positions concerning 
EsDp. it further suggests that in the post nice iGc era, and with the developments 
in the homeland security agenda, ‘Westphalian’ concepts of sovereignty within the 
Eu suffer from varying degrees of false consciousness. the ability of any European 
state to act autonomously in the defence sector – be it projecting military power, 
in procurement, or in homeland security – has been replaced by a complex set of 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy146
transnational interactions between governments, state agencies and industrial 
interests. Governments formally establish the arrangements through which most of 
these interactions take place; however the development of the Europeanized arms 
trade has highlighted how the European commission and manufacturers can do this 
outside of state-created institutions.  
the transfer of sovereignty from the British government to the Eu as a result of the 
ESDP negotiations was very limited. The key areas in which the transfer of defence 
and security sovereignty has occurred is in line with a liberal intergovernmentalist 
critique that EU negotiated outcomes reflect and codify informal arrangements 
between member governments.  Peacekeeping in the Balkans, for example, established 
good levels of cooperation between British and French armed forces in the field. The 
EsDp negotiations focused on issues where common interests lay. Examples of this 
lie in agreements which have already been reached on research, development and 
procurement projects through the single market provisions, resulting in projects like 
Eurofighter Typhoon. 
The significance of the Europeanization of defence lies in the potential it has 
to take European defence and security policy into areas where eventually larger 
transfers of sovereignty will occur. 
Formulating a Europeanized Defence Policy 
Domestic policy formulation has proved to be a rich area of inquiry for this research. 
The formulation of preferences and policies, to use Moravcsik’s taxonomy, is a 
crucial part of the formal Europeanization of domestic policy. it was particularly 
crucial in the negotiation of the EsDp 1998-2000; in which a convergence of British 
and french government preferences were required for negotiations to succeed. in 
the context of minor changes in British defence policy that have often taken years 
to finalize, the Saint Malo accords were completed with unusual haste. This speed 
was the product of the PM’s desire to announce publicly, a pro-European policy 
initiative that would be seen as credible to Britain’s European partners and his 
involvement in the policy – including resolving the debate between the fco and 
MoD – lends weight to the notion that Saint Malo was a cornerstone of Labour’s 
first term European policy. 
The preferences at the heart of Labour’s European defence policy have remained 
consistent across all the examples presented in this book. Their core desire – to be 
a ‘force for good’ in the world – is strained by the war in Iraq and by the supply 
of weapons to fragile regions, but on the government’s understanding of its own 
actions these policies remain consistent with this core goal. similarly, the preference 
for collaborative rather than unilateral defence ventures to build credible coalitions 
of the willing, constitutes another facet of the preferences behind ESDP, Britain’s 
international security commitments and the practice, but not necessarily the theory 
behind British arms trade policy.  
Stable, historical ‘preferences’ are an effective way to examine the formulation 
of British defence policy. the transatlantic security preference has driven the British 
government’s efforts to create an ESDP that supports, rather than undermines NATO; 
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motivates the government’s internal EU diplomacy, its decisions over Iraq and its 
procurement strategies. In the case of Saint Malo, the Cabinet Office, MoD and FCO 
officials invested a great deal of time in meetings with other EU government and 
US State Department officials to secure the continued pre-eminence of NATO to 
European security. if the saint Malo initiative was a fundamental shift of preferences 
– as some claim – it is unlikely that UK officials would have invested so much 
time ensuring that the trans-atlantic security guarantee was a prefix to every public 
announcement on this policy.
liberal intergovernmentalist approaches to Europeanization argue that that 
domestic policy is created through the rational aggregation, by government, of 
domestic interest group preferences. in the case of saint Malo and the EsDp these 
domestic interest groups were difficult to find, particularly given the evidence that 
the policies had been formulated by the core executive and then they had gone out to 
seek support for this new policy from key interest groups. The influence of interest 
groups on the saint Malo initiative domestically varied greatly, but the positioning 
of key policy officials was a crucial determinate in the progression of the policy. 
For example, Richard Hatfield, as the Policy Director of the MoD, is said to be the 
originating author of the Saint Malo initiative. The positioning of other officials 
involved in interdepartmental relations and advising the pM about policy, such as 
Emyr Jones-Parry as Policy Director of the FCO and Stephen Wall as the head of 
the European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office, were also important but less crucial. 
Although driven initially by the MoD the agreement of the Cabinet Office and FCO 
gave the initiative credibility and momentum within Whitehall, which facilitated its 
development for negotiation at the European council at nice. these developments 
were of course also assisted by the fortuitous positioning of key political allies like 
peter Mandelson, Minister without portfolio and George robertson, secretary of 
state for Defence (1997-1999) who offered cabinet level support for the initiative 
and on his personal staff, roger liddle, his personal political advisor (now of the 
European Commission), and within the Cabinet Office Stephen Wall who, as former 
UK ambassador to the EU, as able to offer keen insights into how the British 
negotiators would be able to deliver their package of measures. 
the analysis of domestic policy formulation within this study touches upon a 
growing body of literature on epistemic communities – ‘…agents working on a 
commonly acknowledged subset of knowledge issues and who at the very least 
accept a commonly understood procedural authority as essential to the success of 
their knowledge a tivities’ (Cowan and Foray 2000, 212-253).  The outcome from 
the Saint Malo initiatives were driven by a small group of influential actors within 
the MoD, FCO, Downing Street and European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office 
support the notion that the core executive was an epistemic community. the decision 
to go to war in iraq was similarly decided a small clique of the political, intelligence 
and civil service core executive, whilst the arms trade is run – at the Board room 
and political level – by a state-private network of interlocking and exchangeable 
arms manufacturers, Cabinet and Junior Ministers, and Ministry of Defence and 
Department of Trade and Industry Officials. Policy formulation at this micro-level 
brings out the politics of personalities and the role of well placed policy activists. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy148
however, without the structural context these micro-level analyses only tell part of 
the story. 
research on epistemic communities can be located within a broader literature 
concerning public administration that has focused on theories of networking, 
governance, institution building and cooperation. The work of James March and 
Johan Olsen has explored the impact of the infrastructure of political institutions and 
how this impacts on policy formulation (March and olsen 1984, 738; Weaver and 
Rockman 1993). Institutional explanations of policy-making argue that officials mould 
institutional policy preferences and that the importance of leadership provided by 
politicians and officials cannot be underplayed.  Moreover, Peter Haas has expanded 
the notion of community within these groups defining them as ‘…[A] network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and 
an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ 
(haas 1992, p.3). all the accounts of domestic policy formulation presented within 
this book can be analysed in these terms and locating these processes within this 
extant literature provides an avenue for future research. 
Sectional interest groups like the armed forces only had a limited role in the 
decision to adopt Europeanized defence policies. the armed forces were ostensibly 
ambivalent about the war in Iraq, seeking legal clarification before carrying out the 
invasion. The forces are a key element, in political and human resource terms in 
the arms trade’s state-private network and European military industrial complex. 
there is a growing body of evidence that despite their close involvement in research, 
development and procurement the British armed forces do not hold a great deal 
of influence over arms manufacturers or the procurement process (Page, 2006). 
Furthermore, Saint Malo would have been politically difficult for the PM to sign 
if the Chief of Defence Staff, Lord Guthrie, had been opposed to it, just as the Iraq 
campaign was made more problematic for the prime Minister by the request from 
admiral sir Michael Boyce about its legality.  
the preferences of commercial and manufacturing interest groups played a 
less significant role in the ESDP process than one might have reasonably expected 
– the evidence from the first few years of the ESDP reflects this; since defence 
manufacturers have benefi ed very little from it in terms of new orders. However, 
in the development of a Europeanized defence policy, and particularly in homeland 
security and counter-terrorism, the arms manufacturers, along with the European 
commission are playing a very large role in generating additional research and 
development proje ts and in providing procurement requirements. The overly 
‘securitized’ response from European governments to the perceived threat from 
terror has opened up these opportunities but the manufacturers have been very 
effective in using their insider position with the British government and the European 
commission to steer favourable outcomes on these issues.   
Sectional interest groups and analysts, like the Centre for Defence Studies, 
King’s College London, Bradford University’s Department of Peace Studies, the 
heritage foundation in the united states, the international security information 
service, Demos, rusi and the centre for European reform, continue to exert 
pressure and influence on UK government policy through publications, policy 
forums and informal meetings with politicians and officials engaged in UK defence 
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policy formulation. however, there is very little evidence that this pressure affects 
the British government’s approach to defence policy. Sympathetic hearings for 
government policy, such as that given by the Centre for European Reform’s Charles 
Grant to the saint Malo proposal and, for example, by two Demos reports to the 
commercial securitization of homeland security, merely provide favourable mood-
music to current initiatives (Demos 2005; Demos 2006). 
Intergovernmental Negotiations
intergovernmental bargaining is the second element of the formal Europeanization 
of British defence policy. the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective from 
which this book has been written highlights the rationality of governments when 
negotiating at the European level. following robert putnam this rationality occurs 
at the supranational and domestic levels, as he puts it ‘the two-level game’ (Putnam 
1992, 436).  The essence of his work is that governments negotiate to maximize 
their national interests in an issue specific area or across a broad range of issues but 
that any agreement struck between governments must also satisfy interests within 
domestic constituencies. in short, no national government can negotiate and agree to 
measures that jeopardize the electoral survival of the government.
a practical example of this comes through the series of informal negotiations 
between the uK and french governments, particularly the respective British and 
french Ministries of Defence, which were based on a series of lowest common 
denominator agreements (Walter 2003).1 however, this is not the case for the multiple 
bi-lateral negotiations between UK officials bargaining with officials from other EU 
governments. this type of negotiation developed along higher than lower common 
denominator lines, because vetoes were likely to be used in security and defence 
policy if the proposed agreement went beyond a perceived domestic win-set.  
Similarly, issue linkage, log-rolling and side-payment negotiating tools were 
not present in the EsDp negotiations at nice, although the negotiated outcome was 
greater than lowest common denominator because less influential governments were 
able to incorporate these in the final policy without disrupting the core tenets of the 
agreement. however, a fundamental reality of this type of government behaviour 
is the political judgment of what is and is not electorally significant. The decision 
to go to war with iraq prompted a large public response – over a million people 
marched through london on february 16 2003 – and received a similarly severe 
response from European heads of state. nevertheless, the prime Minister and his 
government judged correctly that the war with Iraq would not cost them the 2005 
General Election.  
When it comes to the formal Europeanization of defence, governments are the 
principal units in the international system but not all governments have the same 
influence over the direction of European negotiations. Their influence is determined 
by their respective interest in security and defence policy, their ability to project their 
1  this conclusion feeds into an emerging niche political literature in German political 
science known as ‘Durchwelsten’ which argues that policy formulation is an iterative product 
of successive lowest common denominator agreements. 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy150
preferences and create coalitions of governments around a policy area. Evidence of 
this is provided by the agreed texts at saint Malo and the presidency conclusions 
of the European Council at Nice that outline the ESDP – the final negotiated output 
remained very faithful to the spirit of the original text – a point that was highlighted 
by key members of the British negotiating team in interview evidence. In the case 
of the EsDp the European commission and parliament had particular views which 
they asserted in the General affairs council at nice but which were excluded by the 
member governments from the informal bi- and multi-lateral negotiations between 
the government on ESDP. However, once the ESDP framework was established the 
European commission and parliament have been able to exert some useful pressure 
in shaping the direction of ESDP, through the extension of peacekeeping and peace 
support operations in Africa (through Operation Artemis) and in the Balkans. 
the self-created perception of defence as an area of core sovereignty meant 
that the negotiating parameters established by the British nd french MoD and 
Foreign Office negotiating teams were extremely difficult to break. The absence 
of persuasive interest groups opposing the policy and a very large parliamentary 
majority gave UK negotiators considerable leeway. The red-lines established by 
the UK core executive were difficult to breach partly because of a self-imposed 
discipline and partly because of the public expression of these red-lines by the fco. 
the outcome of saint Malo, which was exceptional within post-second world war 
and Eu history, was a lowest common denominator agreement between france and 
the uK. the common interests between the french and uK governments were, for 
some interviewees, surprisingly considerable and enough to create a substantive 
policy initiative. to achieve convergence between the other Eu governments at the 
nice European council, the original saint Malo outcome was extended through 
allowing policy tools to be added to the final agreement by post-neutral countries 
like Ireland and Sweden such as humanitarian and peace support roles. 
the negotiated EsDp therefore provides a lowest common denominator 
agreement between all the European governments, as the presidency conclusions 
did not breach any of their fundamental preferences. importantly, then, the saint 
Malo negotiations were the crucial moment in the development of the EsDp, rather 
than the iGc at nice, which would be a more natural site of substantive progress. 
Whilst governments were still the principal players in these negotiations it reduces 
the importance of the iGc in the formal Europeanization of defence and means 
that researchers should focus more sharply on the meetings that lead up to iGc 
negotiations.    
Governments act as gatekeepers between the domestic and international 
bargaining tables. The evidence from the case studies presented in this book strongly 
supports this view. This gatekeeper role serves to keep domestic political actors from 
the international bargaining table. the negotiations at the nice European council 
were conducted by a small cadre of negotiators from the Cabinet Office, COREPER, 
fco and MoD. these negotiators were few in number and acted on behalf of their 
departments with delegated authority around the red-lines established by the pM 
and core executive. These negotiators would only refer back to their department 
when they felt an issue was close to the agreed red-lines or was an area without 
an established departmental position. aside from these narrow circumstances the 
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officials and ministers acting as negotiators operated in a vacuum with control over 
the flow of information back to their home departments. 
Neither parliamentarians, nor Labour party officials were kept informed of how 
the negotiations were proceeding. the co-ordination between the uK MoD, fco, 
Downing Street, European Secretariat of the Cabinet Office and UKREP before the 
nice negotiations (february-December 2000) clearly established British negotiating 
positions. the uK negotiating team placed great emphasis on the coordination of 
the negotiating strands, through COREPER, and in briefing the political negotiators 
about the issue area and how British interests might be maximized. this research 
strongly suggested that the uK negotiating team acted in a closely coordinated 
way facilitating their role as a gatekeeper between the domestic and international 
bargaining table.  
EsDp was negotiated separately from the institutional and procedural reforms 
that were a significant part of the business at the Nice European Council and there 
was therefore, very little issue linkage. Evidence from the British negotiating team 
at nice suggested that the negotiations concerning EsDp were all but concluded 
before the final four days of the IGC at Nice (7-11 December 2000).  The gatekeeper 
role was also present when the British government held the presidency of the Eu in 
2005, although the development of the EsDp and the processes behind the European 
arm trade highlight how supra- and trans-national actors are able to circumvent 
the gatekeeper role of government by deepening integration without going back to 
governments’ for successive permissions. 
in the formal Europeanization of defence policy – through treaty amendment 
– not only are governments the principal actors in the international system, but the 
Eu is merely a forum through which the co-ordination of national policies can be 
regulated by a third party without needing to continually create new agreements. 
an important function of EsDp is that it serves as a way of avoiding having to 
create new agreements between overnments for each new piece of defence policy 
collaboration. in EsDp this should be limited because of the scope of operations 
that can be conducted in the policy’s name; however where defence policy takes 
on cross-pillar dimensions (notably with the arms trade and homeland security) a 
greater degree of control over policies is vested within the supranational institutions 
of the Eu.
A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Revival? 
This book has been written from a liberal intergovernmentalist slant, because 
this approach offers the largest number of analytical assumptions and hypotheses 
about Europeanization. This approach has been subject to a number of theoretical 
critiques (Budden 2002; young 1999, 805-10; Diez 1999; Wincott 1995; forster 
1998; c poraso, scharpf and Wallace 1999). some of the criticisms in the extant 
literature have argued that international negotiations are not a process in which 
governments try to maximize national interests in each issue area. furthermore, they 
argue that negotiators are willing to accept disadvantageous negotiations on some 
issues providing that the entire negotiated package has more potential benefits than 
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costs (peterson and Bomberg 1999; richardson 1996, 14-24). these criticisms have 
not been validated by the example of the EsDp negotiations. 
philip Budden, anthony forster and helen Wallace have argued that li fails 
to take full account of the role of the EU’s supranational institutions and does not 
adequately explain the process by which governments formulate policy (Budden 
2002; Forster 1999). The evidence presented in this book reinforces and extends 
these views. in the case of the EsDp, British domestic policy formulation was not 
a process by which governments aggregate the preferences of domestic interest 
groups. 
rather, it was a process in which the core executive, in the context of positive 
externalities and an ideological platform, created a distinctive policy goal and then 
sought support from domestic producer groups. this research has highlighted that 
the formulation of British defence policy was not motivated by the preferences 
of domestic producer groups but was driven by a core executive of officials and 
politicians in Downing street, the MoD and fco. furthermore, the European 
Commission and European Parliament (through key actors) have been able to advance 
Europeanized defence initiatives outside of the control of national governments – 
which suggests that greater attention needs to be paid to the commission as an actor 
in Europeanization. this conclusion adds to the analysis of Budden and forster who 
argue that LI’s account of domestic policy formulation is inadequate and requires 
theoretical correctives.
The question of whether this book provides a revival of liberal intergovernmentalist 
theory overstates the case somewhat. liberal intergovernmentalist approaches provide 
a useful way to analyse Europeanization – it is important to explore the domestic 
and European dimensions within Europeanization, which actors and institutions are 
involved and the behaviours they adopt. Where the approach falls short is in under-
estimating the influence of the EU’s central institutions, and the linkages between 
very different aspects of Eu policy on governments and negotiators. however, 
in suggesting patterns of behaviour amongst government officials and politicians 
this approach is highly informative, and importantly highly testable, opening up 
possibilities to conduct interesting empirical research on important Europeanization 
issues. 
Europeanized Defence? 
When British and french negotiators began their dialogue in 1997 – that resulted 
in the EsDp – all options were possible. for the french government, the utopia in 
1997 of a European army and a common European defence separate from nato 
was a theoretical possibility. for the British this dystopia was to be avoided at 
all costs. the British preference was for a European force that could support the 
americans in wars of choice and show the Eu to be capable of resolving issues on 
its own backdoor. Several years on and the path of ESDP now seems set; NATO 
is the pre-eminent security institution within Europe and the Eu, acting in its own 
name, performs peace-keeping, peace-support and advanced policing roles. As 
part of a broader security identity it has been at the forefront of arms control and 
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actions against landmines, as well as to provide force multiplication assistance to 
areas under post-conflict reconstruction. In these areas integration and operational 
experience has deepened, but not widened in the intervening time. this is not the 
case in procurement and homeland security where Europeanization has both widened 
and deepened at the behest of the European commission, the European Defence 
agency and the manufacturers, assisted by states that have radically securitized their 
policing and counter-terror agendas.  
the great fear of eurosceptics, certainly in Britain, is that even the relatively 
small step that ESDP represents will result in a fully fledged European army and 
collective European defence. This simply has not been borne out by the first four 
years of the EsDp in operation. the us-uK war against iraq has made collective 
EU military action – outside of NATO structures – problematic and looks likely to 
have consigned the EsDp into its peace-support activities for the medium term, at 
least. However, in the field of counter-terrorism and homeland security there are 
strong signs of Europeanization – through the proliferation of common practices and 
procurement. 
A Europeanizing Future?
the example of the Europeanization of British defence policy has illuminated 
wider trends in the transformation of the British state and the European union. 
away from the excitable rhetoric of eurosceptic newspapers and politicians, the 
European commission and European parliament are gaining a foothold in the 
provision of defence and security in the Eu area. it is clear that governments 
remain the final arbiters of all that goes on in the EU – all states retain the right 
to repeal their accession to the Eur pean union and mostly have the right to veto 
provisions or to not sign treaty amendments that extend European powers. however, 
Europeanization is only partly about big treaty-based advances; it is mostly about 
small amendments, institutional tweaks and subtle developments. Certainly in 
the defence sphere European governments have absolute control over the large 
treaty-based developments. The codification of the ESDP at Nice was a triumph of 
anglo-french diplomacy that saw a meaningful convergence of national interests. 
once treaty amendments are enacted, however, there are opportunities through 
entrepreneurial activism or through bureaucratic inertia for Europeanization to be 
deepened. 
The specifics of the ESDP and the arms trade demonstrate the extent to which the 
EU institutions and big business can shape Europeanization. In this specific example 
the ‘securitization’ of domestic policing and counter-terrorism policies has allowed 
manufacturers and the European commission to advance a Europeanized industry in 
advanced policing and surveillance technologies. 
finally, the real question that comes out of studies into Europeanization and 
the public’s perception of these developments is the extent to which we are less 
British now, that the British government has less control of its or our collective 
destiny because of advances in the European project. The answer to this, rather large 
question, is that whilst a ‘golden age’ of state autonomy has in all probability never 
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Europeanization of British Defence Policy154
existed, and the British people and its government are subject to the influence, and 
pressure of supranational and transnational political and economic concerns, both in 
its domestic and European policies. the business of government has undoubtedly 
changed since the UK’s entry to the EEC in 1972. Greater consideration has to be 
given to the decisions of an external body, and implemented into national law, even 
if this against the national interest. 
in a softer way, the British way of doing politics has been forced to recognize 
a European way of working. The extent to which these realities affect ‘British’ or 
‘European’ identities is less clear – the man on the street in Bristol still feels British 
and still has his British customs; even though he might eat food inspired by the 
Indian sub-continent and drink coffee inspired by the Turks. The transformation of 
the British state, certainly in defence, but perhaps on other issues as well, lies in the 
realization that independent state action is no longer as important as collective state 
action. how effectively the uK formulates partnerships within the Eu, and uploads 
it preferences into the supranational level is now more important than its actions as 
a unitary state. this is the real lesson of Europeanization.  
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